Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a developer, helped construct a planned development (the "community"). The community HOA sued the developers, sellers, and builders of the development, including Petitioner, on behalf of the individual homeowners, alleging construction-defect-based claims for breach of implied and express warranties and negligence. Thereafter, the community HOA filed a motion for the district court to determine that its claims satisfied the class action requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded that the HOA did not need to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and thus allowed the action to proceed without conducting a class action analysis. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition, claiming that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to undertake a class action analysis. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition to the extent that it directed the district court to analyze the Rule 23 factors in this case. In so doing, the Court clarified the application of D.R. Horton v. District Court when a homeowners' association seeks to litigate construction-defect claims on behalf of its members under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d). View "Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on an action to recover damages from a well driller who drilled a well that later caved in. The district court granted the well driller's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the alleged claims of negligence and breach of contract were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and the court dismissed the action. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that the breach of contract claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations and that the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling" on Justia Law

Home Loan Investment Bank appealed from a judgment entered in the superior court following a bench trial that confirmed the validity of the mechanic's liens to Jim's Plumbing and Heating, Inc. and Westbrook Tools, Inc. against Bedford Falls Associates for work performed at a commercial property. The Bank argued that the court erred as a matter of law and fact by concluding that the liens had priority over two mortgages granted to Bedford Falls for the acquisition and renovation of the property because it did not consent to the work performed by Jim's Plumbing or Westbrook Tools. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported a finding that the Bank had sufficiently specific knowledge of Jim's Plumbing and Westbrook Tools's labor and materials to infer that the Bank consented to the labor and materials secured by the liens. View "Jim's Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Home Loan Inv. Bank" on Justia Law

In this construction defect case, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment ruling. The court meanwhile entered judgment, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. When the trial court later denied the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did not file a new notice of appeal. The question in this case was whether plaintiff needed to do so. Defendant argued that, because a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for new trial, its filing rendered plaintiff's earlier notice of appeal premature and, as a consequence, a nullity. Plaintiff argued that the motion for reconsideration did not constitute a motion for a new trial and thus had no effect on the filing of the notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under "Carter v. U.S. National Bank," (747 P2d 980 (1987)), a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court held that the filing of the motion did not have the effect of rendering the appeal a nullity. Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff was not required to file a new notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Carter" and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided. In this case, plaintiff's filing of the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment did not render the filing of the notice of appeal premature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren" on Justia Law

Riverbend Community, LLC and Parkway Gravel, Inc. jointly owned a parcel of land (the Property), which they intended to develop into residential real estate. Before purchasing the Property, Riverbend and Green Stone Engineering, LLC signed a August 2005 Contract, which required Green Stone to perform four tasks: (1) Site Evaluation and Regulatory Review, (2) Wetlands Restoration Conceptual Design, (3) Wetland Enhancement Conceptual Layout, and (4) Regulatory Meetings and Presentation. In March 2006, the parties signed a second contract which required Green Stone to provide design services for the site and roadways, the stormwater collection and conveyance systems, the sanitary sewer system, the water supply piping system, the stormwater management plans, the sediment and erosion control plans, and the landscape plans. Green Stone left the project in late 2007. Riverbend hired a new engineering firm to complete the work, but the new firm needed Green Stone's work product. Green Stone would not release its work product unless Riverbend executed a release. In 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued two Cease and Desist Letters against Riverbend because of the work in the wetlands. Meanwhile, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control filed a complaint against Riverbend too. As a result of the federal and state issues, Riverbend could not sell houses, and its lender foreclosed on and purchased the Property at a sheriff's sale in April 2012. Riverbend sued Green Stone for breach of contract, professional negligence, and simple negligence. Green Stone moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the economic loss doctrine barred the tort claims and the general release barred all claims. The trial judge granted the motion, and Riverbend appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court interpreted the release as a general release, and did not address the application of the economic loss doctrine. Because the Court found the release was a general release that unambiguously waived all claims, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment below on both the tort and contract claims. View "Riverbend Community, LLC, et al. v. Green Stone Engineering, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

This case concerned the remedy under Louisiana law for the purchaser of a newly constructed home with a construction defect that has not resulted in actual physical damage to the home. The court held that the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:3141, 9:3150, provided the exclusive remedy against a builder for a purchaser of a new home. The court also held that a claim brought under the Act must allege that the defect in question resulted in actual physical damage to the home. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the case. View "Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This litigation arose from the construction of a 143-unit condominium complex. Plaintiff Long Trail House Condominium Association appealed a trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant general contractor Engelberth Construction, Inc. on its complaint. The Association argued that the court erred in: (1) applying the economic loss rule to bar its negligence claim; and (2) dismissing its breach of implied warranty claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the trial court's decision. View "Long Trail House Condominium Assoc. v. Engelberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

An owners association for a construction defect action against a condominium developer, seeking recovery for damage to its property and damage to the separate interests of the condominium owners who composed its membership. In response, the developer filed a motion to compel arbitration based on a clause in the recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions providing that the association and the individual owners agreed to resolve any construction dispute with the developer through binding arbitration. The trial court determined that the clause embodied an agreement to arbitrate between the developer and the association but invalidated the agreement upon finding it marked by slight substantive unconscionability and a high degree of procedural unconscionability. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause bound the association and was not unconscionable. View "Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Dev." on Justia Law

WR sought to develop a medical office building by executing a long-term ground lease to a developer, who would design, finance, construct, and own the facility, leasing space to WR. WR requested proposals, describing a 30-year ground lease for a 30,000 square foot medical facility. Citadel submitted a proposal. Negotiations followed. WR signed an “Authorization to Proceed” stating that WR “will only be responsible for architectural and engineering fees in the event [W R] does not execute its space leases and ground lease.” Citadel hired attorneys, architects, engineers; refined plans: conducted zoning review, and began securing financing. Negotiations failed. WR terminated the relationship, just as Citadel was preparing to commence construction. WR refused to pay expenses unless it received the plans; entered into contracts with Citadel’s architect and engineer; used their plans and built the facility. The district court rejected Citadel’s claims. The parties settled with respect to pre-construction costs and fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Citadel failed to show that WR agreed to complete the arrangement. When the relationship ended, they had not agreed on essential lease terms. No language in the agreement required the parties to negotiate in good faith, nor did it establish a framework for the negotiation process. View "Citidal Grp. Ltd. v. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Respondent/cross-appellant Precision Construction, Inc. solicited bids from subcontractors for the design and installation of an early suppression, fast response sprinkler system. Certified Fire Protection, Inc. submitted a bid. Precision notified Certified that it won the bid, and Precision entered into a contract with the owner to complete the project. Certified obtained a copy of the subcontract along with a set of construction plans and sprinkler system specifications. The subcontract’s provisions required Certified to complete the preliminary design drawings of the sprinkler system within two weeks and to obtain a certificate naming Precision as an additional insured. Over the next few weeks, Precision asked Certified several times to sign the subcontract and provide the additional-insured certificate. Certified objected to the subcontract as imposing terms that differed from the bid specifications. It complained that the unanticipated terms changed the scope of work and that it would have to amend its bid accordingly. Certified also took exception to some of the generic contractual provisions, including the additional-insured requirement. Nonetheless, Certified hired specialists to work on the Precision contract, and began work. Precision and Certified communicated several more times about getting the subcontract signed. Eventually Precision terminated its relationship with Certified for refusing to sign the subcontract, for not providing the additional-insured endorsement, and for incorrect designs. At Precision’s request, Certified submitted an itemized billing for the work it had performed; its bill reported costs of $25,185.04, which included design work and permit fees for the project. Precision deemed the costs too high and never paid. Certified placed a mechanic’s lien on the property and sued to recover for its design-related work. Certified’s complaint sought to foreclose the mechanic’s lien and damages for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and breach of contract. On appeal, Certified argued that the district court failed to determine whether a contract for the design-only work existed but conceded that the parties never reached agreement on the full design and installation contract. Certified also asserted that the district court erred in concluding that Precision was neither unjustly enriched nor liable to Certified in quantum meruit because Precision did not benefit from the work performed. On cross-appeal, Precision argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying Precision’s motion for attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Certified did not provide sufficient evidence to establish either an implied-in-fact contract or unjust enrichment, the Court affirmed. Additionally, the Court affirmed on cross-appeal the district court’s order denying attorney fees. View "Certified Fire Prot. v. Precision Constr." on Justia Law