Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The claim arose from an accident at a construction site. The company was insured under its own commercial general liability policy, issued by Acadia, and as an additional insured on a subcontractor's policy, issued by AIG. Both policies contained provisions that: This insurance is excess over: (1) Any of the other insurance, whether primary, excess, contingent, or on any other basis . . . (a) That is . . . coverage for "your work"; . . .(2) Any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises or operations for which you have been added as an additional insured by attachment of an endorsement. The company and Acadia sought declaratory judgment that AIG was obligated to defend the construction company and compensation of costs incurred by Acadia that defense. The district court granted judgment in AIG's favor. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the plain language of the policy requires that the Acadia policy be treated as excess over the AIG policy. The word "you" refers solely to the listed Named Insured in the policy Declarations or "qualifying as Named Insureds" under the policy. View "Wright-Ryan Constr., Inc., v. AIG Commercial Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to prove that they were subjected to excessive force while in custody at the Sacramento County Main Jail. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to use certain jury instructions plaintiffs had requested. The court held that the district court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, for purposes of proving a Monell claim, a custom or practice could be supported by evidence of repeated constitutional violations which went uninvestigated and for which the errant municipal officers went unpunished. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "Hunter, et al. v. County of Sacramento, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging excessive force and other Eighth Amendment and due process violations in connection with a prison yard altercation. At issue was whether a plaintiff in a lawsuit governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was entitled to a jury trial on disputed factual issues relating to his exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court held that the Seventh Amendment did not guarantee a jury trial on factual disputes regarding administrative exhaustion under the PLRA. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Messa v. Goord, et al." on Justia Law

In negotiations for architectural services for construction of a hotel, the parties agreed that defendant would pay an additional $15,000, apart from design fees, if defendant elected not to use plaintiff's construction affiliate. The agreement stipulated that architectural designs would remain plaintiff's intellectual property. Defendant did not use plaintiff's construction affiliate and the relationship deteriorated. Plaintiff claimed that it had no further design obligations; defendant refused to pay what $28,000 demanded by plaintiff. Plaintiff accepted an $18,000 payment in satisfaction, but registered a copyright for designs that it had produced and filed copyright infringement claims against defendant. The district court ruled in favor of defendant, holding that plaintiff had not complied with registration requirements (17 U.S.C. 408(b)) when it submitted re-created designs because its office had been robbed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not identify anything in the designs that was original and protectable; the designs were, for the most part, based on the Holiday Inn Express prototype. View "Nova Design Build, Inc. v. Modi" on Justia Law

Respondent Annapolis Towne Centre (ATC), the owner and developer of a mixed-use development, entered into an agreement with petitioner Hovnanian Land Investment, a residential developer, under which ATC agreed to sell a portion of the property to Hovnanian for the construction of a residential tower. The contract required certain conditions to be met by ATC prior to the closing and contained a clause stating that any waiver of the contract had to be in writing. Before closing, Hovnanian terminated the agreement, alleging that ATC failed to meet a condition precedent. ATC sought a declaratory judgment, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether ATC had complied with the condition precedent. The circuit court granted ATC's motion for summary judgment on that issue, holding that Hovnanian waived the condition precedent. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because (1) a condition precedent may be waived by a party's conduct, despite a non-waiver clause, but whether Hovnanian's actions amounted to a waiver was a dispute of material fact; and (2) the question of whether ATC strictly fulfilled the condition also involved material questions of fact. Remanded. View "Hovnanian Land Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. Annapolis Towne Centre at Parole, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Defendants, the owner and operator of a Nevada company that inspected homes for construction defects and encouraged homeowners to file claims against their builder under a Nevada statute, appealed an injunction enjoining them from conducting further inspections. Del Webb Communities, Inc. (Del Webb), the developer of a retirement community where defendants inspected many homes, sued, alleging that defendants' business practices violated federal and state law. The court held that the general prohibition against operating "by means of illegal, unlicensed and false practices" was too vague to stand. Accordingly, the court affirmed the remaining provisions of the injunction but rejected the district court's reliance on Nevada's common law of champerty to create a tort cause of action for which Del Webb could obtain relief. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction in part and affirmed in part. View "Del Webb Cmty, Inc. v. Partington, et al." on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant Yvan Safar contracted with developer Per Bjorn-Roli to construct a 12-unit condominium project. Appellee Wells Fargo agreed to finance the project. By early 2007, the developer paid Appellant the entire amount of his contract, and Wells Fargo disbursed the entire loan, but the units were not complete. Appellant allegedly used his own funds to meet his payroll needs on the project. The project overran its budget, and Wells Fargo had to foreclose. Appellant contended that the bank promised to reimburse him for monies he spent in contemplating the completion of the project. After trial, the superior court found that Wells Fargo made no enforceable promise to Appellant to reimburse him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the bank did not make any promise or commitment to Appellant sufficient to meet the "actual promise" element of promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Appellant's case. View "Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

After Clark and Sullivan Constructors (C&S), a general contractor, solicited bids for a public works project, Dynalectric, a subcontractor, submitted a bid to perform electrical work on the project. C&S incorporated Dynalectric's bid into its bid for the contract, and C&S was awarded the project. Subsequently, Dynalectric repudiated its obligations to C&S. C&S sued Dynalectric in district court under various theories of liability, including promissory estoppel. The district court entered judgment for C&S on its promissory estoppel claim and awarded C&S $2,501,615 in damages, which represented the difference between Dynaletric's bid and the amount C&S paid the three replacement contractors to complete the work. Dynalectric appealed, contending that the district court applied the incorrect measure of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the determination of the appropriate measure of damages in any given case turns on considerations of what justice requires and the foreseeability and certainty of the particular damages award sought; and (2) the presumptive measure of damages for a general contractor that reasonably relies on a subcontractor's unfulfilled promise is the difference between the nonperforming subcontractor's original bid and the cost of the replacement subcontractor's performance. View "Dynalectric Co. of Nev., Inc. v. Clark & Sullivan Constructors, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Army Corps of Engineers awarded the company a contract for construction of a government hospital at Fort Benning. Two rival bidders each filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office, which recommended that the contract be re-procured without the company's participation. The GAO found organizational conflict of interest, focusing on the potential for access to nonpublic information and had concluding that the company had access to special knowledge of the Army's requirements that would give unfair advantage. The Army announced that it would follow the GAO recommendation and terminated the contract. The Court of Claims ordered reinstatement and the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Claims Court applied the correct standard of review in concluding that the termination was unreasonable. Th GAO identified no facts to indicated that the company actually had access to specific, sensitive information. View "Turner Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a limitations period applied to an action for breach of a construction contract. The Court of Appeals held that the limitations period applied in this case, and that the statute's six-year limit expired before Plaintiff Miller-Davis Company filed its complaint. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court that had awarded Plaintiff damages. Plaintiff argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that a different statute of limitations for breach of contract controlled, and the period prescribed by that statute was the applicable statute for this action. Upon review of the two statutes of limitations, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff. The limitation in both statutes is six years, however, the period runs from "the date the claim first accrued." The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment because there was a question about the date Plaintiff's action accrued. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Construction, Inc." on Justia Law