Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Johnson Controls, Inc. contracted with a school district (the District) to provide design services. Johnson then subcontracted with Architectural Resources, Inc. Marshall Helmberger subsequently submitted a request to Johnson under the Data Practices Act for a copy of the subcontract. Johnson denied the request and withheld the contract. Thereafter, Helmberger filed a complaint with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint after a hearing, concluding that Helmberger did not establish that Johnson was performing a governmental function for the District within the meaning of Minn. Stat. 13.05(11)(a). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Johnson was not obligated to disclose the subcontract under the Act because the subcontract was not public data under section 13.05(11)(a).View "Helmberger v. Johnson Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

Steve and Karen Donatelli hired D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers Inc. to help the Donatellis develop their real property. Before development could be completed, the Donatellis suffered substantial financial losses and lost the property in foreclosure. The Donatellis sued D.R. Strong for breach of contract, violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. D.R. Strong moved for partial summary judgment on the CPA and negligence claims. D.R. Strong argued that the negligence claims should have been dismissed under the economic loss rule because the relationship between the parties was governed by contract and the damages claimed by the Donatellis were purely economic. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that as a matter of law, the Donatellis' negligence claims were not barred. Finding no error in that analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

Hard Hat Workforce Solutions, LLC (Hard Hat) appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Great American Insurance Company (GAI). Hard Hat argued it was entitled to make a claim against a payment bond GAI issued on a construction project. The threshold issue in this case was whether Hard Hat's bond claim must comply with section 29-5-440's "notice of furnishing" provision. The Supreme Court found it did not: three e-mails Hard Hat sent to a subcontractor, Walker White, created an issue of fact as to whether Hard Hat satisfied section 29-5-440's notice provisions. View "Hard Hat Workforce v. Mechanical HVAC" on Justia Law

Petitioners were two German limited liability corporations who were sued by a homeowners association for alleged construction defects in plumbing parts. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they had no direct connection to Nevada, did not manufacture or distribute the allegedly faulty plumbing parts, and had no responsibility or control over their American subsidiaries such that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. The district court asserted jurisdiction over Petitioners, determining that the companies’ American subsidiaries acted as Petitioners’ agents and concluding that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging the validity of the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. The district court granted the petition, holding that no agency relationship was shown in this case, and accordingly, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in imputing the subsidiaries’ contacts to Petitioners. View "Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

CSS, the debtor, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2012. Acting as general contractor or as a first tier subcontractor, CSS placed orders with Subcontractors, the creditor. The court held that construction subcontractors entitled to a lien on funds under North Carolina law had an interest in property when the debtor contractor filed for bankruptcy, by which time the subcontractors had not yet served notice of, and thereby perfected, their liens. Because there is no dispute that the other criteria of the applicable bankruptcy stay exception have been met, the court held that the bankruptcy court and district court correctly allowed Subcontractors to serve notice of, and thereby perfect, their liens post-petition. View "Construction Supervision Svcs v. Branch Banking & Trust" on Justia Law

Border States Paving Company, Inc. was the prime contractor on a South Dakota Department of Transportation road construction project. Weatherton Contracting Company, Inc. entered into a subcontract with Border States to supply crushed aggregate for the project. Stern Oil Company sold Weatherton fuel and petroleum products necessary for Weatherton to perform its subcontract, but Weatherton failed to pay Stern Oil for the products. Stern Oil Company brought suit against Border States and its surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, pleading causes of action against Border States for unjust enrichment and breach of an alleged third-party beneficiary payment agreement to pay the bill and against Liberty Mutual for payment on the bond. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Stern Oil on all claims. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment against Stern Oil on its claims. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Border States Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1990, construction was completed on a condominium development. In 2003, the Oaktree Condominium Association (“Oaktree”) discovered that there was a defect in the construction. In 2007, Oaktree filed an action against the builder of the condominiums. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Oaktree. The trial court, however, ruled that Oaktree’s claims were time-barred under a ten-year statute of repose enacted by the General Assembly in 2007. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that although the statute of repose was not in effect at the time that Oaktree’s action accrued, the action was nonetheless time-barred because Oaktree did not file its action within two years of accrual. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict in favor of Oaktree, holding (1) Ohio’s construction statute of repose is unconstitutional as applied to Oaktree because the retroactive application of the statute would bar Okatree’s accrued action; (2) a cause of action that has accrued but on which no suit has been filed by the effective date of repose is governed by the relevant statute of limitations; and (3) the complaint was filed within four years of its accrual and was therefore timely under the relevant statute of limitations. View "Oaktree Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hallmark Bldg. Co." on Justia Law

Miller-Davis Company was an "at risk" contractor for the Sherman Lake YMCA's natatorium project. Miller-Davis hired defendant Ahrens Construction, Inc., as a subcontractor to install similar roof systems on three rooms, including the natatorium. After nearly a decade of litigation and alternative dispute resolution proceedings, the indemnification contract underlying the troubled natatorium roof in this case was brought before the Supreme Court. The Court previously held that the six-year period of limitations of MCL 600.5807(8) applied to the parties’ indemnification contract. Upon further review, the Court held that the indemnity clauses in the parties’ subcontract applied here, because the plain language of the indemnification clauses extended to Ahrens’s failure to undertake corrective work as obligated by the subcontract. Furthermore, because the Sherman Lake YMCA made a "claim" upon Miller-Davis which triggered Ahrens’s liability under the indemnity clauses, Ahrens’ failure to indemnify caused the damages Miller-Davis sustained in undertaking the corrective work itself. Finally, the Court held that Miller-Davis’ claim was not barred by the six-year statute of limitations found in MCL 600.5807(8). Rather, Miller-Davis’ breach of contract claim for Ahrens’s failure to indemnify is distinct from its breach of contract claim based on Ahrens’s failure to install the roof according to specifications, and Miller-Davis’s indemnity action necessarily accrued at a later point. The Court reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussing Miller-Davis’s indemnity claim, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for entry of judgment in Miller-Davis’s favor and to determine whether Miller-Davis is entitled to attorney’s fees under the relevant indemnification clauses. View "Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a contract between Roanoke Healthcare Authority (doing business as Randolph Medical Center) and Batson-Cook Company, a general contractor, to renovate the medical center, located in Roanoke. Batson-Cook received written notice from Roanoke Healthcare that work on the renovation project had been suspended. Batson-Cook notified one of its subcontractors, Hardy, of the suspension and stated that "[t]he contract has been suspended by [Roanoke Healthcare] through no fault of Batson-Cook ... or its subcontractors. [Roanoke Healthcare] is currently out of funding and has subsequently closed the facility while seeking a buyer." Liberty Mutual, the project's insurer, alleged in its answer that Roanoke Healthcare failed to pay Batson-Cook $241,940.51 for work performed pursuant to the contract. Batson-Cook sent Hardy a change order the change order deducted from the subcontract the $147,000 in equipment and materials another subcontractor Hardy hired, Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI), had furnished for the renovation project and for which it has not received payment. JCI notified Liberty Mutual, Roanoke Healthcare, Batson-Cook, and Hardy by certified letters of its claim on a payment bond. The letters identified Batson-Cook as the general contractor and Hardy as the debtor. Liberty Mutual denied the claim. JCI sued Liberty Mutual, alleging JCI was entitled to payment on the payment bond Liberty Mutual had issued to Batson-Cook. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded JCI was a proper claimant on the payment bond. Therefore, the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual and denying JCI's summary judgment motion. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company " on Justia Law

Northern, operated by VanDuinen, was a general contractor on public construction projects, legally required to obtain surety bonds. Hanover was Northern’s bonding agent and required Northern to enter into an Indemnity Agreement, which VanDuinen signed in his individual capacity and as Northern’s President. The Midway Airport Project was financed by the FAA and managed by Parsons. In 2008 Northern won the bid and began subcontracting. in 2009 subcontractors complained that Northern failed to pay them in accordance with the bonds and contracts. Work was halted, resulting in a separate complaint, by Parsons, for failure to complete the Project as required. The FAA opted to retain possession of remaining contract funds, $127,086.00, pending resolution of the disputes and completion of the work. Hanover received claims from subcontractors McDaniel ($127,452.78) and Rex Electric ($78,495.00) and a claim for performance from Parsons. Hanover demanded collateral under the Agreement. Northern refused to post collateral or to indemnify Hanover. In 2009 McDaniel filed for bankruptcy; the bankruptcy trustee sued Hanover seeking payment for work performed. In 2012, Hanover paid the trustee $127,452.78 to resolve both McDaniels’s and Rex Electric’s claims. Hanover resolved Parson’s claim by stepping in as general contractor and arranging for completion of the Project. Parsons paid Hanover the $127,086.00 of contract funds the FAA had withheld. Hanover sued Northern and VanDuinen. The district court granted summary judgment in Hanover’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Agreement is unambiguous. Northern breached it, and Hanover is entitled to contractual damages. View "Hanover Ins. Co. v. Northern Bldg. Co." on Justia Law