Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Georgia
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Scean Mitchell appealed his convictions for malice murder and other offenses in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Calvin Clark, Jr. Mitchell argued the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other acts under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). He also argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the trial court instructed the jury to disregard evidence of self-defense and for failing to request a jury instruction on self-defense. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected both claims: there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the Rule 404 (b) evidence because it was relevant to the issue of intent and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect; and trial counsel was not ineffective because the self-defense claim was not supported by strong evidence and was inconsistent with the defense theory counsel had reasonably pursued instead. View "Mitchell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Property owners and the contractors they hired to build a house had a dispute. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the owners' request for review to consider: (1) whether anticipated profits could be included in a materialmen’s lien; and (2) if so, whether the improper inclusion of such profits rendered the entire lien void. Because the Court of Appeals correctly held that anticipated profits could not be included in a lien and that their inclusion does not invalidate the entire lien, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Massey et al. v. Duke Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

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Antonio Wallace was tried by a jury and convicted of the murder of Leroy O’Hara. Wallace appealed, claiming: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial on the general grounds; and (3) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Supreme Court found no merit in these claims, and affirmed. View "Wallace v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Diara Hood was convicted by jury of the felony murder of Steven Carden, the aggravated assault of Thomas Smith, and other related crimes. Following the trial court’s denial of her motion for new trial, Hood appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting other-acts evidence and by charging the jury on that evidence. Although the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court committed two merger errors at sentencing, it otherwise affirmed her convictions. View "Hood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Brandon Carter was convicted by jury of malice murder and two firearm offenses in connection with the shooting death of Terrance Baker. On appeal, Carter contended the trial court erred by admitting certain hearsay statements into evidence and by violating his constitutional right to be present during his trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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The federal United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the scope of the “acceptance doctrine” in negligent construction tort cases. At issue was whether and how the acceptance doctrine applied as a defense against a claim brought by a subsequent purchaser of allegedly negligently constructed buildings. Thomaston Crossing, LLC (the “original owner”) entered into a construction contract with appellee Piedmont Construction Group, Inc. to build an apartment complex in Macon. Piedmont then retained two subcontractors – appellees Alan Frank Roofing Company and Triad Mechanical Company, Inc. – to construct the roof and the HVAC system, respectively. In 2014, the complex was completed, turned over to, and accepted by the original owner. In 2016, the original owner sold the apartment complex to appellant Thomaston Acquisition, LLC (“Thomaston”) pursuant to an “as is” agreement. Shortly after the sale, Thomaston allegedly discovered evidence that the roof and HVAC system had been negligently constructed. Thomaston filed suit against Piedmont, asserting a claim for negligent construction of the roof and HVAC system and a claim for breach of contract/implied warranty. Piedmont then filed a third-party complaint against Alan Frank Roofing and Triad Mechanical because both companies had allegedly agreed to indemnify Piedmont for loses arising out of their work. Each of the appellees later moved for summary judgment based in part on the defense that Thomaston’s negligent construction claim is barred by the acceptance doctrine. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the acceptance doctrine applied to Thomaston’s claim, and that “readily observable upon reasonable inspection” referred to the original owner’s inspection. “Without any real claim of privity, Thomaston nevertheless contends that it should be treated like the original owner because it is the current owner-occupier of the property. But doing so would undermine the acceptance doctrine’s foundational purpose of shielding contractors from liability for injuries occurring after the owner has accepted the completed work, thereby assuming responsibility for future injuries. There is no ‘current owner-occupier’ or ‘subsequent purchaser’ exception to the acceptance doctrine, and the facts of this case do not compel us to recognize one here.” View "Thomaston Acquisition, LLC v. Piedmont Construction Group, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC (“VPD”) appealed a Superior Court order granting injunctive relief and requiring an accounting in this suit by RMW Development Fund, II, LLC (“RMW”) stemming from VPD’s management of Veterans Parkway Apartments, LLC (the “Company”). The order at issue granted RMW an interlocutory injunction: (1) enjoining VPD from using funds in its possession or control to construct a second entrance to an apartment complex in Columbus (the “Property”), constructed and managed by the Company; (2) prohibiting VPD from using funds for any purpose other than the normal day-to-day expenses of the Property; and (3) requiring VPD to submit a monthly report of its expenses to the superior court, with copies to counsel for the parties. RMW filed suit against VPD alleging VPD’s breach of contract by its entering into an unauthorized management agreement and thereby paying an unauthorized management fee, and a claim for “promissory estoppel,” stemming from VPD’s alleged failure to use some of the Company’s funds for partial repayment of a development loan; RMW asked for VPD’s removal as manager of the Company and for the costs of litigation. Prior to the filing on the complaint, the Company had purchased a 60-foot strip of land for the purpose of creating a second entrance to the Property. At a hearing on the injunction, RMW argued that it could not undo any construction of the second entrance to the Property. VPD countered that RMW was, in reality, concerned about money being spent on the construction of the second entrance instead of being used to repay the loans made by RMW, and that any appropriate redress was monetary damages. Ultimately the injunction was granted and VPD appealed. The Supreme Court found after review of this matter that the trial court's injunction was not supported by the record, and that court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC v. RMW Development Fund II, LLC" on Justia Law