Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Tharaldson Ethanol Plant I, LLC and Tharaldson Financial Group, Inc. appealed a judgment and amended judgment ordering Tharaldson Financial to pay VEI Global, Inc., $1,150,000 plus interest, and an order granting certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). VEI provided design and construction management services for an ethanol plant owned and operated by Tharaldson Ethanol. In 2009, Tharaldson Ethanol and VEI reached a settlement on disputed fees, agreeing Tharaldson Ethanol would pay VEI $1,350,000 for all work VEI performed through February 28, 2009. The agreement also provided Tharaldson Financial would enter into a $1,350,000 promissory note payable to VEI, and a copy of the note was attached and incorporated into the agreement. Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial sued VEI, claiming VEI negligently designed and constructed the ethanol plant. The complaint sought damages for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence claims; and sought a declaratory judgment that Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial did not owe VEI anything under the settlement agreement or promissory note because of damages VEI caused by its breaches of contract and warranty and other wrongful acts. VEI answered and counterclaimed, including a breach of contract claim against Tharaldson Financial for failing to make payments on the promissory note. The district court ultimately granted VEI's motion for partial summary judgment, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact and VEI was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and ordered VEI was entitled to judgment against Tharaldson Financial in the amount of $1,150,000, with interest. The Supreme Court dismissed Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial's appeal, holding that "[c]ertification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) must be reserved for 'the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.'" The Court concluded this case did not present "out-of-the-ordinary circumstances" or the "infrequent harsh case" warranting its immediate review. Consequently, the Court did not reach the merits of Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial's appeal. View "Tharaldson Ethanol Plant I, LLC v. VEI Global, Inc." on Justia Law

In order to renovate a former warehouse building into administrative offices, Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation (“School Corporation”) implemented a plan to convey the Building to the EVSC Foundation (“Foundation”), a private non-profit entity, have the Foundation contract with a contractor for the renovations, and then have the Foundation sell the Building back to the School Corporation. School Corporation officials selected this arrangement because the Foundation was not subject to public bidding laws, and therefore, the renovation could occur more quickly. Plaintiffs, several area contracting businesses paying taxes in the school district, filed an action against the School Corporation and the Foundation (together, “Defendants”) claiming that Defendants violated public bidding statutes and Indiana’s Antitrust Act. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the School Corporation engaged in the transactions to circumvent the public bidding statutes but that the transactions were not unlawful. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the project violated the Public Bidding Laws. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that the scheme used by Defendants violated the Public Bidding Laws; and (2) concluded that Plaintiffs' antitrust claim failed because Plaintiffs did not present evidence of an antitrust injury. View "Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Technica, a subcontractor on a federal construction project in California, filed suit under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131-3134, against Candelaria, the prime contractor, and its surety CCIC. On appeal, Technica challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Supreme Court and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that rights and remedies under the Miller Act may not be conditioned by state laws. The court applied their reasoning and held that the limitation in California Business and Professions Code 7031(a) on the right of a non-licensed contractor to maintain an action for collection of unpaid services did not apply to an action under the Miller Act. Because the California licensing requirement is not a defense to a claim under the Miller Act, the court need not address whether Technica falls within the labor provider exception to the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded. View "Technica LLC v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Consumers Energy entered into a Purchase Order, under which DynaSteel, operating in Tennessee and Mississippi, would fabricate ductwork for shipment to an Essexville, Michigan power plant for installation by a third party. The PO contained a Michigan choice-of-law provision. Consumers was to pay $10,634,755. PCI, with locations in Kansas and Tennessee, was to supply the insulation requested by Consumers for $1,842,890. The contract between DynaSteel and PCI contained a Tennessee choice-of-law provision. As the project progressed, Consumers paid DynaSteel $2.9 million, but DynaSteel did not pay PCI $1,542,890 it owed. DynaSteel also owed PCI more than $3.2 million for other projects. DynaSteel allegedly comingled Consumer’s payments with funds from other projects. Under a “Payment Plan Proposal,” DynaSteel was to make payments, which would apply to the unpaid orders in chronological order (the Consumers project came last in this order). The PPP did not contain a choice-of-law provision. DynaSteel paid PCI $2.1 million, which satisfied its obligations concerning the other projects, but did not fulfill its obligation as to the Consumers project. PCI sued in Michigan, alleging that DynaSteel violated the Michigan Builders Trust Fund Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Dynasteel, reasoning that the PO between PCI and DynaSteel was controlling, that the Tennessee choice-of-law provision was binding, and that the Trust Fund Act did not apply extraterritorially by its own force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Performance Contracting Inc. v. Dynasteel Corp." on Justia Law

Century Steel and Pacific Coast Steel (PCS) filed third- and fourth-party complaints and amended complaints against Converse Professional Group after being brought into commercial construction litigation as defendants. PCS and Century, subcontractors whose work Converse had inspected, sought to recover damages that allegedly arose from the deficient performance of Converse's services. Converse filed motions to dismiss the complaints, asserting that the initial pleadings were void ab initio and could not be cured by the amended pleadings because PCS and Century failed to file an attorney affidavit and expert report that Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258 requires for actions involving nonresidential construction. The district court denied the motions after expressing concern that Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.259 could require dismissing the entire litigation. The Supreme Court granted Converse's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the dismissal of the amended pleadings, holding (1) PCS's and Century's pleadings subjected them to section 11.258's attorney affidavit and expert report requirements; and (2) the Otak Nevada, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court court correctly construed section 11.259(1) as requiring the dismissal of an amended pleading, rather than the entire action, that followed an initial pleading that was filed without adhering to section 11.258.View "In re CityCenter Constr. & Lien Litig." on Justia Law

Defendant general contractor Super One, Inc., and various subcontractors, including defendant subcontractor T. T. & L. Sheet Metal, Inc., contracted with VIP's Industries, Inc. and VIP's Motor Inns, Inc. (VIP's) to build a hotel. Defendants began work in 1996. In early 1997, VIP's posted a "completion notice" pursuant to ORS 87.045. On or about that same date, VIP's also obtained a certificate for temporary occupancy and began accepting paying guests. However, a Certificate of Substantial Completion was not issued by the architect or accepted by VIP's as had been contemplated by the contract between the parties. After the date on which VIP's posted the completion notice, defendants continued to perform construction work. The county issued a certificate of final occupancy later that year. In 2006, plaintiff purchased the hotel and soon thereafter allegedly discovered damage. Plaintiff filed an action against defendants for negligence, nuisance, and trespass in 2007, a date more than 10 years after the posting of the completion notice but less than 10 years after the issuance of the certificate of final occupancy. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred by ORS 12.135. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term "substantial completion" as used in ORS 12.135. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "PIH Beaverton, LLC v. Super One, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sunset Presbyterian Church contracted with defendant Brockamp & Jaeger to act as its general contractor and build a new church facility. Defendant then subcontracted with Anderson Roofing Company and other subcontractors to perform various specialized construction tasks. Plaintiff did not enter into a contractual relationship with any of the subcontractors. In early 2009, plaintiff allegedly discovered extensive water damage in the church, and filed an action asserting tort claims against defendants. Defendant general contractor filed an affirmative defense alleging that, by the terms of the parties' contract, plaintiff's claims accrued on the "date of substantial completion" and were time-barred. A defendant-subcontractor, which was not a party to that contract, filed an affirmative defense alleging that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of ultimate repose. Both defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted their motions and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed. Defendants then petitioned for review. The Supreme Court concluded that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the decision of the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sunset Presbyterian Church v. Brockamp & Jaeger" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple felonies, including first degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Specifically, Defendant contended that the trial court failed to make him aware of the disadvantages of self-representation or to make sufficient inquiries to assess whether Defendant's decision to proceed pro se was knowingly and intelligently made. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Petitioner to represent himself.View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Mechanics' Lien Law of 1963 authorized a union employee benefit trust to file a lien on behalf of union members who performed work for a construction contractor. Developer raised a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer as to each complaint, alleging that the Trustees lacked standing to assert a mechanics' lien claim on behalf of the unionized workers because such workers were employees of Contractor and, as such, were neither "contractors" nor "subcontractors." The Supreme Court concluded that the union workers were not subcontractors, and the Trustees, by corollary in their representative capacity, were not entitled file a lien claim on the workers' behalf. Although the 1963 Act was intended to protect subcontractors who suffer harm occasioned by the primary contractor’s failure to meet its obligations, we have determined that the Legislature did not intend the term "subcontractor" to subsume employees of the primary contractor. Furthermore, the Superior Court erred in overturning the demurrers based on an implied-in-fact contract theory. The order of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the county court’s order. View "Bricklayers of Western PA v. Scott's" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, acting as subcontractor to Builder, performed work on a property in the City of Providence owned by Owner and leased by Lessee. A dispute subsequently arose regarding payment, and Plaintiff sought to enforce a mechanics’ lien against Owner, Lessee, and Builder. After Owner and Lessee deposited a bond, with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as surety, the superior court discharged the lien. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to add Liberty as a defendant. Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment on the mechanics’ lien claim. The trial justice denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in entering judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee because they, as well as Builder and Liberty, were all directly liable to it for any rights it had under the lien statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of the mechanics’ lien statute mandates the dismissal and discharge of the lien once a bond, which replaces the property as security for the claim, is deposited with the registry of the court. View "Nat’l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Props., Inc." on Justia Law