Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

L.H. Bolduc Company, Inc. (Bolduc) was the subcontractor of Engineering and Construction Innovations, Inc. (ECI). Bolduc damaged a sewer pipe while working on a construction project. ECI repaired the damage and sought reimbursement from Bolduc's insurer, The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut (Travelers) under an endorsement to Bolduc's policy naming ECI as an additional insured for liability caused by acts or omissions of Bolduc. Travelers denied coverage. ECI subsequently sued Bolduc and Travelers (collectively, Appellants) for negligence and breach of contract. A jury found that Bolduc was not negligent, and the district court granted summary judgment for Appellants on ECI's breach of contract claims, concluding that Appellants had no obligation to reimburse ECI for damages not caused by Bolduc. The court of appeals reversed, determining (1) ECI was entitled to coverage as an additional insured without regard to Bolduc's fault; and (2) Bolduc was required to indemnity ECI. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ECI did not qualify as an additional insured with respect to the pipe damage; and (2) Bolduc could not be required to indemnify ECI without violating Minn. Stat. 337.02, which prohibits indemnification for the fault of others in construction contracts. View "Eng'g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Homeowners obtained a default judgment against an LLC. Although the LLC's manager (Manager) was listed as an individual defendant, the default was only against the LLC. A partial satisfaction of the judgment was later entered. Afterwards, the trial court issued an order stating that any other claims against Manager were dismissed with prejudice. Later, LLC unsuccessfully challenged the amount of the partial satisfaction of judgment. Thereafter, Manager, individually and on behalf of the LLC, filed a notice of appeal appealing four separate orders made in the case. Homeowners moved to dismiss, arguing that the appeal was untimely, Manager was not an attorney and could not represent the LLC, and Manager was not an aggrieved party. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the appeal of three of the orders was untimely; (2) a non-licensed attorney is not permitted to appear pro se to represent an LLC; and (3) because all of the claims against Manager were dismissed, he was not an aggrieved party and could not appeal the remaining order, the partial satisfaction of judgment order. View "Smith v. Rustic Home Builders, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a construction contract dispute between Total Industrial Plant Services, Inc. (TIPS) and Turner Industries Group, LLC (Turner). Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) was the surety for Turner's substitution bond filed in lieu of TIPS's construction lien. TIPS filed a complaint against Turner and Fidelity, alleging various causes of action. The trial court granted TIPS's motion for partial summary judgment and ordered Turner to return the retainage it had withheld. After a trial, the district court found in favor of Defendants and dismissed TIPS's remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying TIPS's claim for additional compensation under a theory of either quantum meruit or breach of contract; (2) failing to find that TIPS was the prevailing party and awarding costs and fees to Turner; (3) finding TIPS's construction lien was barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations; (4) granting partial summary judgment to TIPS and ordering Turner to return the retainage; and (5) dismissing Turner's bill of costs for being untimely. The Court, however, found the district court erred by denying TIPS prejudgment interest on the retainage. Remanded. View "Total Indust. Plant Servs. v. Turner Indust. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1987, Waterfront purchased 5.3 acres in Philadelphia’s Central Riverfront District, zoned G-2 industrial. In exchange for rezoning to C-4 commercial, for a mixed-use, high-rise project, Waterfront agreed to restrictive covenants. When financing became possible in 2005, Waterfront obtained a permit for demolishing existing structures and constructing a 28-story apartment tower and entered into a financing agreement with a construction start date of February 2006. Waterfront had to postpone construction. In March 2006, the city extended to the site a zoning overlay with a height restriction of 65 feet and a width restriction of 70 feet. Waterfront alleged mistake; that the area councilman admitted that inclusion of the site was a mistake; and that Mayor Street stated that he would not have signed it had he known that the height restriction applied to the site. Waterfront unsuccessfully sought repeal, but never applied for a permit under the ordinance and did not seek a variance. Waterfront filed suit. In 2010 the city rescinded application of the height restriction. The district court held that the rescission mooted federal constitutional claims, denied Waterfront’s motion to amend to attack the width restriction, and granted the city summary judgment on all other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Forrest Construction was the named insured on a commercial general liability policy with Cincinnati Insurance. In 2004, Forrest was hired toconstruct a home for the Laughlins. A dispute arose over the amount owed and Forrest filed suit. The Laughlins counter-sued based on alleged defects in the workmanship of the construction, particularly the foundation. Forrest notified Cincinnati Insurance of the counter-complaint and requested defense. Cincinnati Insurance based its denial on an exclusion in the policy for work done by the insured its position that the underlying complaint did not allege damage caused by a subcontractor, thereby rendering the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion inapplicable. Forrest sued, alleging breach of contract, bad-faith denial, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The district court found that Cincinnati Insurance had breached its contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Cincinnati Insurance was given sufficient notice of the facts giving rise to its obligation to defend and that, under Tennessee law, “property damage” occurs when one component (here, the faulty foundation) of a finished product (the house) damages another component. View "Forrest Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Arbor builds homes in Indiana and contracted with Willmez Plumbing, which was to obtain insurance naming Arbor as an additional insured. Willmez subcontracted to Alarcon. After the work was ostensibly completed, the buyers noticed a foul odor and felt ill. Alarcon had not connected the plumbing to the main sewer line. Raw sewage had discharged into the crawl space. Willmez corrected the connection. Arbor contracted for cleanup that required excavation and decontamination and cost about $65,000. The owners demanded replacement of the house. Arbor told Willmez to notify its insurer West Bend. Hearing nothing, Arbor assumed the insurer had no objections and agreed to build a new home, pay closing costs and moving expenses, and to compensate for any increase in mortgage rate. Arbor sued Willmez, alleging negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and constructive fraud, and sent West Bend a copy. The district court granted West Bend summary judgment, finding that it was relieved of duties to defend or indemnify by “fungi and bacteria exclusion” and “voluntary payments” provisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Arbor’s quick and decisive action was laudable, failure to obtain West Bend’s consent to the settlement relieved it of any obligation. View "West Bend Mut.l Ins. Co v. Arbor Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a developer, helped construct a planned development (the "community"). The community HOA sued the developers, sellers, and builders of the development, including Petitioner, on behalf of the individual homeowners, alleging construction-defect-based claims for breach of implied and express warranties and negligence. Thereafter, the community HOA filed a motion for the district court to determine that its claims satisfied the class action requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded that the HOA did not need to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and thus allowed the action to proceed without conducting a class action analysis. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition, claiming that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to undertake a class action analysis. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition to the extent that it directed the district court to analyze the Rule 23 factors in this case. In so doing, the Court clarified the application of D.R. Horton v. District Court when a homeowners' association seeks to litigate construction-defect claims on behalf of its members under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d). View "Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

A pipeline owner (Owner) purchased sixty-eight mile-long pipeline constructed in the 1940s and made plans to remove the old pipeline and construct a new one that would carry butane. Owner awarded Contractor the contract to replace a certain section of the pipeline. After Contractor commenced work, Contractor filed suit against Owner for breach of contract and fraud based on Owner's failure to locate several hundred "foreign crossings" in the pipeline's path and its subsequent refusal to compensate Contractor for its additional expenses resulting from the obstacles. The trial court found in favor of Owner, finding that the parties' contract allocated the risk of any additional cost incurred because of foreign crossings to Contractor. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Owner failed to exercise due diligence in locating the foreign crossings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the contract allocated all risk to Contractor for unknown obstacles discovered during the construction process; and (2) the jury's answers to questions about Contractor's recovery for breach of contract based on due diligence were immaterial. View "El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on an action to recover damages from a well driller who drilled a well that later caved in. The district court granted the well driller's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the alleged claims of negligence and breach of contract were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and the court dismissed the action. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that the breach of contract claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations and that the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling" on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Assurance Company of America a "builder's risk" insurance policy and contracted with Wehr Constructors for installation of subsurfaces and floors as part its project. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface done by Wehr was damaged. Hospital sought recompense under the builders risk policy. Assurance denied the claim. Meanwhile, Wehr and Hospital settled on Wehr's breach of contract claim. As part of the settlement, Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim Hospital had against Assurance arising out of the policy. Wehr, as Hospital's assignee, then sued Assurance in federal district court. Assurance moved for judgment on the pleadings, invoking the policy's anti-assignment provision and arguing that it had not consented to the assignment. The district court requested certification to answer a question of Kentucky law. The Supreme Court concluded that under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law