Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The City of New Orleans appealed a jury verdict for Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church finding that the city violated the church's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by demolishing the church building without notice. At issue was whether the suit should be dismissed because the church's procedural and substantive due process claims were unripe. The court dismissed the suit as unripe where the church did not allege a substantive due process claim that was independent of its procedural due process claim and where the court could not address the procedural due process claim without knowing the outcome of the takings claim, which was not before the court.

Petitioner requested a judgment of acquittal on the charge of felony criminal mischief where defense counsel argued that the state failed to establish a prima facie case that the damage to the doors that petitioner drove into was one thousand dollars or more, the threshold amount for the felony charge. At issue was whether the Third District Court of Appeal properly relied on a "life experience" exception to the general rule that a state must establish the amount of damage to prove felony criminal mischief. The court quashed the Third District's decision, disapproved of Jackson v. State, and other decisions in this context that applied to the "life experience" exception and held that before a defendant could be convicted of felony criminal mischief, the state must prove the amount of damage associated with the criminal conduct.

Appellant Don Phillips was the sole shareholder and officer in Crystal Lake Land Developers, Inc.(CLLD). In 1979, CLLD began developing Crystal Pines, and deeded all the roads in Crystal Pines to the Crystal Lake Road Company. In the mid 1980s, the Road Company operated as a simple homeowners association, but eventually changed its name to Crystal Pines Homeowners Association (HOA). CLLD attempted to execute a second deed to reflect the change of the Road Companyâs name to the HOA. The second deed stated that the HOA would be responsible for fixing the roads in Crystal Pines. In 1980, CLLD constructed a boat ramp that many of the homeowners used regularly. In 2004, CLLD gated and locked the boat ramp, and later conveyed title of the ramp to his son. The son then transferred title of the ramp to the Crystal Pines Yacht Club, which continued to keep the ramp locked from the residents. The HOA filed suit against Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club over who was responsible for maintaining Crystal Pinesâ roads, and for access to the boat ramp. The master-in-equity ruled in favor of the HOA, and Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club appealed. The Supreme Court found the deed in question unambiguous pertaining to who was responsible for fixing the roads. The Court found that CLLD and Phillips are not responsible for maintaining all of Crystal Pinesâ roads, only those roads they damage as a result of their development efforts. However, the Court found the mater did not err in finding that the HOA had established a prescriptive easement in its use of the boat ramp. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower courtâs decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that which it reversed.

Appellant Don Phillips was the sole shareholder and officer in Crystal Lake Land Developers, Inc.(CLLD). In 1979, CLLD began developing Crystal Pines, and deeded all the roads in Crystal Pines to the Crystal Lake Road Company. In the mid 1980s, the Road Company operated as a simple homeowners association, but eventually changed its name to Crystal Pines Homeowners Association (HOA). CLLD attempted to execute a second deed to reflect the change of the Road Companyâs name to the HOA. The second deed stated that the HOA would be responsible for fixing the roads in Crystal Pines. In 1980, CLLD constructed a boat ramp that many of the homeowners used regularly. In 2004, CLLD gated and locked the boat ramp, and later conveyed title of the ramp to his son. The son then transferred title of the ramp to the Crystal Pines Yacht Club, which continued to keep the ramp locked from the residents. The HOA filed suit against Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club over who was responsible for maintaining Crystal Pinesâ roads, and for access to the boat ramp. The master-in-equity ruled in favor of the HOA, and Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club appealed. The Supreme Court found the deed in question unambiguous pertaining to who was responsible for fixing the roads. The Court found that CLLD and Phillips are not responsible for maintaining all of Crystal Pinesâ roads, only those roads they damage as a result of their development efforts. However, the Court found the mater did not err in finding that the HOA had established a prescriptive easement in its use of the boat ramp. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower courtâs decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that which it reversed.

Appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine ("PCP"), a controlled substance. Appellants raised issues regarding the admissibility of certain evidence and contested the basis for their sentences. The court held that the district court properly denied the first defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of a certain house where, under the circumstances and in light of his failure on appeal to demonstrate that Los Angeles police were dishonest or reckless in relying on the house warrant, the good faith exception applied. The court also held that evidence from the second house at issue was inextricably intertwined with evidence tending to prove that the second defendant aided and abetted to possess with intent to distribute PCP and, in light of evidence implicating the second defendant in a scheme to aid and abet possession with intent to distribute PCP, any error in admitting evidence of the July 2008 controlled buy was harmless. The court further held that the district court's factual findings and application of U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 were not erroneous where certain material assertions were not worthy of credence in light of the weight of the physical evidence and were flatly contradicted by other witnesses and the ultimate finding of the jury. The court finally held that the sentencing enhancement for the first defendant's leadership role was based on an erroneous recitation of facts and therefore, was vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

Defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and resisting arrest. At issue was whether the court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress and properly convicted him. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion and held that there was no error in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence where the firearm was recovered as a result of a lawful seizure of his person; there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of resisting arrest to and unlawful possession of a firearm where he charged at officers and used physical force against one officer; and there was no merit to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to suppress his statement in response to an officer where there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have could have inferred that he knew that the two men following him were police officers and that the police wished to stop him. The court also held that defendant's right to bear arms and to self-defense under the Second Amendment and his equal protection guarantees under Federal and State Constitutions were not violated.

Appellees Mark and Marilyn Hesse purchased an undeveloped subdivision of land owned by Canberra Development Company (CDC) in February 2004. Appellees constructed their home on the lot. After moving into their new home, Appellees noticed several structural problems including the presence of large cracks in the floor. Appellees later learned that these problems were caused by unstable soil beneath the foundation of their home. Subsequently, Appellees discovered that CDC had failed to inform them of soil analysis assessment reports which had been ordered seven years prior to the selling of their lot. These test reports indicated the presence of expansive and collapsible soils most notably in the Appelleesâ back yard. Appellees filed suit against CDC seeking compensatory and punitive damages for fraudulent nondisclosure and misrepresentation. After a jury trial, Appellees were awarded over $3 million in economic damages including pain and suffering. No punitive damages were awarded. After the trial, CDC filed several post-verdict motions including a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The District Court ultimately denied these motions. The Supreme Court held that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude CDC was liable to Appellees for fraudulent nondisclosure and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court found later, however, that the district court had erred in denying CDCâs motion for a new trial to assess damages. As a result, the Supreme Court reduced Appelleesâ economic damages award.

Suspecting the defendant of drug trafficking, federal agents attached a GPS device to his vehicle while it was parked in a public place. The GPS tracked the defendant from Phoenix to Illinois, where the state police took up live surveillance, stopped the defendant for a traffic violation, searched the vehicle after a canine unit alerted to the presence of drugs, and found nine packages of heroin. The district court refused to suppress the evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The GPS surveillance conducted in this case was not lengthy and did not expose, or risk exposing, the "twists and turns" of the defendant's life. The purpose of the GPS was only to record the trip, so no warrant was required; real-time information from a GPS is exactly the kind of information that drivers make available by traversing public roads.