Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Twelve years after he pled guilty to capital murder in exchange for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole Appellant filed a motion to vacate his sentence. Appellant, who was seventeen years old when he committed the murder, argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama applied retroactively to his case. The circuit denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing scheme applicable to Appellant’s conviction was not a mandatory life without the possibility of parole scheme; and (2) therefore, even if Miller applied retroactively, it was not applicable to the Virginia sentencing statutes at issue in this case. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, filed a first amended class action complaint alleging that Gentry Homes, Ltd. constructed Plaintiffs’ home without adequate high wind protection. Gentry filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the Home Builder’s Limited Warranty (HBLW) between Gentry and Plaintiffs. The circuit court ordered Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against Gentry but severed and struck an arbitrator-selection provision for potential conflict of interest. The intermediate court of appeals concluded that the circuit court should have enforced the HBLW’s arbitrator-selection provision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court orders, holding (1) the ICA erred in required a party challenging an arbitrator-selection provision to show evidence of “actual bias”; and (2) in resolving a challenge to an arbitrator-selection provision, the “fundamental fairness” standard should be applied, and under this standard, the arbitrator-selection provision was fundamentally unfair. View "Nishimura v. Gentry Homes, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-construction company filed suit asserting that Defendant-homeowners breached the parties’ contract in which Plaintiff agreed to complete construction work on Defendants’ home. Further, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were unjustly enriched in failing to pay the balance owed to Plaintiff. The trial justice awarded Plaintiff $55,455 in damages plus prejudgment interest on an offer of judgment that had been deposited in the Registry of the Superior Court. Defendants appealed the decision to award prejudgment interest, and Plaintiff cross-appealed the damages award. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of both parties and affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in awarding statutory interest in the offer of judgment and in his conclusion that Plaintiff was entitled to $55,455. View "Raiche v. Scott" on Justia Law

After an exhaust pipe in the furnace in their home ruptured, Richard and Mary Horning were diagnosed with having sustained severe carbon monoxide poisoning. The Hornings sued Penrose Plumbing & Heating, Inc. and others, alleging that Penrose was negligent in installing the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system. The district court granted summary judgment for Penrose, determining that the Hornings did not file their complaint within the applicable ten-year statute of repose. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its interpretation of the applicable statute of repose; and (2) under the facts of this case, the Hornings’ complaint was timely filed. View "Horning v. Penrose Plumbing & Heating Inc." on Justia Law

America's Home Place, Inc. ("AHP") appealed a Circuit Court order denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by the plaintiff below, Gregory Rampey. In August 2012, Rampey and AHP entered into a contract, the terms of which provided that AHP would construct a house for Rampey in Chambers County. AHP constructed the house; however, after he took possession of the house, Rampey began to notice "settlement and sinking of the foundation," which, according to Rampey, resulted in significant structural and other damage to the house. AHP attempted to stabilize the foundation and to repair the damage to the house that had occurred as a result of the unstable foundation; those efforts were unsuccessful. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and to enter an order granting AHP's motion to compel arbitration. View "America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey" on Justia Law

In 2006, Richard Myers owned the property at issue in this case. At the time, the property was subject to a deed of trust in favor of First Horizon Home Loans. Myers enlisted Michael Horn and his company, Frontier Development Group (FDG) to build a residence on the property, which First Horizon financed. However, in April of 2007, Myers filed for bankruptcy, and First Horizon rescinded the construction loan and instructed FDG to halt construction when the project was only fifty percent complete. The structure was left exposed to the elements for fourteen months. Following Myers' bankruptcy, foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and Myers hired Kathleen Horn (Michael Horn's wife), of Windermere Real Estate/Teton Valley to list the property for sale. The Caravellas, who were Ohio residents, looking for property in the Teton Valley, contacted their real estate agent who put them in touch with Kathleen Horn who provided them with information on the stalled Myers project. Kathleen Horn eventually put the Caravellas in touch with Michael Horn. The Caravellas traveled to Idaho, met with Kathleen Horn, and spent two days inspecting the property. The Caravellas testified that Kathleen Horn minimized issues with the house, telling them that it was "in good shape,""structurally sound,"and a "great house."The Caravellas chose not to have a professional inspection performed and closed on May 5, 2008. After closing, the Caravellas and Michael Horn agreed that Horn would complete construction on the house in accordance with Myers' original plans. In reaching this agreement, the Caravellas testified that they believed they were dealing with Horn as an individual. The total contract price for the first phase of work that the Caravellas authorized was $88,500. However, the Caravellas paid FDG $138,097.24 for the first phase before refusing to pay any more. Much of the money that the Caravellas paid to FDG was for unauthorized work or work that was completed in a nonconforming or substandard manner. The Caravellas hired a second builder to complete the first phase and to remedy the substandard work. FDG initiated this action by filing a complaint to foreclose on a lien for construction services and building materials provided to, but not paid for by, the Caravellas. The Caravellas filed an amended counterclaim alleging that FDG and Horn: (1) breached the parties' contract; (2) breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (4) breached the implied warranty of habitability; (5) committed slander of title; (6) committed fraud and misrepresentation; (7) engaged in a civil conspiracy; and (8) acted negligently. The district court held that FDG's lien was defective and dismissed it. The district court also held that FDG breached its contract with the Caravellas by: (1) failing to complete agreed upon work in conformity with the plans and in a workmanlike manner; (2) charging the Caravellas for unauthorized and defective work; and (3) substantially overbilling the Caravellas for work and materials that were not authorized and never provided. As to the Caravellas' fraud counterclaim, the district court concluded that the Caravellas failed to establish all nine elements of fraud and dismissed the claim. The district court also concluded that Horn was not personally liable. The district court awarded the Caravellas $113,775.45 in attorney fees, $5,484.83 in costs as a matter of right, and $200.00 in discretionary costs. The Caravellas timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by applying the incorrect evidentiary standard to the Caravellas' fraud counterclaim, but that error was harmless. The Court affirmed that portion of the district court's judgment dismissing the Caravellas' fraud claim, and reversed that portion of the judgment dismissing the Caravellas' claims against Michael Horn personally. In all other respects, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Frontier Development Grp v. Caravella" on Justia Law

Appellee, a construction company, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Appellants, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, the General Assembly’s Claims Review Subcommittee, the General Assembly’s Joint Budget Committee, the Arkansas State Highway Commission, and the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department. The circuit court granted in part and denied in part Appellants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on direct appeal and granted Appellants’ motion to dismiss the cross-appeal, holding (1) Appellee’s equal-protection claim was barred by sovereign immunity; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Appellee’s cross-appeal. View "Ark. State Claims Comm'n v. Duit Constr. Co." on Justia Law

CBD designs and builds restaurants. Its client, Mongolian House, wanted to renovate an upscale Chicago restaurant called “Plan B.” CBD designed the interior and in 2006 filed blueprints to obtain a “repair and replace” building permit. CBD completed the construction work in 2007. In 2008 a CBD employee visited the city’s offices on other business and chanced upon blueprints for Plan B that were labeled with another architect’s name. The city refused to provide a copy, saying the blueprints were exempt from disclosure. Mongolian House defaulted on payments to CBD. In 2009 the city issued a new building permit for Plan B based on the 2008 blueprints. In 2012 CBD sued, alleging copyright infringement and state-law claims. The district court dismissed the claims under the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), reasoning that CBD was on “inquiry notice” of a possible copyright violation when its employee happened upon the 2008 blueprints. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court recently clarified that the Act’s limitations period establishes a “separate accrual rule” so that “each infringing act starts a new limitations period.” CBD’s complaint alleges potentially infringing acts within the three-year look-back period from the date of suit. View "Chicago Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House Inc." on Justia Law

Neumann Homes was the developer of two Antioch subdivisions. The Village entered into infrastructure agreements with Neumann to make public improvements in the subdivisions; Neumann provided four substantially identical surety bonds issued by Fidelity, totaling $18,128,827. The bonds did not contain specific “payment bond” language. A payment bond generally provides that if the contractor does not pay its subcontractors and material suppliers, the surety will pay them. In contrast, a “completion bond” or “performance bond” provides that if the contractor does not complete a project, the surety will pay for its completion. Lake County Grading (plaintiff) and Neumann entered into agreements for plaintiff to provide labor and materials for the improvements. Plaintiff completed the work, but was not paid in full. Neumann defaulted on its contract with the Village and declared bankruptcy. Plaintiff served Neumann and the Village with notices of a lien claim and ultimately filed suit, alleging breach of contract because the surety bonds did not contain language guaranteeing payment to subcontractors compliant with the first paragraph of section 1 of the Bond Act, 30 ILCS 550/1, and that it became a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between the Village and Neumann because the Act’s requirements are read into every public works contract for the benefit of subcontractors. The circuit court entered summary judgment on those counts. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bonds were sufficient and did not violate the Act, so that the Village did not breach any contractual obligation. View "Lake Cnty. Grading Co. v. Vill. of Antioch" on Justia Law

These consolidated writ petitions arose from a construction-defect action initiated by The Regent at Town Centre Homeowners’ Association against Oxbow Construction, LLC. Oxbow served as the general contractor of the Regent at Town Centre mixed-use community (Town Centre). The Association, on behalf of itself and the condominium unit-owners, served Oxbow with Nev. Rev. Stat. 40 notice, alleging construction defects in the common elements of the condominiums. The district court ultimately allowed claims seeking Chapter 40 remedies to proceed for alleged construction defects in limited common elements assigned to multiple units containing at least one “new residence.” Both parties filed writ petitions challenging the district court’s rulings. The Supreme Court denied both petitions, holding that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by (1) failing to perform a Nev. R. Civ. P. 23 class-action analysis; (2) determining that previously occupied units in Town Centre did not qualify for Chapter 40 remedies; and (3) concluding that the Association could pursue Chapter 40 remedies for construction defects in the common elements of buildings containing at least one previously unoccupied unit, i.e., a “new residence.” View "Oxbow Constr., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law