Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Respondents were involved in the development and construction of Holcomb Condominiums (Condos). Appellant was the homeowners' association for Condos. Appellant filed, on behalf of itself and all condominium homeowners, a constructional defect complaint against Respondents, alleging a variety of defects and claims for negligence and breach of warranty. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint as time-barred by the two-year contractual limitations period found in nearly identical arbitration agreements attached to each of the homeowners' purchase contracts. The court also denied as futile Appellant's request to amend its complaint to add causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent concealment based on missing roof underlayment, finding that the claim would also be time-barred by the contractual limitations period. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) arbitration agreements containing a reduced limitations period that are attached to and incorporated into purchase contracts are unlawful; (2) the district court erred in finding Appellants' negligence-based claims and breach of warranty claims were time-barred; and (3) because the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable, the district court's denial of the motion to amend on this basis was improper. View "Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC" on Justia Law

The Sponsors formed West Run to construct and manage West Virginia University off-campus housing and retained CBRE to secure financing. CBRE provided prospective lenders with confidential information. Huntington’s predecessor loaned $39.975 million and construction began. A competing project (Copper Beach) was built across the street. West Run learned that Huntington had loaned $20 million for that project; West Run alleged that Huntington divulged to Copper Beach proprietary West Run information provided by CBRE. West Run‘s occupancy dropped from 95 percent to 64 percent. West Run sued, alleging that Huntington had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by financing Copper Beech. Two similar projects, involving the Sponsors, alleged breach of contract based on Huntington‘s failure to provide funds under their construction loan agreements. Huntington claimed that they had sold insufficient units to require Huntington to disburse additional funds under the agreements. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the complaint contained no corroborating facts that confidential information was disclosed and that no contract terms prohibited Huntington from lending to competitors. The court vacated with respect to the other projects for a chance to provide evidence showing that the pre-sale numbers in the original complaint were incorrect. View "W. Run Student Hous. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

In 2003, a stampede at a Chicago nightclub killed 21 people and injured 50 others. Security guards had released pepper spray to break up a fight on the dance floor, and a rush to the exit crushed these victims. The operators of a restaurant and bar in the building were acquitted on charges of involuntary manslaughter. They were held in indirect criminal contempt for willful violation of court orders concerning building code violations, and received two-year prison sentences. Those orders prohibited occupancy of a suspended mezzanine and occupancy of the second floor of the building. The appellate court ruled that the original orders were not clear and reversed the finding of indirect criminal contempt in 2011. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for consideration of other issues, holding that the jury could have found the defendants guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt View "People v. Le Mirage, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a verbal agreement entered into by Contractor and Landowner to construct a subdivision on a parcel of land. Disagreements arose between the parties, and the subdivision was never completed. Landowner filed this action against Contractor asserting Contractor had failed to make payments on an endloader that had been purchased for the project. Contractor counterclaimed for unjust enrichment based on excavation services he performed on the property. The jury found in favor of Landowner with regard to the endloader and in favor of Contractor with regard to his counterclaim. The trial court found Contractor was entitled to a prejudgment interest on his award of damages on his unjust enrichment claim. Contractor filed a motion to amend the judgment order, contending that the court erred in determining the date on which prejudgment interest began to accrue and had utilized an incorrect prejudgment interest date. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Contractor's motion to amend the judgment order, holding that the trial court erred by awarding Contractor prejudgment interest instead of allowing the jury to determine whether an award of prejudgment interest was warranted. Remanded. View "Ringer v. John" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (HOA) was a condominium owners' association that brought suit on its own behalf and on behalf of its members against various individuals and corporations seeking damages arising from the alleged defective development, negligent construction, and misleading marketing of a condominium complex. The complex consisted of dozens of units owned by members of the HOA. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion to join all unit owners, denied the HOA's motion for a protective order, and certified six questions to the Supreme Court. The Court answered only one of the questions, finding it unnecessary to address the remaining questions, holding (1) a unit owners' association is an adequate representative when a lawsuit is instituted by a unit owners' association on behalf of two or more unit owners pursuant to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act and the damages sought include unit specific damages affecting only individual units; and (2) this case should proceed in accordance with W. Va. Trial Court R. 26. View "Univ. Commons Riverside Home Owners Ass'n v. Univ. Commons Morgantown, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2009, Respondents hired a construction company (Company) to construct a shooting range. Respondents paid Company's bills as the construction continued through the summer and fall. By September, Company had billed $48,810. Respondents paid $46,000 by October but then refused to pay anything further. Soon thereafter, Company quit the project, which was largely finished. The range opened for business soon after. At the end of the year, Respondents installed soundproofing to the building. In March 2010, Company recorded its mechanics lien. In August, Company filed a complaint against Respondents seeking to recover $40,000 in damages and costs. The district court held the lien was not timely and was therefore frivolous and ordered the lien released, ruling that the "work of improvement" of constructing the shooting range concluded more than ninety days before Company filed the lien. At issue on appeal was whether the soundproofing constituted a "work of improvement." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the soundproofing was not within the scope of the "work of improvement" or finding that the lien was untimely and frivolous. View "I. Cox Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Jack Bays, Inc. did site work on the construction of a new church (New Life). Jack Bays contracted with several subcontractors, eleven of which were parties to this action. New Life obtained additional funds for the project through three lenders. The Lenders were listed on the deed of trust for the new financing. After New Life stopped making to Jack Bays due to lack of funding, Jack Bays recorded its memorandum of mechanics' lien against New Life and terminated the construction contract. All Contractors timely filed complaints against the Lenders. The circuit court ordered that the property be sold at public auction with the proceeds to be applied in satisfaction of the mechanics' liens in the following order of priority: Subcontractors, Jack Bays, and Lenders. The Lenders appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that Jack Bays' lien was valid; (2) was not plainly wrong in determining that the Contractors' liens had priority over the Lenders' deed of trust; but (3) erred in approving the sale of the entire parcel of land to satisfy the Contractors' liens, where no evidence was introduced to support this decision. Remanded. View "Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, Inc." on Justia Law

While a lawsuit by Appellees David and Elizabeth Speaks was pending against Rosemary and Byron Baker for damages related to poor construction workmanship, the Bakers transferred two parcels of real property to their son, Nathan Baker. The case resulted in a judgment against Byron but a dismissal of the claims against Rosemary. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Five days later, Nathan transferred the properties to a limited liability company (LLC) he and his family controlled. Appellees subsequently filed this case under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. While the case was pending, the LLC transferred the two pieces of property to trusts controlled by Rosemary Baker. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees permitting execution on the properties, finding that all of the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly found the conveyances to be fraudulent; but (2) Appellees failed to make the required prima facie showing that the properties were subject to execution on a judgment against Byron Baker alone. View "Baker v. Speaks" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered into a consent order with the several Queen Anne's County officials regarding resolution of their disputes over Petitioner's proposed construction of a project in the county. The consent order terminated litigation in Kent Island I in the Anne Arundel County circuit court. Seeking invalidation of the consent order, Respondents filed suit in the Queen Anne's County circuit court (Kent Island II). On Petitioner's motion, the case was transferred to the Anne Arundel County circuit court, which granted summary judgment for Petitioner. The court of special appeals vacated the judgment, finding that venue was appropriate in the Queen Anne's County circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court for Queen Anne's County did not have jurisdiction to modify or revise the consent order, a final judgment, entered by the Anne Arundel County circuit court; and (2) moreover, the Anne Arundel County circuit court was not empowered to revise or modify the judgment entered in Kent Island I in a manner sought by Respondents, as none of Respondents were a party in Kent Island I, and therefore, they could not maintain an action seeking either circuit court to exercise revisory power over the judgment in Kent Island II. View "Kent Island, LLC v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

In 1987, Waterfront purchased 5.3 acres in Philadelphia’s Central Riverfront District, zoned G-2 industrial. In exchange for rezoning to C-4 commercial, for a mixed-use, high-rise project, Waterfront agreed to restrictive covenants. When financing became possible in 2005, Waterfront obtained a permit for demolishing existing structures and constructing a 28-story apartment tower and entered into a financing agreement with a construction start date of February 2006. Waterfront had to postpone construction. In March 2006, the city extended to the site a zoning overlay with a height restriction of 65 feet and a width restriction of 70 feet. Waterfront alleged mistake; that the area councilman admitted that inclusion of the site was a mistake; and that Mayor Street stated that he would not have signed it had he known that the height restriction applied to the site. Waterfront unsuccessfully sought repeal, but never applied for a permit under the ordinance and did not seek a variance. Waterfront filed suit. In 2010 the city rescinded application of the height restriction. The district court held that the rescission mooted federal constitutional claims, denied Waterfront’s motion to amend to attack the width restriction, and granted the city summary judgment on all other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law