Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court granting dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and negligence as to four of the defendants, holding that the complaint included facts capable of supporting relief on Plaintiff's implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants.Plaintiff, a homeowners' association, sued Defendants after discovering defects at a condominium complex. Four of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not subject to the implied warranty of habitability because they were not builder-vendors and that the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants; and (2) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its negligence claim. View "Residences at Ivy Quad Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Ivy Quad Development, LLC" on Justia Law

Munoz sued general contractor, Bulley & Andrews, for injuries he sustained while an employee of its subcontractor, Bulley Concrete. Bulley & Andrews had paid workers’ compensation insurance premiums and benefits for the subcontractor and its employees. Each company has its own distinct federal tax identification number and files separate federal and state income tax returns. The companies have different presidents and employ different workers.The circuit court dismissed, finding that the genderal contractor was immune from the lawsuit under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a). The appellate court affirmed.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The exclusive remedy provisions do not extend to a general contractor who is not the employee’s immediate employer. Immunity does not hinge on the payment of benefits. Bulley & Andrews had no legal obligation to provide workers’ compensation insurance for Bulley Concrete employees. The fact that Bulley Concrete was a subsidiary of Bulley & Andrews is of no import. If a parent company and its subsidiary are operated as separate entities, only the entity that was the immediate employer of the injured worker is entitled to immunity. The Act bars an employee from bringing a civil suit directly against his employer but does not limit the employee’s recovery from a third-party general contractor. View "Munoz v. Bulley & Andrews, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part the judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) awarding attorney fees and expenses to Forney & Weygandt, Inc. (F&W) but vacated a portion of the judgment awarding F&W attorney fees and expenses related to subcontractor claims, holding that remand was required.Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC, et al. (collectively, GBT), a group of limited purpose entities and a commercial real estate developer, appealed the attorney fees and expenses award to F&W, a commercial general contractor, pursuant to Maine's prompt payment statute, Me. Rev. Stat. 10, 1111-1120. Specifically, GBT contended that the BCD erred in awarding attorney fees and expenses that were not incurred in direct pursuit of F&W's prompt payment claims, including those related to F&W's contract claims, GBT's counterclaims and affirmative defenses, and subcontractor claims against F&W. The Supreme Judicial Court largely affirmed the judgment but vacated the award of attorney fees and expenses related to the subcontractor claims, holding that the court abused its discretion when it did not articulate a basis for an award of fees that would be proper under the prompt payment statute and this Court's interpretative case law. View "Fortney & Weygandt, Inc. v. Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC" on Justia Law

William Greenwood was in the business of salvaging valuable materials from old buildings. Greenwood was insured by Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company through a policy sold by Dixie Specialty Insurance. Greenwood was later sued by adjoining building owners who complained he had damaged their property, and Mesa denied coverage based, in part, on a policy exclusion for demolition work. Greenwood later brought suit against his insurers alleging breach of contract and bad-faith denial of coverage. Greenwood averred that his business was actually “deconstruction” rather than demolition, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Estate of Greenwood v. Montpelier US Insurance Company, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court ordering Plaintiff to pay the attorney fees and costs of Defendant, the prevailing party in a construction defect suit initiated by Plaintiff, holding that the district court erred in part.Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants alleging negligence, breach of contract, and other claims. The district court held in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court then awarded attorney fees and costs to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred by determining that Defendant had a reciprocal right to an award of attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 70-19-428 and Mont. Code Ann. 28-3-704. View "Rafes v. McMillan" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Archdiocese purchased a roof membrane system from Siplast, for installation at a Bronx high school. Siplast guaranteed that the system would “remain in a watertight condition for a period of 20 years.” In 2016, school officials observed water damage in the ceiling tiles after a rainstorm and notified the installing contractor and Siplast. A designated Siplast contractor unsuccessfully attempted to repair the damage and prevent leaks. The Archdiocese ultimately obtained an estimate for remediation and replacement of approximately $5,000,000.The ensuing lawsuit alleged “Breach of the Guarantee” Siplast submitted a claim to its insurer, EMCC, asserting coverage under commercial general liability policies that covered “property damage” caused by an “occurrence,” defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The policies were subject to exclusions for “Your Product/Your Work” and “Contractual Liability.” The district court granted EMCC summary judgment, finding that while the complaint did allege property damage that was caused by an “occurrence,” the alleged damage fit within the Your Product/Your Work Exclusion. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that EMCC had a duty to defend. The underlying complaint contains allegations of damage to property other than Siplast’s roof membrane as part of the claim against Siplast; the exclusion does not apply. View "Siplast, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Jeanne and Nevin Tergesen appealed a judgment dismissing their complaint and awarding Nelson Homes, Inc. damages for its breach of contract counterclaim. The Tergesens argued the district court erred in dismissing their rescission and breach of contract claims, and the court erroneously found the Tergesens breached the contract. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing the Tergesens’ claims or finding the Tergesens breached the contract, but the court did err in calculating the amount of prejudgment interest on Nelson Homes’ damages. View "Tergesen, et al. v. Nelson Homes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment upon the jury's general verdict in favor of Homeowners in their complaint against the builder of their house (Builder), holding that there was no error.Homeowners brought this suit alleging defects in the construction of their home and in the preparation of the lot it was built on. The jury found in a special verdict form that Homeowners' claims were not barred by the statute of limitations and rendered a general verdict in favor of Homeowners. Builder appealed, challenging the amount of damages and the court's statute of limitations rulings. Builder cross-appealed, challenging the damages award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in refusing to determine the statute of limitations as a matter of law, in giving its instructions on the statute of limitations, or in failing to order remittitur or setoff of the damages award; and (2) did not err in excluding evidence of stigma damages. View "de Vries v. L & L Custom Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

Glacier Northwest Inc. claimed the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 (Local 174) was liable for concrete product loss during a strike and for an alleged misrepresentation by a union representative that Glacier claims interfered with its ability to service a concrete mat pour. The trial court ruled the strike-related claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and granted summary judgment for Local 174 on the misrepresentation claims. Glacier appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the preemption issue but affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the misrepresentation claims. The Washington Supreme Court granted review and accepted amicus curiae briefing from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, to address whether an employer’s state tort claims against its truck drivers’ union were preempted by the NLRA, and whether any claims that were not preempted were properly dismissed by the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded the NLRA preempted Glacier’s tort claims related to the loss of its concrete product because that loss was incidental to a strike arguably protected by federal law. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of Glacier’s misrepresentation claims because the union representative’s promise of future action was not a statement of existing fact on which those claims could be properly based, and because the statement was not a proximate cause of Glacier’s losses. View "Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a construction defect lawsuit involving waterfront townhomes on Lake Keowee in Oconee County, South Carolina. After a two-week trial, Petitioners-Respondents Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners' Association, Inc. (the HOA) received plaintiff's verdicts against several defendants, including Respondents-Petitioners Marick Home Builders, LLC and Rick Thoennes. Marick Home Builders, Thoennes, and other defendants appealed, and in a pair of published opinions, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted several writs of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decisions. Here, the Court reviewed "Stoneledge I" and addressed the trial court's: (1) jury charge; (2) denial of Marick's directed verdict motions; (3) finding of amalgamation; and (4) calculation of damages. The Supreme Court affirmrf the court of appeals as to the jury charge and as to the trial court's denial of Marick's motions. The Court reversed the court of appeals as to amalgamation. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals as to the amount of the judgment in favor of the HOA and remanded to the circuit court for final calculation and entry of judgment. View "Stoneledge at Lake Keowee v. IMK Development Co., LLC" on Justia Law