Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the conclusion of the trial court that Plaintiff failed to establish Defendant's requisite minimum contacts with Tennessee, and thus the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant with respect to Plaintiff's suit, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff, a Tennessee resident, hired Defendant, an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Alabama, to build a house on a parcel of land in Alabama. Upon becoming dissatisfied with the quality and expense of the construction work Plaintiff filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Defendant's contacts with Tennessee were minor and attenuated. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of the minimum contacts necessary for a Tennessee court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. View "Baskin v. Pierce & Allred Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals as to the applicability of the economic loss doctrine in this case, holding that the economic loss doctrine applies only in products liability cases and should not be expanded to apply outside the products liability context.In the underlying suit brought by a drywall subcontractor against a general contractor under theories of breach of contract and tort a jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the subcontractor. The court of appeals affirmed in part the award of compensatory damages for breach of contract, dismissed the tort claim, and reversed the award for punitive damages, holding that the economic loss doctrine applied outside the products liability context when the contract was negotiated between sophisticated commercial entities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the economic loss doctrine only applies in products liability cases and should not be extended to other claims; and (2) the economic loss doctrine did not bar the subcontractor's recovery of compensatory and punitive damages based on its tort claim. View "Commercial Painting Co. v. Weitz Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In this case involving the correct interpretation of provisions in the Prompt Pay Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 66-34-101 to -704, relating to retainage withheld on construction projects, the Supreme Court held that the $300 per day penalty is assessed each day retaining is not deposited in a statutorily-compliant escrow account.The Act requires the party withholding retain age to deposit the funds into a separate, interest-bearing escrow account, and failure to do so results in a $300 per day penalty. Here, Subcontractor's retainage was not placed into an interest-bearing escrow account, and the retainage was not timely remitted to Contractor. Three years after completing its contractual duties, Subcontractor sued Contractor for unpaid retainage plus amounts due under the Act. Thereafter, Contractor tendered the retainage. At issue was the statutory penalty. The trial court concluded that Subcontractor's claim under the Act was barred by Tenn. Code Ann.'s one-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while Subcontractor's claim for the statutory penalty was subject to the one-year statute of limitations, if Subcontractor can establish that Contractor was required to deposit the retainage into an escrow account, Subcontractor was not precluded from recovering the penalty assessed each day during the period commencing one year before the complaint was filed. View "Snake Steel, Inc. v. Holladay Construction Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to an architect firm seeking to recover its design fees from a development company, holding that disputed issued of material fact existed that precluded summary judgment.Plaintiff, the architect firm, designed a condominium project for Defendant, the development company. Defendant was not able to pay Plaintiff under the contract, and as a result, Plaintiff's project agreed to accept a condominium in the project instead of a fee. Defendant did not fulfill the agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien for its unpaid fee under the contract and filed suit to enforce the lien. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the parties intended a novation by substituting the agreement to convey a condominium for the contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted because disputed questions of material fact existed about whether Plaintiff and Defendant intended a novation when they executed the agreement for the condominium. View "TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for, inter alia, two counts of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence, ruling that the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act applied to the case despite ex post facto concerns. The jury then convicted Defendant as charged. The jury sentenced Defendant to life sentences without the possibility of parole for the murders. The court of criminal appeals upheld Defendant’s convictions and sentences. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court should modify the Tennessee ex post facto analysis found in Miller v. State in light of Collins v. Youngblood. The Supreme Court affirmed on separate grounds, holding (1) Miller v. State is overruled; (2) the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee Constitution has the same definition and scope as the federal ex post facto clause; (3) the application of the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act to this case was not an ex post facto violation; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining issues. View "State v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

A construction company (Contractor) entered into a contract with the State to restructure an interstate interchange. The contract contained an incentive clause stating that no incentive payment would be made if work was not completed in its entirety by December 15, 2006. After the work was completed, Contractor filed a complaint alleging that the State had breached the contract by refusing to grant an appropriate time extension of the completion date, the disincentive date, and the incentive date. The claims commission (1) found that the contract contained a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, and (2) considered extrinsic evidence in concluding that Contractor was entitled to the maximum incentive payment and an extension of the contract completion date. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous and did not permit an extension of the incentive date, and (2) therefore, Contractor was not entitled to an incentive bonus. Remanded. View "Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, Defendant hired an independent contractor to make repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in a large insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners' rights and claims arising out of the fire, Plaintiff insurance company sued Defendant in tort and contract. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that because Defendant had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters " on Justia Law