Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) contracted with Meadow Valley Contractors (MVC) for a highway construction project. MVC subcontracted the paving work to Southwest Asphalt Paving. After UDOT refused to allow Southwest to use ribbon paving and assessed MVC a thickness-laying penalty, MVC filed a compliant against UDOT, alleging that (1) it incurred costs not contemplated by the contract as a result of UDOT's prohibition on ribbon paving, and (2) the thickness penalty assessed by UDOT was unwarranted. UDOT denied MVC claims. Southwest then filed a complaint in district court in MVC's name against UDOT alleging breach of contract. The trial court (1) concluded that UDOT breached its contract with MVC by refusing to allow ribbon paving on the construction project, and (2) denied MVC's claim that UDOT had erroneously imposed a paving-thickness penalty. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) UDOT did did not breach its contract with MVC when it forbade MVC and Southwest from using ribbon paving, and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that UDOT's interpretation of the contract regarding paving thickness was more reasonable than MVC's interpretation. View "Meadow Valley v. UDOT" on Justia Law

In 1995, Charles and Charlene Ebinger contracted with Venus Construction Corporation to build a home. The couple moved into their new residence in 1997. In 2003, the Ebingers filed suit against Venus alleging defects in the home's foundation. Venus sought indemnification from one of its subcontractors. At issue in this case is whether the construction company's third-party demand against its subcontractor was time-barred by state law that established a peremptive period for actions against residential building contractors. The peremptive period was established originally at ten years, but subsequent amendments shortened its duration. A 1999 amendment reduced the period to seven years; a 2003 amendment reduced it to five years. Upon consideration of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the latest version of the statute applied in this case (2003). Consequently, the court held that the construction company's right to indemnity from its subcontractor was extinguished and its third party demand was perempted. View "Ebinger v. Venus Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William and Vivian Allen contracted defendant V and A Brothers, Inc. (V&A) to landscape their property and build a retaining wall to enable the installation of a pool. At the time, V&A was wholly owned by two brothers, Defendants Vincent DiMeglio, who subsequently passed away, and Angelo DiMeglio. The corporation also had one full-time employee, Defendant Thomas Taylor. After V&A completed the work, Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint naming both corporate and individual defendants. The first count was directed solely to V&A and alleged that the corporation breached its contract with Plaintiffs by improperly constructing the retaining wall and using inferior backfill material. The second count was directed to the corporation and Vincent's estate, Angelo, and Taylor individually, alleging three "Home Improvement Practices" violations of the state Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Before trial, the trial court granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against them, holding that the CFA did not create a direct cause of action against the individuals. Plaintiffs' remaining claims were tried and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on all counts, awarding damages totaling $490,000. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order dismissing the claims against the individual defendants under the CFA. The panel remanded the matter to determine whether any of the individual defendants had personally participated in the regulatory violations that formed the basis for Plaintiffs' CFA complaint. The panel precluded relitigation of the overall quantum of damages found by the jury in the trial against the corporate defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that employees and officers of a corporation might be individually liable under the CFA for acts they undertake through the corporate entity. Furthermore, individual defendants are not collaterally estopped from relitigating the quantum of damages attributable to the CFA violations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

The hospital engaged a contractor for renovations and expansion. Before occupancy the hospital noted problems with the flooring in operating rooms; the contractor completed some repairs. After the project was complete, new problems continued to appear and the contractor repeatedly repaired the floors. All of the problems documented by January 2005, the expiration of a one-year warranty period, were repaired. The contractor continued to perform repairs through early 2006, when the hospital conducted its own investigation and replaced the floors at a cost of $398,070, without involving the contractor. The cost was higher than the original installation because of the need for containment systems so that the facility could continue to operate. A jury awarded $331,835 in damages on the warranty plus pre-judgment interest. The First Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that the problems were due to faulty workmanship or materials for which the contractor was responsible under the warranty, that the hospital properly invoked the warranty, and that the hospital was not required to give the contractor the option of doing the job. View "Berkshire Med. Ctr., Inc. v. U.W. Marx, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Defendants Richco Construction, Inc. (Richco) and Ronald Richards, Jr. were personally notified of the default judgment against them and denied their motion to set aside that judgment. The suit arose from a contractual relationship between Plaintiff Lawrence M. Clarke, Inc. (Clarke) and Defendant. Clarke worked on a residential subdivision in 2003, and hired Richco as a subcontractor to work on the sewer system. Richco's work did not satisfy the local governing municipality, and after efforts to repair were unfruitful, Clarke contracted with another party to finish the work. Clark filed a breach of contract and fraud complaint against Richco. The process server attempted to serve Richco at its business address on file with the state, but Richco had vacated the premises and left no forwarding address. Clarke continued in its efforts to locate Richco and refiled its complaint. The trial court permitted alternative service through mailing notice to last-known addresses and a classified advertisement in the local paper. With no response, Clarke moved for a default judgment that the court granted. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Richco was personally notified, and that Richco was entitled to relief from the default judgment. The Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Lawrence M. Clarke, Inc. v. Richco Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

In this lawsuit, one of several suits alleging construction defects in homes located in a Shea Homes planned community, plaintiffs Albert Albano and other homeowners appealed to the circuit court from the district court's summary judgment dismissing their construction-defect claims against Shea Homes as barred by Arizona's statute of repose. The plaintiffs were three homeowners not allowed to join a previous putative class action against Shea Homes. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in failing to apply American Pipe v. Utah, which tolls the applicable statute of limitations for non-named class members until class certification is denied, to the period between the filing of the previous putative class action lawsuit and the denial of class certification. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to answer the certified question of whether the American Pipe tolling rule would also apply to a statute of repose. The Court held that the class-action tolling doctrine does not apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects. View "Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Stephen and Marilee Bell hired contractor Defendant Perception Construction Management, Inc. (PCM) to build a log home. The parties' relationship deteriorated, and the Plaintiffs terminated the contract before construction was complete. Plaintiffs refused to pay PCM's final invoices, and PCM filed suit to enforce a lien it placed on the home for the unpaid invoices. Plaintiffs filed multiple counterclaims, including construction defect and breach of contract. PCM prevailed at trial, and the district court found PCM was entitled to damages, prejudgment interest and attorney fees. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district court erred by excluding certain evidence relating to their defense against the lien, and in its determination of the monies allegedly owed under the lien. The Supreme Court found that the district court impermissibly excluded Plaintiffs' evidence, and as such, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perception Construction Management, Inc. v. Bell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an electrician working on a construction project site, brought a personal injury suit against defendants asserting claims under Labor Law 200, 240(1), and 241(6), and common law negligence. At issue was whether defendants-property owners (property owners) were entitled to common law indemnification from defendant-general contractor (general contractor). The court held that the general contractor's demonstrated lack of actual supervision and/or direction over the work was sufficient to establish that it was not required to indemnify the property owners for bringing about plaintiff's injury. The court also held that the property owner's vicarious liability could not be passed through the general contractor, the non-negligent, vicariously liable general contractor with whom they did not contract. Therefore, the court held that, under the facts and circumstances, the property owners were not entitled to common law indemnification from the general contractor. View "McCarthy, et al. v. Turner Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Ron and Linda Reece and Greg and Staci Hunter agreed to flip a house and put their agreement in writing. Mr. Reece supplied the labor and submitted invoices for expenses incurred to Mrs. Hunter. Later, the Hunters became dissatisfied with the progress on the project, told Mr. Reece to stop working on the project, and hired other contractors to complete the project. The Reeces then filed suit against the Hunters, alleging that, under the contract, the Reeces were entitled to payment for Mr. Reece's labor on the project in addition to one half of the profits. The district court found that the parties' contract was not valid because there had been no meeting of the minds regarding an essential term of the agreement, that being whether Mr. Reece was to be paid for his work in addition to receiving one half of the profits. The court then invoked the theory of unjust enrichment to award all of the profits to the Reeces. The Hunters appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, given the language of the written agreement and the parties' stipulation that it was a valid contract, the district court erred in finding there was no contract. View "Hunter v. Reece" on Justia Law

Wayne Nocar, who was doing construction work on a house, died after falling through a stairwell opening in a floor that C&M Builders had built. Kelly Strub sued C&M on behalf of her son, alleging negligence in the death of Nocar. The trial court determined the C&M was not negligent. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held (1) C&M owed a duty to Nocar to comply with the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), and (2) C&M's motion for judgment asserting the evidence showed that Nocar assumed the risk of his fatal injury as a matter of law was properly denied by the lower court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an employer does not owe a duty under MOSHA to provide a safe workplace to a person who is not his employee after the employer has left the worksite and has no control over worksite conditions, and (2) where it is clear that any person in Nocar's position must have understood the danger of falling, the issue of assumption of the risk may be decided by the court rather than the jury. Thus the issue should have been decided in C&M's favor by the lower court on C&M's motion. View "C&M Builders, L.L.C. v Strub" on Justia Law