Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Respondents hired a construction company (Company) to construct a shooting range. Respondents paid Company's bills as the construction continued through the summer and fall. By September, Company had billed $48,810. Respondents paid $46,000 by October but then refused to pay anything further. Soon thereafter, Company quit the project, which was largely finished. The range opened for business soon after. At the end of the year, Respondents installed soundproofing to the building. In March 2010, Company recorded its mechanics lien. In August, Company filed a complaint against Respondents seeking to recover $40,000 in damages and costs. The district court held the lien was not timely and was therefore frivolous and ordered the lien released, ruling that the "work of improvement" of constructing the shooting range concluded more than ninety days before Company filed the lien. At issue on appeal was whether the soundproofing constituted a "work of improvement." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the soundproofing was not within the scope of the "work of improvement" or finding that the lien was untimely and frivolous. View "I. Cox Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Jack Bays, Inc. did site work on the construction of a new church (New Life). Jack Bays contracted with several subcontractors, eleven of which were parties to this action. New Life obtained additional funds for the project through three lenders. The Lenders were listed on the deed of trust for the new financing. After New Life stopped making to Jack Bays due to lack of funding, Jack Bays recorded its memorandum of mechanics' lien against New Life and terminated the construction contract. All Contractors timely filed complaints against the Lenders. The circuit court ordered that the property be sold at public auction with the proceeds to be applied in satisfaction of the mechanics' liens in the following order of priority: Subcontractors, Jack Bays, and Lenders. The Lenders appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that Jack Bays' lien was valid; (2) was not plainly wrong in determining that the Contractors' liens had priority over the Lenders' deed of trust; but (3) erred in approving the sale of the entire parcel of land to satisfy the Contractors' liens, where no evidence was introduced to support this decision. Remanded. View "Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, Inc." on Justia Law

While a lawsuit by Appellees David and Elizabeth Speaks was pending against Rosemary and Byron Baker for damages related to poor construction workmanship, the Bakers transferred two parcels of real property to their son, Nathan Baker. The case resulted in a judgment against Byron but a dismissal of the claims against Rosemary. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Five days later, Nathan transferred the properties to a limited liability company (LLC) he and his family controlled. Appellees subsequently filed this case under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. While the case was pending, the LLC transferred the two pieces of property to trusts controlled by Rosemary Baker. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees permitting execution on the properties, finding that all of the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly found the conveyances to be fraudulent; but (2) Appellees failed to make the required prima facie showing that the properties were subject to execution on a judgment against Byron Baker alone. View "Baker v. Speaks" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered into a consent order with the several Queen Anne's County officials regarding resolution of their disputes over Petitioner's proposed construction of a project in the county. The consent order terminated litigation in Kent Island I in the Anne Arundel County circuit court. Seeking invalidation of the consent order, Respondents filed suit in the Queen Anne's County circuit court (Kent Island II). On Petitioner's motion, the case was transferred to the Anne Arundel County circuit court, which granted summary judgment for Petitioner. The court of special appeals vacated the judgment, finding that venue was appropriate in the Queen Anne's County circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court for Queen Anne's County did not have jurisdiction to modify or revise the consent order, a final judgment, entered by the Anne Arundel County circuit court; and (2) moreover, the Anne Arundel County circuit court was not empowered to revise or modify the judgment entered in Kent Island I in a manner sought by Respondents, as none of Respondents were a party in Kent Island I, and therefore, they could not maintain an action seeking either circuit court to exercise revisory power over the judgment in Kent Island II. View "Kent Island, LLC v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

In 1987, Waterfront purchased 5.3 acres in Philadelphia’s Central Riverfront District, zoned G-2 industrial. In exchange for rezoning to C-4 commercial, for a mixed-use, high-rise project, Waterfront agreed to restrictive covenants. When financing became possible in 2005, Waterfront obtained a permit for demolishing existing structures and constructing a 28-story apartment tower and entered into a financing agreement with a construction start date of February 2006. Waterfront had to postpone construction. In March 2006, the city extended to the site a zoning overlay with a height restriction of 65 feet and a width restriction of 70 feet. Waterfront alleged mistake; that the area councilman admitted that inclusion of the site was a mistake; and that Mayor Street stated that he would not have signed it had he known that the height restriction applied to the site. Waterfront unsuccessfully sought repeal, but never applied for a permit under the ordinance and did not seek a variance. Waterfront filed suit. In 2010 the city rescinded application of the height restriction. The district court held that the rescission mooted federal constitutional claims, denied Waterfront’s motion to amend to attack the width restriction, and granted the city summary judgment on all other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a developer, helped construct a planned development (the "community"). The community HOA sued the developers, sellers, and builders of the development, including Petitioner, on behalf of the individual homeowners, alleging construction-defect-based claims for breach of implied and express warranties and negligence. Thereafter, the community HOA filed a motion for the district court to determine that its claims satisfied the class action requirements of Nev. R. Civ. P. 23. The district court concluded that the HOA did not need to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 and thus allowed the action to proceed without conducting a class action analysis. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition, claiming that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to undertake a class action analysis. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition to the extent that it directed the district court to analyze the Rule 23 factors in this case. In so doing, the Court clarified the application of D.R. Horton v. District Court when a homeowners' association seeks to litigate construction-defect claims on behalf of its members under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3102(1)(d). View "Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on an action to recover damages from a well driller who drilled a well that later caved in. The district court granted the well driller's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the alleged claims of negligence and breach of contract were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and the court dismissed the action. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that the breach of contract claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations and that the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule. The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling" on Justia Law

Home Loan Investment Bank appealed from a judgment entered in the superior court following a bench trial that confirmed the validity of the mechanic's liens to Jim's Plumbing and Heating, Inc. and Westbrook Tools, Inc. against Bedford Falls Associates for work performed at a commercial property. The Bank argued that the court erred as a matter of law and fact by concluding that the liens had priority over two mortgages granted to Bedford Falls for the acquisition and renovation of the property because it did not consent to the work performed by Jim's Plumbing or Westbrook Tools. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported a finding that the Bank had sufficiently specific knowledge of Jim's Plumbing and Westbrook Tools's labor and materials to infer that the Bank consented to the labor and materials secured by the liens. View "Jim's Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Home Loan Inv. Bank" on Justia Law

In this construction defect case, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment ruling. The court meanwhile entered judgment, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. When the trial court later denied the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did not file a new notice of appeal. The question in this case was whether plaintiff needed to do so. Defendant argued that, because a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for new trial, its filing rendered plaintiff's earlier notice of appeal premature and, as a consequence, a nullity. Plaintiff argued that the motion for reconsideration did not constitute a motion for a new trial and thus had no effect on the filing of the notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under "Carter v. U.S. National Bank," (747 P2d 980 (1987)), a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court held that the filing of the motion did not have the effect of rendering the appeal a nullity. Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff was not required to file a new notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Carter" and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided. In this case, plaintiff's filing of the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment did not render the filing of the notice of appeal premature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren" on Justia Law

Riverbend Community, LLC and Parkway Gravel, Inc. jointly owned a parcel of land (the Property), which they intended to develop into residential real estate. Before purchasing the Property, Riverbend and Green Stone Engineering, LLC signed a August 2005 Contract, which required Green Stone to perform four tasks: (1) Site Evaluation and Regulatory Review, (2) Wetlands Restoration Conceptual Design, (3) Wetland Enhancement Conceptual Layout, and (4) Regulatory Meetings and Presentation. In March 2006, the parties signed a second contract which required Green Stone to provide design services for the site and roadways, the stormwater collection and conveyance systems, the sanitary sewer system, the water supply piping system, the stormwater management plans, the sediment and erosion control plans, and the landscape plans. Green Stone left the project in late 2007. Riverbend hired a new engineering firm to complete the work, but the new firm needed Green Stone's work product. Green Stone would not release its work product unless Riverbend executed a release. In 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued two Cease and Desist Letters against Riverbend because of the work in the wetlands. Meanwhile, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control filed a complaint against Riverbend too. As a result of the federal and state issues, Riverbend could not sell houses, and its lender foreclosed on and purchased the Property at a sheriff's sale in April 2012. Riverbend sued Green Stone for breach of contract, professional negligence, and simple negligence. Green Stone moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the economic loss doctrine barred the tort claims and the general release barred all claims. The trial judge granted the motion, and Riverbend appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court interpreted the release as a general release, and did not address the application of the economic loss doctrine. Because the Court found the release was a general release that unambiguously waived all claims, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment below on both the tort and contract claims. View "Riverbend Community, LLC, et al. v. Green Stone Engineering, LLC, et al." on Justia Law