Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from an action brought by Stonebrook Construction, LLC against Chase Home Finance, LLC where it sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The district court granted Chase's motion for summary judgment, holding that Stonebrook was precluded from placing a lien against the subject property because it did not properly register under the Idaho Contractor Registration Act (ICRA) Stonebrook appealed, arguing that Chase lacked standing to assert this defense and was not within the class intended to be protected by the ICRA. Alternatively, Stonebrook contended that the good-faith registration of one member of the LLC constituted actual or substantial compliance with the requirements of the ICRA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed: "the plain language of the Act unambiguously indicates that the Legislature intended to require all limited liability companies engaged in the business of construction to register as contractors and to preclude those that do not register from enforcing mechanic's liens. Although the result for Stonebrook is harsh, it is the result the Legislature intended. [The Court was] not at liberty to disregard this legislative determination as to the most effective means of protecting the public." Thus, the Court declined to vacate the district court’s decision. View "Stonebrook Construction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

Lake Cabin Development entered into two separate written agreements with the Robert Hurly and John Hurly families to purchase their respective properties. Pursuant to an agreement, Lake Cabin provided Robert Hurly with a $250,000 option payment. After public opposition to Lake Cabin's proposed development on the land forced Lake Cabin to extend the deadline on the closing date of its agreement with the Hurlys, Lake Cabin declared the contract to be null and void and demanded return of its option payment. Both Hurly families brought separate breach of contract actions. The district court concluded that Robert Hurly was required to refund the $250,000 option payment to Lake Cabin because there was never an enforceable contract between the parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that the parties had not entered into a binding agreement, and (2) Lake Cabin was not entitled to a refund of the option payment. Remanded. View "Hurly v. Lake Cabin Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Cascade Development, Inc. and the City of Bozeman. On December 7, 2007, Cascade filed a complaint alleging various claims against Bozeman. A summons and complaint were issued by the clerk's office on the same day, but service was not attempted by Cascade for nearly three years. On December 2, 2010, a professional process server took the summons and complaint to the city attorney's office, and a deputy city attorney took the papers. Bozeman filed a motion to quash service and dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court was correct in determining that Cascade had not validly served its summons and complaint on Bozeman pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(t), as the deputy city attorney had neither implied authority nor apparent authority to accept service of process on behalf of Bozeman; and (2) the district court was correct in concluding that Bozeman was not estopped from asserting defective service of process. View "Cascade Dev., Inc. v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Gerald T. Dixon, Jr., LLC retained Hassell & Folkes to survey and mark the boundary lines of a parcel Dixon owned. After completion of the survey, Dixon conveyed the parcel to Brat Development, which began construction of an office building. Thereafter, A&G Partnership filed for injunctive relief alleging that the building encroached upon its adjoining parcel. The circuit court found in favor of A&G and ordered the building's removal. Brat subsequently sued Dixon. Dixon then sued Hassell alleging breach of contract due to Harrell's erroneous determination of the parcel's boundary lines. The circuit court dismissed Dixon's complaint with prejudice, concluding that Dixon's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dixon's cause of action was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was time-barred when Dixon filed its complaint. View "Gerald T. Dixon, Jr., L.L.C. v. Hassell & Folkes" on Justia Law

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist. View "Redco Constr. v. Profile Props., LLC " on Justia Law

Homeowners sued Contractor for, inter alia, breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and fraudulent concealment, claiming that Contractor negligently failed to perform contractually required work. The district court granted summary judgment in Contractor's favor on all claims. As to the negligence allegations of interest in this appeal, the district court held (1) the economic loss doctrine prevented Homeowners from bringing a tort action under circumstances governed by contract, and (2) the economic loss doctrine supplied an additional bar to Homeonwers' fraud claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal to decide whether the economic loss doctrine barred any negligence claims. The Court reversed, holding that the doctrine should not apply in this case where (1) existing caselaw establishes that homeowners' claims against residential contractors may be asserted in tort, contract, or both, depending on the nature of the duty giving rise to each claim; and (2) rationales upholding the economic loss doctrine do not support its adoption for disputes between homeowners and their contractors. Remanded. View "David v. Hett" on Justia Law

After Leon Coleman failed to perform eight construction contracts for detached homes, he was convicted of eight counts of theft by deception and eight counts of failure to escrow under Deposits on New Homes Subtitle (Act). The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Act did not apply and that there was insufficient evidence of intent to support the theft convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to conclude that Coleman intentionally deprived buyers of their property, as required under the theft statute; and (2) the plain meaning of the Act indicated that it did not apply to Coleman. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute regarding developed property. Developer filed a complaint alleging that the project's general contractor (Contractor) and an engineering firm (Firm) had negligently provided recommendations with respect to site preparation. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor Firm on Contractor's cross-claims against Firm that sought recovery of remediation costs incurred by Contractor, concluding (1) some of Contractor's cross-claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) W. Va. Code 55-2-21 did not apply to toll any limitations periods because Contractor's claims were independent causes of action as opposed to cross-claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court prematurely found that section 55-2-21 did not apply because it failed to analyze whether the claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence and, thus, constituted cross-claims or independent causes of action; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed so as to preclude summary judgment if Contractor's claim was an independent cause of action. Remanded. View "J. A. Street & Assocs. v. Thundering Herd Dev." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the grant of summary judgment against Landscapes Unlimited, LLC (LU) in which the district court: (1) applied I.C. 45-508 to postpone LU’s lien claim in golf course property to Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC’s (Hopkins) deed of trust covering the same, and (2) alternatively apportioned LU’s lien amount. Hopkins filed a complaint in district court seeking to foreclose on its deeds of trust because the borrowers were in default on both promissory notes. Hopkins alleged in the complaint that its interest in the subject properties had priority over LU’s lien claim. LU cross-claimed, alleging that its lien claim was superior to Hopkins’ deeds of trust because LU began work on the project in June 2006 and Hopkins did not record its first deed of trust until August. Accordingly, LU sought to foreclose its lien with respect to the parcels identified in its lien claim. LU filed a motion for summary judgment in December 2008 regarding the validity, superiority, and amount of its lien claim. Hopkins responded that LU’s lien, even if valid, did not have priority over Hopkins’ interest because LU failed to designate what portions of its lien amount are attributed to each parcel or improvement pursuant to I.C. 45-508. LU countered that a single lien claim could be filed, without segregating the amount, when the labor is provided pursuant to a single contract and the work provided amounts to a single improvement. The district court orally ruled that LU’s lien claim on the four parcels at issue was superior to Hopkins’ interest pursuant to I.C. 45-506. Because the Supreme Court found that I.C. 45-508 was inapplicable to LU’s lien claim and that equitable apportionment was not an appropriate alternative remedy where I.C. 45-508 does not apply, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC " on Justia Law