Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

An employee of the general contractor on a construction site was allegedly injured by the negligent act of the employee of a subcontractor who carried no workers' compensation insurance. Plaintiff, the injured party, brought a common-law action against Defendants, the uninsured subcontractor and its employee, the alleged tortfeasor. The Defendants filed a plea in bar, asserting that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act was Plaintiff's sole remedy. The circuit court held that Defendants' failure to carry workers' compensation insurance deprived them of the protections afforded by the Act because they were not participants in the statutory workers' compensation system. The court denied the plea in bar, permitting the action to go forward, but certified the case for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed from and entered final judgment dismissing the case, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendants' plea in bar because Defendants were entitled to the exclusivity protection provided by the Act notwithstanding their lack of workers' compensation insurance. View "David White Crane Serv. v. Howell" on Justia Law

Sammy Thomas and Pam Thomas appealed the Blount Circuit Court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Sloan Homes, LLC ("Sloan Homes"), David Sloan, and Teresa Sloan in the Thomases' action alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct in relation to the construction of a house by Sloan Homes, the grantor under the residential sales agreement. The question presented by this appeal was whether, under the doctrine of merger, the execution and delivery of the deed in this case nullified an arbitration clause included in the antecedent residential sales agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause was still valid, thereby affirming the circuit court's order granting Sloan Homes and the Sloans' motion to compel arbitration of the Thomases' claims. View "Thomas v. Sloan Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Carter Boehm, Trustee, sued Defendants Cokedale, L.L.C. and Allen Carter for property damages when, during construction of a road to reach Defendants' land, rocks of various sizes rolled downhill onto Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff subsequently added claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Boehm was not the trustee of any trust validly established under Montana law, and therefore Boehm was perpetuating the lawsuit on behalf of a non-existent trust. The district court also awarded Defendants attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 17(a), which requires that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants. The award of fees was reversed. View "Boehm v. Cokedale" on Justia Law

Francis Weber was severely burned by hot mineral water when he lost consciousness in a steam room in Hot Spring State Park. Weber brought a personal injury action against several defendants, including the State. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that it was immune from suit pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's activities in the park fell within the statutory waiver of immunity for operation and maintenance of a public park as (1) overseeing building construction on leased property and delivery of hot mineral water to lessees are part of the State's operation of the park, and (2) under these circumstances, the State's operation and maintenance of the park included overseeing and/or inspecting its lessee's property. Remanded. View "Weber v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this extraordinary writ proceeding was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.259(1) compels dismissal where the initial pleading in an action alleging nonresidential construction malpractice was served without filing the attorney affidavit and expert report required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258(1) and (3). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that a defective pleading served in violation of section 11.258 is void ab initio and of no legal effect and, thus, cannot be cured by amendment. The Court held that because the initial pleadings served by certain real parties in interest in this case did not include the attorney affidavit and expert report as required by section 11.258, those pleadings were void ab initio, and the district court did not have discretionary authority to allow the parties to amend their pleadings to cure their failure to comply with section 11.258. View "Otak Nevada, L.L.C. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

K & L Homes appealed a district court judgment based upon a jury verdict in favor of Neal Leno and Susan Leno ("the Lenos"). On appeal, K & L Homes argued: (1) the district court erred by deciding K & L Homes had not sufficiently raised the defense of fault by the Lenos in its answer; (2) the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, the court erred by denying K & L Homes' request for inspection and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during a jury viewing; and (3) the court erred by ruling K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties as a matter of law. The Lenos purchased a newly-constructed house from K & L Homes. The Lenos alleged they noticed cracks, unevenness, and shifting due to improper construction not long after purchasing the house from K & L Homes. Initially, the Lenos claimed K & L Homes was negligent, breached the parties' contract, and breached implied warranties. The Lenos claimed the parties' contract implied warranties that the house would be built according to the applicable codes, that it would fit its purpose as a residence, and that it would be constructed according to engineering standards and in a workmanlike condition. K & L Homes requested the jury be instructed on comparative fault, but the district court denied the proposed comparative fault instruction. The district court decided K & L Homes had not adequately pled fault, and comparative fault did not apply to Lenos' cause of action. The district court also found, as a matter of law, that K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties in a Homeowners' Guide given to the Lenos at the closing on the house. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings made by the district court and affirmed its decisions as to all issues raised on appeal. View "Leno v. K & L Homes" on Justia Law

Following an automobile crash for which United Tool Rental (UTR) and DeLyle Paulsen admitted negligence, UTR and Paulsen sought contribution from the state DOT and several construction entities (construction parties), alleging their negligent design, construction, and maintenance of the highway contributed to the crash. After a jury trial, the district court determined UTR and Paulsen were entirely at fault for the crash and rejected their contribution claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence the DOT erected a "no left turn" sign after the crash and a post-crash memorandum prepared by the highway patrol; (2) the district court did not deprive UTR and Paulsen a fair trial by allowing the construction parties' counsel to inquire what caused Paulsen to drive inattentively; and (3) the jury's verdict was not defective. View "United Tool Rental, Inc. v. Riverside Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

Stephen and Dawn Steadele contracted with Montana Component Housing Corporation (MCHC) to construct a home. MCHC did not complete the home by the deadline and eventually abandoned the project without completing the home. The Steadeles filed suit against MCHC. The district court entered a default judgment against MCHC when it failed to respond to the suit. The Steadeles then requested payment from Colony Insurance Company, MCHC's insurer. Colony denied coverage and refused to pay because MCHC never notified it of the Steadeles' claim. The Steadeles then filed this action, arguing that Colony's refusal to issue payment on the underlying judgment was a violation of Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-201, which prohibits unfair claim settlement practices. The district court granted summary judgment to Colony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Colony because MCHC's failure to notify Colony of the Steadeles' claim was a material breach of MCHC's obligations under the policy. View "Steadele v. Colony Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, the company entered into contracts with the government for roof repairs of two government buildings. Due to delays the projects were not completed and accepted by the government until September and October 2005. At the time, Federal Acquisition Regulations required that a performance report be prepared for each construction contract for $550,000 or more, 48 C.F.R. § 36.201. The company received negative interim performance evaluations from the resident engineer for both projects in February, 2004. In March, 2006, the resident engineer issued proposed negative final performance evaluations for both projects. The company protested the proposed evaluations, asserting that subcontractors and other problems, beyond its control, caused the delays. In final performance evaluations, the engineer assigned an overall performance rating of unsatisfactory and assigned unsatisfactory ratings for each project in 15 individual categories. The contracting officer issued a final decision that the unsatisfactory performance appraisal was justified. The Claims Court rejected the company's suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed. A contractor is responsible for the unexcused performance failures of its subcontractors and the complaint did not allege facts that would excuse the delays. View "Todd Constr., L.P. v. United States" on Justia Law

Miguel Rivera, a fifteen-year-old unauthorized alien, sought workers' compensation benefits from Abel Verdon Construction for injuries sustained when he fell through a hole in the second floor of a home that Verdon was constructing. The ALJ found Rivera to be Verdon's employee and awarded Rivera partial disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed Rivera's partial disability award. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Verdon's argument that the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) preempts the application of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342, which provides workers' compensation coverage to employees without regard to the legality of the employment relationship, to this claim based on the claimant's status as an unauthorized alien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employment relationship existed between Rivera and Verdon and that the IRCA does not preempt a workers' compensation law that covers unauthorized aliens. View "Abel Verdon Constr. & Acuity Ins. v. Rivera " on Justia Law