Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
BCL Properties, Inc. v. Boyle
The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment awarding attorney fees in this action brought over a dispute between a general contractor and a property owner related to a residential construction contract but otherwise affirmed the judgment, holding that there was no statute or uniform course of procedure that allowed recovery of attorney fees on this record.After Property Owner failed to pay a construction lien General Contractor filed a breach of contract action and sought to foreclosure on the lien. Property Owner counterclaimed. The district court entered judgment in favor of General Contractor. Thereafter, the district court granted prejudgment interest in the amount of $49,946 and attorney fees in the amount of $115,473. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 52-157 of the Nebraska Construction Lien Act; and (2) Property Owner was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error. View "BCL Properties, Inc. v. Boyle" on Justia Law
Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I
The Village alleged that the defendants breached a 2003 recorded annexation agreement executed by the Trustee that was then the legal owner of the property, which now consists of an annexed 114-acre subdivision. The Village alleged that the defendants were subject to the annexation agreement as successors to the Trustee when they purchased undeveloped portions of the property from Plank, which had acquired the property from the Trustee. The Village alleged that the defendants refused its request for a letter of credit in the amount proportionate to the number of lots the defendants owned in the subdivision, to secure the completion of roads in the subdivision.The defendants argued that, although the annexation agreement was a covenant that ran with the land, it did not confer successor status to an entity that purchased only a portion of the property subject to annexation, as opposed to the whole of the property. The Appellate Court reversed the dismissal of the action. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Reading the annexation agreement as a whole, the court found that its plain language required its provisions to be binding and enforceable on the parties’ successors. Defendants are successors in title to the landowner who agreed to those obligations. The obligations imposed upon any particular purchaser depend upon the obligations of the original developer that remain unsatisfied with respect to the specific parcel sold. View "Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I" on Justia Law
Jones Brothers, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Administration
The Tennessee Department of Transportation (TDOT) contracted with Jones to repair State Route 141. The project involved 68,615 tons of “graded solid rock” for the new road's bottom layer. To obtain graded solid rock, Jones leased land near the roadway, paying the property owner $75,282. Jones prepared the Site and began pattern blasting the limestone to produce appropriately sized rock pieces, using a “shaker” bucket to allow debris to fall away. Appropriately-sized rocks were hauled to the road site. The Site also served as a waste pit for material from the road repair. After several months, a Federal Mine Safety & Health Administration Inspector inspected the Site, determined that Jones had violated several Administration standards, and issued citations and orders.An ALJ ruled that the Site was a mine subject to the Mine Act, not a “borrow pit,” which is not subject to the Administration’s jurisdiction. On remand, the case was assigned to another ALJ, who indicated that she had read the vacated decision. Jone moved for recusal, citing the Sixth Circuit’s command that Jones receive fresh proceedings. The ALJ denied the motion and held that the Site was a mine, not a borrow pit, based on findings that Jones did not only use the Site on a one-time basis or only intermittently; engaged in milling, sizing, and crushing; and did not use the rock more for bulk fill than for its intrinsic qualities. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision as supported by substantial evidence. View "Jones Brothers, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law
Lennar Homes of Tex. Land & Construction, Ltd. v. Whiteley
The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal concerning whether a subsequent purchaser (Purchaser) of a home is required to arbitrate her claims against the builder (Builder) for alleged construction defects, holding that the trial court erred in granting Purchaser's motion to vacate and denying Builder's motion to confirm.The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration filed by Builder, which joined two subcontractors in the arbitration, asserting that they owed defense and indemnity obligations. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Builder. The trial court vacated the award against Purchaser but made no ruling whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors. The Supreme Court rendered judgment confirming the award against Purchaser and remanded the case, holding (1) Purchaser was bound by the arbitration clause in the purchase-and-sale agreement under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel; and (2) because the record contained no ruling on whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors, remand was required. View "Lennar Homes of Tex. Land & Construction, Ltd. v. Whiteley" on Justia Law
Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose
The eight-acre San Jose City View Plaza contained nine buildings, including the Bank, built in 1971, which later housed the County Family Court. The Bank was eligible for listing on the California Register of Historic Resources and National Register of Historic Places. The site development permit provided for the demolition of all structures, followed by the construction of three, 19-story office towers, 65,000 square feet of ground-floor retail, and five levels of underground parking.The city council certified the Downtown Strategy 2040 final environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000 (CEQA)), finding that the Plaza required a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The draft SEIR identified the proposed demolition of the buildings as a “significant unavoidable impact” and presented mitigation measures, to document the structures, advertise their availability for relocation, and otherwise make the structures available for salvage. The city voted not to designate the Bank as a city landmark and approved the permit, certifying the Final SEIR and rejecting project alternatives as infeasible because the “anticipated economic, social, and other benefits” of the project outweighed its “significant and unavoidable impacts.”After the trial court denied a mandate petition filed by opponents, the Bank was demolished. The court of appeal affirmed. The Final SEIR’s discussion of mitigation for the unavoidable loss of significant historic resources complied with CEQA. San Jose did not abuse its discretion by briefly considering and rejecting additional mitigation measures. View "Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law
Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law
Allie Construction, Inc. v. Mosier
Allie Construction, Inc., obtained writs of garnishment against the estate of Willard Mosier one day shy of the 20th anniversary of obtaining a judgment against his widow Debra Mosier, a beneficiary of his estate. The Alabama Supreme Court found Allie Construction properly commenced an enforcement action, and that action should be allowed to proceed. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred. The circuit court judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Allie Construction, Inc. v. Mosier" on Justia Law
Hamilton and High, LLC v. City of Palo Alto
In 1985, Palo Alto established the Commercial Downtown zoning district with parking regulations that allowed for “payment of an in-lieu monetary contribution to the city to defray the cost” of new, off-site parking spaces for “sites which would otherwise be precluded from development due to parking constraints.” In 1995, the city recognized the need to further mitigate insufficient downtown parking facilities and established an in-lieu parking fee for new, nonresidential development in the “University Avenue parking assessment district.” City staff has periodically submitted “five-year findings” on the parking fund, consistent with the Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code, 66000).The plaintiffs, developers who paid the fees as a condition of approval of a building project, sued, seeking a refund of their unexpended fees. The city argued that the fee was not subject to the Mitigation Fee Act; that the five-year finding and refund provisions did not apply; that, even if the Act did apply, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and that it complied with the Act’s requirements by belatedly adopting five-year findings.The court of appeal reversed the trial court, ordering a refund of the plaintiffs’ unexpended fees. The fee is subject to the Act, and the action is not time-barred. The failure to timely make five-year findings triggered the refund provision. Section 65010(b), does not require that plaintiffs make an independent showing of prejudice for a violation of section 66001(d) View "Hamilton and High, LLC v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law
Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley
Government Code 65913.4 provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. Berkeley denied Ruegg’s application for ministerial approval of a mixed-use development under section 65913.4. Ruegg alleged violations of both section 65913.4 and the Housing Accountability Act (HAA, section 65589.5). The trial court found Berkeley was not required to approve the proposed project under section 65913.4 and denied Ruegg’s petition without reaching the HAA issues. The court of appeal, without addressing the HAA, directed the trial court to grant the writ petition.On remand, the trial court reasoned that it could not avoid ruling on the HAA issues. With respect to the section 65913.4 claim the court ordered Berkeley to issue the permits; it set a briefing schedule and hearing date concerning the HAA issues. The court of appeal declined to prohibit that hearing. Berkeley issued the permit. After a hearing, the trial court found that the disapproval of the application violated the HAA and that Ruegg was entitled to the “albeit duplicative” injunctive relief. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the HAA issue, which was not forfeited nor rendered moot by the prior order. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law
Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Briggs Engineering, Inc.
BrunoBuilt, Inc., was constructing a custom home on a vacant lot in 2016 when a landslide occurred beneath the Terra Nativa subdivision in the Boise foothills. Following damage to the lot, BrunoBuilt filed a professional negligence suit against numerous engineers and engineering firms involved in the construction of the subdivision, arguing that they failed to identify preexisting landslide conditions and other geological circumstances that made residential development unsafe at this site. In the fall of 2018, BrunoBuilt discovered additional damage to the finished custom home itself. It then brought suit against additional defendants, including Briggs Engineering, Inc., and Erstad Architects. Briggs Engineering moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court concluded that BrunoBuilt’s action was time barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). BrunoBuilt appealed this decision, arguing that the malpractice claim did not begin to accrue until there was damage to the custom home, rather than just the land. To this the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with BrunoBuilt’s analysis and affirmed the district court that BrunoBuilt’s claim was time barred. View "Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Briggs Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law