Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, a construction company and the owner of a building, after he was injured when a heavy conduit pipe fell on his hand while he was working at the building, alleging that Defendants violated N.Y. Lab. Law 240(1). Supreme Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability, concluding that the conduit, being attached to the ceiling by a compression coupling that failed, was not properly secured so as to give proper protection to Plaintiff. The Appellate Division modified the order of the Supreme Court by denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants’ failure to provide a protective device, i.e., a set-screw coupling rather than the purportedly inadequate compression coupling, was a proximate of his accident. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and held that the order of Supreme Court as modified by the Appellate Court was not property made, as Defendants’ failure to use a set screw couple was not a violation of section 240(1). View "Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the construction manager and owner of a building at a construction site, after a large, flat object fell and injured his hand. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a violation of N.Y. Lab. Law 241(6). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, arguing the form that injured Plaintiff’s hand was not subject to the safety requirements of Industrial Code N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a). The Court of Appeals remitted the matter for further proceedings for a hearing on whether the object as issue was a “form” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. After a hearing, Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, concluding that the form at issue did not come within the coverage of the regulation or section 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and concluded that the Appellate Division’s order should be affirmed, holding that the language of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a) could sensibly be applied to the form that fell on Plaintiff’s hand.View "Morris v. Pavarini Constr." on Justia Law

In 2002, East Side Lutheran Church contracted with NEXT, Inc. for construction of a new addition to its church and renovation to its existing structure. After the project was completed in 2003, East Side experienced a variety of problems throughout the structure. East Side filed suit against NEXT in July 2010. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that East Side filed suit outside of the applicable six-year statute of limitations. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the statute of limitations issue and on the issue of equitable estoppel. On appeal, the parties agreed that any claims that accrued before July 2004 were barred. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether there were any genuine issues of material fact as to whether any or all of East Side’s claims accrued before July 2004. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court’s ruling that barred East Side’s claims of design error and construction error, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed to determine when those claims accrued; and (2) affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on the equitable estoppel claim. Remanded. View "East Side Lutheran Church of Sioux Falls v. Next, Inc. " on Justia Law

Respondent supplied steel for projects on six properties. Respondent was not fully paid for the steel delivered to the properties, and consequently, Respondent perfected mechanics’ liens on the six properties. Respondent then filed a complaint for foreclosure against each property. Thereafter, surety bonds were posted and recorded for four properties. Respondent then amended its complaint to dismiss its lien foreclosure claims against those four properties, replacing them with claims against the sureties and principles on the surety bonds. The district court concluded that Respondent established liens on the six properties. The district court ordered the sale of all six properties without demonstrating that each surety bond was insufficient to pay the sum due on its respective property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a materialman has a lien upon a property and any improvements thereon for which he supplied materials in the amount of the unpaid balance due for those materials; (2) in this case, Respondent established a materialman’s lien on each of the six properties for the unpaid balance due on the steel delivered; and (3) the district court erred by ordering the sale of all six properties. View "Simmons Self-Storage Partners v. Rib Roof, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada certified three questions of law to the Supreme Court regarding the mechanic’s lien priority law, specifically, the visible-commencement-of-construction aspect of the law, which states that a mechanic’s lien takes priority over other encumbrances on a property that are recorded after construction of a work of improvement visibly commences. The Supreme Court answered (1) the Court’s holding in J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. Corus Construction Venture, LLC does not preclude a trier of fact from finding that grading property for a work of improvement constitutes visible commencement of construction; (2) the contract dates and permit issuance dates are irrelevant to the visible-commencement-of-construction test, even in this case where dirt material was placed on a future project site before building permits were issued and the general contractor was hired; and (3) the Court declined to answer the third certified question because it asked the Court to make findings of fact that should be left to the bankruptcy court. View "Byrd Underground, LLC v. Angaur, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners found allegedly defective plumbing parts in their residences. Petitioners provided Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 40 prelitigation notice to the general contractor/developer, Centex Homes, informing it of the alleged defect. Centex forwarded the notice to various subcontractors and suppliers, including Uponor, Inc. Uponor declined to make repairs. Petitioners filed a complaint against Centex, and Centex filed a third-party complaint against numerous subcontractors, including RCR Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc. RCR filed a fourth-party complaint against Uponor. The district court stayed the proceedings and directed RCR to provide Uponor notice of the construction defectsafter Uponor moved to dismiss the fourth-party complaint against it based on lack of notice. Once RCR provided notice, Uponor made repairs. Petitioners sought an extraordinary writ arguing that neither they nor RCR were required to give Uponor Chapter 40 notice and an opportunity to repair prior to RCR’s filing of its fourth-party complaint. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that claimant homeowners or subcontractors are not required to give notice to other subcontractors, suppliers, or design professionals prior to commencing or adding an action against them. View "Barrett v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

VP & PK purchased an insurance policy from Lexington Insurance Company for work on a construction site. Kila Kila, one of VP & PK’s subcontractors, purchased an insurance policy from Nautilus Insurance Company. Both policies contained an “other insurance” provision and included duties to defend and indemnify. When VP & PK and Kila Kila were sued for damages resulting from the construction, Nautilus funded the defense of both Kila Kila and VP & PK. Lexington satisfied the judgment against VP & PK but did not contribute to the defense costs. Nautilus filed a complaint seeking (1) a declaration that Lexington owed VP & PK a duty to defend, which it breached; and (2) equitable contribution from Lexington for defense costs. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Lexington, holding that Lexington’s policy was in excess to Nautilus’s policy, and therefore, Lexington’s duty to defend was not triggered. The Hawaii Supreme Court accepted certified questions from the court of appeals and held, inter alia, that (1) an “other insurance” clause purporting to release an otherwise primary insurer of the duty to defend if the insurer becomes excess as to liability is enforceable, but only as between two or more insurers seeking to allocate or recover defense costs; and (2) an otherwise primary insurer who becomes an excess insurer by operation of an “other insurance” clause has a duty to defend as soon as a claim is tendered to it and there is the mere possibility that coverage of that claim exists under its policy.View "Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Downing, Thorpe & James Design, Inc. (DTJ) was an architectural firm incorporated in Colorado. Thomas Thrope, one of DTJ’s three founding principals, was allowed to practice individually as a foreign architect in Nevada, but DTJ was not allowed to practice as a foreign corporation in Nevada. In 2004, DTJ contracted with a Nevada developer to provide architectural services for a Las Vegas subdivision owned by Prima Condominiums, LLC (Prima). Prima obtained a loan from First Republic Bank in exchange for a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on one of the subdivision’s units. After Prima defaulted on its payments, DTJ recorded a notice of mechanic’s lien against the property for unpaid services. First Republic then foreclosed and purchased the property. DTJ subsequently brought an action against First Republic for lien priority and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for First Republic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because DTJ had failed to comply with Nevada’s statutory registration and filing provisions, it was barred from maintaining an action in Nevada for compensation for its architectural services; and (2) Thorpe’s individual status had no bearing on whether DTJ could bring or maintain an action for compensation for its services.View "DTJ Design, Inc. v. First Republic Bank" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Navy awarded Metcalf a contract to design and build 212 housing units in Hawaii by October, 2006, for $50 million. Problems arose involving soil conditions. The request for proposals stated that the “soil reconnaissance report” was “for preliminary information only” and required that the contractor conduct independent soil investigation, incorporating 48 C.F.R. 52.236-2, concerning site conditions that differ materially from those disclosed. Discussions delayed construction for a year. Metcalf implemented its preferred changes by over-excavating and using non-expansive fill, without a contract modification. The Navy denied that there was any material difference between pre-bid and post-award soil assessments, but approved some modifications. Metcalf was about 200 days behind schedule and began using “post-tension” concrete, which was more expensive but avoided the additional time and cost of over-excavation. The Navy amended the contract to approve use of post-tension concrete slabs. Metcalf claims additional delays resulting from the presence of more of a chemical contaminant than was expected. With respect to contamination, the Navy granted a 286-day extension and reimbursed $1,493,103. The Navy accepted the buildings in March, 2007. Metcalf alleged that its final cost was $76 million. The government paid less than $50 million. The Claims Court ruled in favor of the government, under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7104. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the court misconstrued what Metcalf needed to show to prove that the government breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and misinterpreted certain contractual provisions.View "Metcalf Const. Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

ICI Homes, Inc. (ICI) had a general liability insurance policy with General Fidelity Insurance Company. In 2007, Katherine Ferrin, the owner of a residence constructed by ICI, was injured while using stairs installed by Custom Cutting, Inc. Ferrin filed suit against ICI. ICI, in turn, sought indemnification from Custom Cutting. The parties agreed to a $1.6 million settlement of Ferrin’s claim. ICI accepted $1 million from Custom Cutting’s insurer to settle its indemnification claim, which it paid to Ferrin. ICI and General Fidelity then claimed the other was responsible for paying Ferrin the remaining $600,000. Both parties paid $300,000 to Ferrin to settle Ferrin’s claim. ICI then filed suit against General Fidelity seeking return of the $300,000 ICI paid above the $1 million indemnification payment. General Fidelity counterclaimed seeking return of the $300,000 it had paid to Ferrin. The district court entered judgment for General Fidelity. The court of appeals certified two questions to the Supreme Court for resolution. The Supreme Court answered (1) the General Fidelity policy allowed ICI to apply indemnification payments received from Custom Cutting’s insurer towards satisfaction of its $1 million self-insured retention; and (2) the transfer of rights provision in the policy did not abrogate the made whole doctrine.View "Intervest Constr. of Jax, Inc. v Gen. Fidelity Ins. Co." on Justia Law