Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Zachary Johnson and Margie Johnson contracted with Buskohl Construction Inc. as a general contractor to oversee the construction of their new house. John Buskohl was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of Buskohl Construction Inc. Due to a deteriorating relationship with the Johnsons, Buskohl walked off the job before construction was complete, leaving various "odds-and-ends" unfinished on the house. The Johnsons repaired some of the alleged deficiencies themselves and solicited bids from various contractors to fix the remaining issues. The Johnsons sued Buskohl alleging Buskohl negligently constructed the house, breached the contract, and breached the warranty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Johnsons. Buskohl moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b), arguing irregularities in the proceedings prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Buskohl argued the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial because the district court erred by: (1) failing to provide a special verdict form that categorically itemized damages; (2) allowing hearsay into evidence; (3) excluding Buskohl's expert from testifying; and (4) denying Buskohl's motion for mistrial based on improper closing argument. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence that did not fall within an exclusion or exception. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, because the district court's error affected Buskohl's substantial right to a fair trial. View "Johnson v. Buskohl Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant used Respondent as the general contractor for the construction of a building. When the building began having problems with water intrusion, Appellant brought suit claiming that Respondent acted negligently in its duties as general contractor. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding that the action was untimely under the two-year statute of limitations for improvements to real property in Minn. Stat. 541.051(1)(a). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly found that the plain language of section 541.051(1) does not require that construction be substantially complete to start the running of the statute of limitations; but (2) there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to when Appellant discovered its injury, and therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Remanded. View "328 Barry Avenue v. Nolan Props. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Keepers appealed, and the City cross-appealed, from partial summary judgment awards. At issue are two questions related to Chapter 2.3 of Milford’s municipal code, which regulates “adult‐oriented establishments.” First, whether the district court improperly considered the affidavit of the police chief in granting partial summary judgment to the City. The court concluded that the district court did not “abuse its discretion” in considering the affidavit and therefore affirmed as to this issue. Second, whether the City’s requirement that sexually oriented businesses publicly post the names of their operators, officers, and significant owners violates the First Amendment. The court concluded that the district court should not have reached the merits of that issue, nor does this Court do so, because Keepers’ First Amendment challenge does not present a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Even if Keepers originally had standing to challenge the public‐posting requirement based on its asserted right against compelled speech, the case has become moot on appeal. Therefore, the court vacated as to this issue and remanded with directions. View "Keepers Inc. v. City of Milford" on Justia Law

Defendants-counterclaimants Jeanmarie Leonard and Carol Sayour appealed the grant of summary judgment on their counterclaims in favor of plaintiff Jennifer Weinstein and third-party defendants, Lloyd Weinstein, plaintiff’s husband, and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C. This case started in an application for a permit to construct a barn made by defendants in May 2012. Defendants received a zoning permit from Manchester’s zoning administrator allowing them to construct a barn on Lot #10. Pursuant to the Declaration for Rocking Stone Farm, defendants received a waiver from the Homeowner’s Association. Plaintiff appealed the permit to the Manchester Development Review Board (the “DRB”). The DRB affirmed the grant of the permit. Defendant Leonard and her husband were walking along Lot #10 with a landscape contractor when plaintiff began yelling at them from her upstairs window. Plaintiff then left her home and entered Lot #10, accompanied by a “very large dog.” Despite being asked to leave, she physically confronted the Leonards, who eventually left the lot. Two days later, plaintiff filed an appeal of the DRB’s decision to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. Plaintiff, a trained attorney, initially represented herself, but Mr. Weinstein and his law firm, The Weinstein Group, P.C., entered an appearance as counsel for her. Both the Association and counsel for defendants advised plaintiff by letter that her opposition to the barn permit constituted a violation of the Non-Interference Clause of the Declaration, which provided that each owner of a lot in Rocking Stone Farm agreed “not [to] take any action to contest or interfere with any development in the Community so long as such development is consistent with the Land Use Approvals.” The Environmental Division rendered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff also filed suit against defendants in superior court with a ten-count complaint, alleging, among other things, that the Declaration had been breached by defendants’ construction of the barn. Defendants filed counterclaims against plaintiff for trespass, civil assault, breach of contract, tortious invasion of privacy, as well as abuse of process and third-party claims against Mr. Weinstein and his law firm for abuse of process and breach of contract. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as it did in plaintiff’s favor, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weinstein v. Leonard" on Justia Law

In 2012, the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department) commenced an audit of Taxpayer’s excise tax and sales tax licenses for tax period 2009 through 2012. At issue in this case was whether Taxpayer’s construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities were subject to a contractor’s excise tax under S.D. Codified Laws 10-46A-1. Taxpayer did not remit excise tax on the gross receipts it received from its construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities. As a result of the audit, the Department issued Taxpayer a certificate of assessment for $43,020, which included excise tax and interest. The circuit court reversed the Department’s certificate of assessment, ruling that Taxpayer’s services were not subject to a contractor’s excise tax under section 10-46A-1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Taxpayer’s act of entering into a contract with a public entity to guarantee a satisfactorily completed public improvement project by a specific date for a specific cost was subject to excise tax under section 10-46A-1. View "Puetz Corp. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Henderson Square Condominium Association sued the developers, alleging: breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, breach of the Chicago Municipal Code’s prohibition against misrepresenting material facts in the course of marketing and selling real estate. The court dismissed with prejudice, finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the Chicago Municipal Code violation and breach of fiduciary duty and that those counts were time-barred. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of those counts and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The claims at issue are construction-related and governed by the limitation and repose of section 13-214 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the fraud exception applied and issues of material fact remained concerning misrepresentations or actions that could support a finding of fraudulent concealment. The defendants were alleged to be “more than silent” regarding insulation and funding of the reserves. The Municipal Code allows private parties to seek damages under its provisions and there were allegations that defendants had a fiduciary duty to budget for reasonable reserves, given allegedly known latent defects. View "Henderson Square Condo. Assoc'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC" on Justia Law

Continental Partners bought a lot with two building pads from Yellowstone Development that was part of the Yellowstone Club subdivision. The purchase and sale agreement included an assurance that the houses Continental intended to build on the lot would have ski-in and gravity ski-out access built by the Yellowstone Club. During construction, Continental sold the homes to separate buyers, including the managing member of WLW Realty Partners, LLC. Before construction on the ski-out access on the two homes had begun, the Yellowstone Club filed for bankruptcy protection. The subsequent owners of Yellowstone Club informed the new owners that ski-out access to the homes would not be constructed. WLW Realty filed this action against Continental, alleging, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for WLW Realty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by (1) imposing liability on Continental for negligent misrepresentation, as WLW Realty failed to satisfy the first and second elements of the tort; and (2) finding that Continental had violated the MCPA, as Continental did not engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. View "WLW Realty Partners, LLC v. Continental Partners VIII, LLC" on Justia Law

High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Association filed a complaint against D.R. Horton, Inc. alleging breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and habitability, breach of contract, breach of express warranties, and breach of fiduciary duty. High Noon moved, ex parte, for a stay and enlargement of time for service of the complaint until the Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 40 prelitigation process for constructional defect cases was complete. The district court granted High Noon’s motion. The Chapter 40 process was still not complete more than eight years later. In these original petitions for extraordinary relief, D.R. Horton argued that the district court erred when it initially granted the ex parte stay and further erred when it denied a motion to dismiss the underlying complaint pursuant to the five-year rule in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) when the Chapter 40 process was still not complete. The Supreme Court denied both of these petitions for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, concluding (1) the district court’s order granting a stay was not in error; and (2) the five-year period was tolled under the Boren exception to Rule 41(d). View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Army Corps of Engineers invited bids on a federal reservoir project in Illinois. One of the successful bidders was Slurry, which leased from Pileco a trench cutter made by Bauer. Slurry was a prime contractor on the Corps of Engineers’ project; the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131, requires prime contractors on some government construction projects to post bonds. Slurry used Fidelity as surety. The bond insured against a failure by Slurry to pay subcontractors, such as Pileco. Contending that the cutter was defective, Slurry refused to pay the agreed rental price. Pileco sued Slurry and Fidelity, asserting breach of contract that Fidelity violated the Miller Act by failing to reimburse Pileco for costs associated with Slurry’s reneging on its obligation to pay. Slurry counterclaimed. A second trial resulted in a verdict in Pileco’s favor except for a $357,716 equitable adjustment in favor of Slurry, based on time that cutter was inoperable because of a defect attributable to Pileco. The net result was that Pileco was awarded $2.23 million against Slurry for breach of contract and the same amount against Fidelity for the Miller Act violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the denial of prejudgment interest and costs. View "Pileco, Inc. v. Slurry Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, brought this action against Defendants, the company that constructed Plaintiffs’ home and the developer of the lot on which the home was built, alleging negligent construction of the home. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-223. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed as to the developer but reversed as to the construction company, finding the action against it was not barred by section 25-223. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the district court, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiffs’ claims at the expiration of the express one-year limited warranty issued by the construction company instead of the date the home was substantially completed. View "Adams v. Manchester Park" on Justia Law