Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the grant of summary judgment against Landscapes Unlimited, LLC (LU) in which the district court: (1) applied I.C. 45-508 to postpone LU’s lien claim in golf course property to Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC’s (Hopkins) deed of trust covering the same, and (2) alternatively apportioned LU’s lien amount. Hopkins filed a complaint in district court seeking to foreclose on its deeds of trust because the borrowers were in default on both promissory notes. Hopkins alleged in the complaint that its interest in the subject properties had priority over LU’s lien claim. LU cross-claimed, alleging that its lien claim was superior to Hopkins’ deeds of trust because LU began work on the project in June 2006 and Hopkins did not record its first deed of trust until August. Accordingly, LU sought to foreclose its lien with respect to the parcels identified in its lien claim. LU filed a motion for summary judgment in December 2008 regarding the validity, superiority, and amount of its lien claim. Hopkins responded that LU’s lien, even if valid, did not have priority over Hopkins’ interest because LU failed to designate what portions of its lien amount are attributed to each parcel or improvement pursuant to I.C. 45-508. LU countered that a single lien claim could be filed, without segregating the amount, when the labor is provided pursuant to a single contract and the work provided amounts to a single improvement. The district court orally ruled that LU’s lien claim on the four parcels at issue was superior to Hopkins’ interest pursuant to I.C. 45-506. Because the Supreme Court found that I.C. 45-508 was inapplicable to LU’s lien claim and that equitable apportionment was not an appropriate alternative remedy where I.C. 45-508 does not apply, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC " on Justia Law

A construction company solicited a bid from a subcontractor to perform concrete work. The construction company provided a plan and bid schedule. The subcontractor responded with a proposal, which the construction company accepted. The subcontractor carried out the subcontract as it understood the terms. After the work was completed, the subcontractor discovered it had inadvertently underbid on the project. In the ensuing lawsuit, the superior court granted partial summary judgment to the construction company with respect to all damages claimed in relation to the bidding error. The subcontractor appealed the partial summary judgment order, claiming breach of an implied warranty that the plans and specifications would be sufficient, and arguing that the superior court erred by applying the theory of unilateral mistake to the case. Because the construction company did not breach the implied warranty and the subcontractor committed a unilateral mistake for which it bore the risk, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether property damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship is an "ocurrence" for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The issue arose from the appeals of Plaintiffs-Appellants Greystone Construction, Inc., The Branan Company, and American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American) who all appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant National Fire & Marine Insurance Company (National). Greystone was the general contractor that employed multiple subcontractors to build a house in Colorado. As is common along Colorado’s front range, the house was built on soils containing expansive clays. Over time, soil expansion caused the foundation to shift, resulting in extensive damage to the home’s living areas. The homeowners sued Greystone for damages, alleging defective construction by the subcontractors who installed the foundation. Greystone was insured under CGL policies provided by two insurers. American provided policies for 2001 to 2003, and National provided policies for 2003 to 2006. The American and National policy periods did not overlap. Greystone tendered a claim to American and then National. National denied it owed Greystone any defense. In district court, the builders and American sought to recover a portion of their defense costs from National. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that damage arising from a poor workmanship may fall under a CGL policy’s initial grant of coverage, even though recovery may still be precluded by a business-risk exclusion or another provision of the policy. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Greystone Construction v. National Fire & Marine" on Justia Law

Employers Mutual Casualty Company (Employers Mutual) appealed a circuit court's denial of its motion to intervene in a pending case. Holman Building Company was sued by multiple homeowners who claimed their homes were poorly built from inferior building materials with poor quality workmanship. In 2010, Employers Mutual moved to intervene in the action, asserting that it had issued Holman commercial general-liability and umbrella policies that covered some if not all of the allegations made by the homeowners. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employers Mutual's permissive intervention: "given the complexity of this case, the trial court was clearly within ints discretion to deny Employers Mutual's request to intervene for the purpose of obtaining a bifurcated trial of insurance-coverage issues or a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories ... this case provides a prime example of the need for discretion in a trial court's ruling on an insurer's motion for permissive intervention." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the insurance company's intervention. View "Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Holman Building Co., LLC et al. " on Justia Law

While making a delivery during the course of his employment, Appellant George Pool walked through a stream of running water that flowed across a parking lot. As a result, Appellant slipped and fell on black ice and suffered injuries. Appellant sued Defendants, the construction company that allegedly pumped the water into the parking lot and the owner of the parking lot, alleging negligence. Several additional defendants were subsequently added. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the original defendants and the two defendants named in Appellant's amended complaint on the ground that Appellant had assumed the risk of his injury. Appellant appealed. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the original defendants because Appellant did not assume the risk of his injury as a matter of law; (2) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of one later-named defendant and the dismissal in favor of the other later-named defendant; and (3) disavowed the reasoning related to assumption of the risk in Allen v. Marriott Worldwide Corp. View "Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

After the district court determined that the parties involved in this appeal were not in a special relationship, a jury found Appellants Eric Rolland and Rolland Building Corporation not negligent in an incident in which a skid loader attachment used to perform landscaping at Respondent Bradley Domagala's home fell on Respondent's foot, resulting in the amputation of three toes. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellants did not have a specific legal duty to warn Respondent arising in the context of a special relationship, but (2) Appellants had a general duty to warn as an exercise of the general duty of reasonable care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's special instructions to the jury that Appellants had no duty to warn and no duty to protect Respondent were misleading as to the crucial elements of duty and breach of duty, and (2) the instructions were prejudicial to Respondent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Domagala v. Rolland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of appeals in "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" (641 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2011)): "[i]s the proposed jury instruction in this case, which state[d] that '(a) Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act,' a correct statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the severing of an underground cable located on property owned by one of the alleged trespass[e]rs, and the property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep it, as an existing cable, underneath the property?" MCI alleged that co-Defendant James Joubert negligently excavated with a backhoe in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act. MCI alleged Defendant Wayne Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. The underground cable at issue was buried under land owned by Hagan. After a trial in the federal district court, a jury found for Hagan and Joubert. MCI appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Upon review of the issue presented by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: the proposed jury instruction in this case was not a correct statement of Louisiana law. View "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" on Justia Law

David and Kristine Anderson purchased an undeveloped lot of land from Country Living Development. After constructing a home on the lot, the Andersons' home developed structural problems resulting from excessive settling caused by unstable soil beneath their home's foundation. The Andersons filed suit against Matthew Kriser, an employee and shareholder of Country Living, for fraudulent nondisclosure. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kriser. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly concluded that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant had actual knowledge of undisclosed information to satisfy the elements of a claim for fraudulent disclosure; (2) because the Andersons failed to set forth any evidence demonstrating that Kriser actually knew of the soil conditions below their home, summary judgment was proper; and (3) the court of appeals erred in relying on the Court's holding in Smith v. Frandsen to reach its conclusion that the law imposed no duty on Kriser to disclose information to the Andersons simply because he did not construct their home. View "Anderson v. Kriser" on Justia Law

Defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, Defendant hired an independent contractor to make repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in a large insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners' rights and claims arising out of the fire, Plaintiff insurance company sued Defendant in tort and contract. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that because Defendant had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters " on Justia Law

CLR Properties and Choice Land Corporation (collectively, CLR) hired Waynco Construction (Waynco) as the general contractor for a commercial real estate improvement project. Waynco solicited a bid from AAA Construction of Missoula (AAA) to perform concrete work. After AAA submitted its bid, Waynco used AAA's bid to formulate Waynco's general contract bid to CLR. CLR accepted Waynco's bid. While AAA completed a majority of the work outlined in its bid by the time it left the project, a dispute arose between Waynco and AAA about the parties' subcontract agreement. Waynco eventually failed to pay AAA for any labor or materials. AAA filed a complaint against CLR and Waynco, alleging that Waynco had breached the contract and CLR had been unjustly enriched from AAA's work. The district court granted CLR's motion for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claims and, after a trial, held for AAA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly concluded that AAA's bid constituted a binding contract between the parties; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Waynco was the materially breaching party; and (3) the district court properly denied CLR's claim for attorney fees. View "AAA Constr. of Missoula, LLC v. Choice Land Corp." on Justia Law