Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This dispute centered on a contract for the construction of a residence. The contract between the general contractor (Contractor) and the owners (Owners) was contingent upon Owners obtaining financing. After construction was completed, Contractor asserted a materialman's lien on the house, arguing that Owners had refused to fully compensate Contractor. After Owners filed suit to protest the lien, the parties agreed to discharge the lien. Contractor later sued Owners based on Owners' failure to disclose that they had obtained inadequate financing. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Contractor's claims were statutorily barred for failure to strictly comply with requirements for the notice of its lien. The order was silent as to the other two grounds Owners had asserted for dismissal and with respect to any of the arguments raised in defense of Owners' motion to dismiss. Contractor appealed, arguing reversal based on other arguments raised below but not ruled on. The Supreme Court affirmed, as (1) the circuit court did not provide a ruling on Contractor's first three arguments, and they were therefore not preserved for appellate review; and (2) Contractor's fourth argument had no merit given the Court's summary affirmance on the first three points. View "TEMCO Constr., LLC v. Gann" on Justia Law

Caliber Builders, Inc., sought to develop a parcel of land commonly referred to as "Golden Orchards." A small portion of the parcel is in Washington Township, but the bulk of it is in the Borough of Hillsdale, where it is included in the residential (R-2) zone. Intending of constructing an age-restricted housing development, which was a conditional use in the R-2 zone, Caliber submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Hillsdale Planning Board. Plaintiff Northgate Condominium Association, Inc., manages and operates a previously-existing condominium community built on an adjacent parcel of land in Washington Township. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the lot designations contained in the notice of public hearings on an application for a conditional use approval sufficiently complied with the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law to confer jurisdiction on the Planning Board, and whether the project design of the internal roadway complied with requirements of the Residential Site Improvement Standards. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the developer's notice of public hearings, although using lot numbers that were not included on the official tax map, did not misidentify the lot to be developed, complied with the provisions of the Municipal Land Use Law, and conferred jurisdiction on the Planning Board. "Plaintiff fail[ed] to point to anything in the record supporting its claim that the project design of the internal roadway did not comply with density requirements under the Residential Site Improvement Standards." View "Northgate Condominium Association, Inc. v. Borough of Hillsdale Planning Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's order that upheld an arbitration award. The underlying dispute arose from a construction contract whereby general contractor respondent C-Sculptures, LLC agreed to build a home for Petitioners Gregory and Kerry Brown. The contract price was in excess of $800,000. However, Respondent only possessed what is referred to as a Group II license, limiting Respondent to construction projects that did not exceed $100,000. A dispute arose between the parties, and Respondent filed an action in circuit court seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against Petitioners. Upon Petitioners' motion and pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' contract, the circuit court matter was stayed pending arbitration. Petitioners sought to have the matter dismissed after they learned Respondent held only a Group II license. The arbitrator was apprised of the applicable law, but nevertheless denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss "after due consideration of all the evidence and authorities presented by the parties in this Arbitration." Respondent prevailed at arbitration, receiving an award of damages and an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 29-5-10(b) (Supp. 2012). Petitioners challenged the arbitration award, contending the arbitrator's denial of their motion to dismiss amounted to a manifest disregard of the law. Following adverse decisions in the circuit court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. Petitioners argue the court of appeals erred in refusing to find the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in declining to dismiss the action. Upon review, the Court agreed, and reversed the appellate court and directed that judgment be entered for Petitioners. View "C-Sculptures v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Stanley Taylor appealed his convictions on: eighteen counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct Against a Child by a Sex Offender; one count of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct Against a Child by a Sex Offender; and two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. The indictment was based on allegations that Defendant engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with his two minor step-granddaughters. To avoid prejudice to Defendant, the sex offender element of his crimes was redacted from the indictment and a separate bench trial was held on that element after the jury returned its verdict. The State dismissed five counts at the close of the evidence. The jury was ultimately left to consider the following charges: four counts of Rape in the First Degree; four counts of Rape in the Second Degree; seven counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child; one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child; and one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. Defendant was found guilty of all of the offenses presented to the jury. Thereafter, in a bench trial, the Superior Court found that Defendant was a registered sex offender at the time of the offenses, resulting in guilty verdicts on all of the sex offender charges. Defendant was sentenced to eight life sentences, plus an additional 225 years of incarceration. Defendant has raised four arguments in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) that the prosecutor made an improper closing argument that jeopardized the fairness and integrity of his trial; (2) that the trial judge abused his discretion and violated Defendant's right to a fair trial when, despite Defendant's request, he refused to strike allegedly irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimonial evidence by a nurse; (3) the trial judge abused his discretion when he allowed the jury to view one of the complainant's out-of-court statements; and (4) the cumulative impact of all of the errors amounts to plain error. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that each of Defendant's first three assignments of error were without merit. Accordingly, there was no cumulative impact amounting to plain error. View "Taylor v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Steel institute appealed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of its complaint, which alleged that the City's regulation of cranes and other hoisting equipment was preempted by federal law. The court granted some weight to OSHA's view in reaching its conclusion that local regulatory schemes such as the City's crane regulations have the aim and primary effect of regulating conduct to secure the safety of the general public, rather than the safety of workers in the workplace. Therefore, the City's crane regulations were saved from preemption as laws of general applicability and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Steel Institute of New York v. City of New York" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Secretary appealed the district court's order granting Odebrecht a preliminary injunction barring the Department's enforcement of a Florida law known as the Cuba Amendment, 2012 Fla. Laws 196, section 2. The Amendment prevented any company that did business in Cuba - or that was in any way related to a company that did business in Cuba - from bidding on state or local public contracts in the State of Florida. The court concluded that Odebrecht has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on its claim that the Cuba Amendment violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution under principles of conflict preemption; Odebrecht would have suffered irreparable harm absent the injunction; the balance of harms strongly favored the injunction; and the injunction did not disserve the public interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Odebrecht Construction, Inc. v. Secretary, FL DOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this suit against the City and County of Honolulu and the State, challenging the approval of a rail project and arguing that state law required that an archaeological inventory survey be completed prior to any approval or commencement of the project. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and State on all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment on Plaintiff's claims that challenged the rail project under Haw. Rev. Stat. 6E and remanded. Plaintiff subsequently requested that the Supreme Court award $255,158 in attorney's fees and $2,510 in costs against the City and State for work performed in the trial court. The Supreme Court (1) granted Plaintiff's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs against the City in the amount of $41,192 in attorney's fees and $343 in costs; (2) and denied Plaintiff's request for trial level fees and costs without prejudice, as Plaintiff's request for fees and costs attributable to work performed at the trial level was more properly within the trial court's discretion. View "Kaleikini v. Yoshioka" on Justia Law

This litigation stemmed from a dispute over monies allegedly owed to a now-defunct corporation for work performed as part of a construction project that took place in 1990. Plaintiff corporation instituted suit about twenty-two years ago. Seventeen years later, the superior court dismissed the action, finding that Plaintiff could neither maintain the action in its own name nor substitute another entity as Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as a defunct corporation, Plaintiff could no longer maintain this action in its own name, and because the receiver was discharged when Plaintiff was dissolved, the receiver could not maintain the action on its behalf. View "Piccoli & Sons, Inc. v. E & C Constr. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

A construction company and its principals (collectively, Appellants) hired a plumbing company (Peters), excavation company (Bostic), and marble company (Esquire) as subcontractors for the construction of Appellants' home. After Buyers purchased the home, Buyers filed a complaint against Appellants, alleging negligence and breach of the implied warranties of habitability, sound workmanship, and proper construction. Appellants filed a third-party complaint against Peters, Bostic, and Esquire, alleging several causes of action. Bostic subsequently filed cross-claims against Peters, and Peters filed cross-claims against both Bostic and Esquire. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) granted Peters' motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, (2) granted summary judgment for Bostic on Peters' cross-claim, and (3) granted Esquire's motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not been entered disposing of all the claims. View "J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd." on Justia Law

The State contracted with a general contractor (Contractor) to complete the renovation of an elementary school. The project required extensive glazing work, specifically, the fabrication and installation of jalousie windows. Contractor held a C-5 specialty license in cabinet, millwork, and carpentry remodeling and repairs, but it did not hold a specialty glazing license. The Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs' (DCCA) Contractors License Board (Board) determined that Contractor could complete the jalousie window work pursuant to its C-5 license. Specifically, the Board determined that the jalousie window work qualified as "incidental and supplemental" to the remodeling and repair work authorized under Contractor's C-5 license. The circuit court and intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts, holding that because the Board did not consider the cost and extent of the jalousie window work when determining if that work qualified as "incidental and supplemental" to the project, the Board's interpretation of the "incidental and supplemental" exception was contrary to law and to the primary purpose of the legislation regarding contractor licensing. Remanded. View "Dist. Council 50 of Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Lopez" on Justia Law