Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court addressed whether a claim for fraud in the inducement was available when the basis for the claim contradicts the very language of the contract at issue in the parties’ dispute. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Court concluded that when a fraudulent inducement claim contradicts the express terms of the parties’ integrated contract, it fails as a matter of law. Additionally, the Court addressed the propriety of the damages awarded by the jury under a separate claim for breach of contract. The Court affirmed the compensatory damages award in this case, but reversed the punitive damages award, as the Court reversed the finding of fraud on which the punitive damages were based. View "Road & Highway Builders v. N. Nev. Rebar" on Justia Law

After agreeing to purchase a new townhouse, the Smiths leased it back to the builder, Ryan Homes, to use for six months as a model home. Ryan Homes converted the garage into a sales office. When the Smiths took possession, they used the converted garage as additional living space. The developer sought a mandatory injunction forcing the Smiths and Ryan Homes to convert the space back to a functional garage. The chancellor ruled in favor of defendants. The recorded subdivision plan and declaration of restrictions do not prohibit conversion of a garage to living space. The partition wall of the garage conversion is not sufficiently visible to the public to trigger an architectural review requirement and fears about parking problems are overly speculative. View "Reybold Venture Grp. XI-A, LLC. v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, 40, requires a conservation commission to issue a decision on a requested order of conditions within 21 days after holding a public hearing on the applicant's notice of intent to perform work covered by the act. Following the owner’s request for an extension, a hearing on his application for construction of a pile-supported pier and floating dock was held on April 6; the commission voted to deny the application on April 27 and mailed notice on April 28, 22 days after the hearing. The department reversed, based on the commission’s failure to timely act. In the meantime, the commission issued an enforcement order, based on work being done on the applicant’s property. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an applicant may waive the statutory time restriction, but any waiver must be voluntary in fact, its duration defined and reasonable in length, and notice of the waiver's duration must be a matter of public record, available to all interested persons. In this case, the applicant is entitled to proceed under the order issued by the department. View "Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham" on Justia Law

David Bennett and Bennett & Bennett Construction, Inc. ("Bennett") appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of the claims alleging fraud in the inducement and the tort of outrage brought against them by Barbara and Leotes Skinner. The Skinners entered into a construction-services contract with Bennett, pursuant to which Bennett was to renovate and remodel their residence located in Oxford. After disagreements developed between the parties, the Skinners sued Bennett, alleging claims of breach of contract; breach of warranty; fraud in the inducement; assault and battery; the tort of outrage; and negligence, wantonness and recklessness. Bennett moved to compel arbitration of all claims, arguing that, because each of the claims alleged by the Skinners arose from the construction-services contract or were related to the construction-services contract, the claims were subject to arbitration. Furthermore, Bennett argued that the tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and that the Skinners should not be allowed to avoid arbitration because they cast their claim as a tort. The Skinners responded, arguing that their agreement to the arbitration clause in the contract was obtained fraudulently. The trial court denied Bennett's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Skinners' tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and thus was a proper claim for arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Skinner " on Justia Law

KM Upstream, LLC and Newpoint, Inc. entered into a contract whereby Newport would construct for KM's amine plant. Newpoint subcontracted with Elkorn Construction, Inc. to build the foundation and perform other work. Elkhorn subsequently filed a lien statement with the county clerk. Elkhorn later filed a complaint against KM for, inter alia, foreclosure of the lien as a mechanic's lien. Newpoint was later added as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to Elkhorn to allow foreclosure on the mechanic's lien. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment; but (2) reversed and remanded the district court's determination that $181,369 of Elkhorn's lien claim was disputed and its subsequent order subtracting that amount from Elkhorn's judgment. View "KM Upstream, LLC v. Elkhorn Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

After the owner of a construction project defaulted on its obligations to various creditors, mortgage holder Pinnacle Bank foreclosed on the real property securing its mortgage. Junior mortgage holder American National Bank (ANB) and construction lienholder Michael's Construction, Inc. (Michael's) both sought payment from the surplus funds resulting from the foreclosure proceeding. The district court declared that ANB's mortgage was superior to Michael's lien, but denied ANB's request for contractual interest from the date of foreclosure through the date of final judgment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order regarding the priority of liens; but (2) reversed the order regarding interest, holding that the district court did not have the discretion to limit ANB's recovery by denying it interest at the contractual rate from the time of foreclosure through final judgment. Remanded to determine the amount of interest due ANB under the promissory note for that time period. View "Michael's Constr., Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank " on Justia Law

An owner and contractor entered into an agreement for the construction of a new home. During construction, the owner refused to pay the contractor after discovering markups on the cost of materials. In response, the contractor halted construction and filed an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. The contractor subsequently filed a petition to foreclose the mechanic's lien. Although the contractor did not complete construction, the district court found the contractor rendered substantial performance under the contract and entered a judgment against the owner. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the contractor had substantially completed work for the owner. Remanded. View "Flynn Builders, L.C. v. Lande" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a seventy-five-day lien notice sent by Appellant, Ground Zero Construction, to Appellees, Walnut Creek, LLC and Rees Development, complied with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-115(e)(2)(C)(i), which requires that the notice contain a "general description of the labor, service, or materials furnished." The lien notice was provided in connection with sums owed and unpaid for labor and materials provided to Appellees for the construction and improvements of water and sewer for a subdivision. The circuit court concluded that the notice did not comply with the materialman's statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ground Zero's description of the labor, service, or materials furnished did not comply with the statute because Ground Zero essentially provided no description at all. View "Ground Zero Constr. v. Walnut Creek, LLC" on Justia Law

IWC appealed the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of IDH. Hawaiian, a Florida condominium, contracted with IDH for roof repair. While IDH was conducting the repairs, a large stone veneer wall fell, causing damage to the condominium. Hawaiian's insurer, ICW, sued IDH for negligence. IDH alleged that the wall fell because it was structurally unsound. During trial, at the close of ICW's case, the district court granted IDH's motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could find that IDH was negligent because ICW failed to present any evidence on the standard of care in the roofing industry. Without reaching the issue of whether roofers were "professionals" under Florida law, the court held that ICW was required to put forth some evidence of the standard of care in the roofing industry in order to meet its burden. Because ICW failed to do so, judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. Further, the specificity requirement in Rule 50(a)(2) did not bar the granting of judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ins. Co. of the West v. Island Dream Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved two mechanic's liens foreclosed against a hotel property. An agent of the lien claimants personally served mechanic's liens statements on the property owner. Appellant, a community bank, challenged the validity of this service. Appellant argued that a lien claimant may not personally serve a mechanic's lien statement, and therefore, service was improper. As a result, Appellant contended that the mechanic's liens were invalid and could not be foreclosed. The district court determined that service was proper and entered judgment in favor of the lien claimants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a lien claimant may personally serve a mechanic's lien statement, and therefore, service of the mechanic's lien statements in this case was proper. View "Eclipse Architectural Group, Inc. v. Lam" on Justia Law