Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from the disputed assignment of certain construction work on the Tappan Zee Hudson River Crossing Project. UBC appealed the district court's conclusion that a May 4th arbitration award was not final and that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by issuing a May 12th arbitration award. Under a heightened standard of deference, the court concluded that it must defer to the arbitrator’s interpretation of Article 10, Section 3(D) of the Project Labor Agreement (PLA) as allowing him to alter the short‐form award when rendering his written opinion. The PLA does not define the term “short‐form,” nor does it specifically require that the second decision echo the result of the first.  The court concluded that, absent any such definitions or provisions, the arbitrator had the authority to interpret Article 10, Section 3(D) as allowing him to change or alter the first award in order to ensure full consideration of the three criteria required under Article 5, Section 8 of the National Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry. Accordingly, the court confirmed the May 13th Award and vacated the May 4th Award. View "United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, Amtrak, alleging that it discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and District of Columbia law. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak. After the engine plaintiff was driving passed a stop signal at the rail yard and was forced off the rails by a safety derailer, Amtrak fired him and suspended his engineer certificate. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that no jury could reasonably conclude based on the evidence in the record that Amtrak was motivated by plaintiff's race to take the adverse actions of which he complains. View "Burley v. Nat'l Passenger Rail Corp." on Justia Law

Wayne Kelly was killed while working at a construction site in Hattiesburg. His family sued, among other defendants, Hanco Corporation, Inc., the general contractor for the project on which Wayne Kelly had been working at the time he died, and American Air Specialists of Mississippi, Inc., the subcontractor that had leased the services of Kelly and his coworkers from Landrum Professional Employer Services, Inc. The Kellys and Hanco/American Air moved separately for summary judgment. The circuit court denied summary judgment to Hanco and American Air. Hanco filed a petition for interlocutory appeal and the Kellys filed a cross-petition for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal and consolidated the cases. After review, the Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment because Hanco waived its exclusive-remedy affirmative defense despite section 71-3-6 of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy to claimants for on-the-job injuries. View "Hanco Corporation v. Goldman" on Justia Law

Cody McDonald was injured while working on the construction of a building. RTK Construction, Inc. hired Ponderosa Enterprises Inc. to frame the building, and Ponderosa hired McDonald as an independent contractor to assist with the framing. McDonald brought suit against Ponderosa and RTK, alleging, inter alia, negligence and violation of the Montana Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA). The district court granted partial summary judgment on the MOSHA claims, concluding that because McDonald was an independent contractor at the time of his injury, Ponderosa and RTK did not owe him any duties of safety under MOSHA. RTK was subsequently dismissed from the case, and a jury found that Ponderosa was not negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MOSHA does not create a duty for employers to meet certain safety guidelines with respect to independent contractors. View "McDonald v. Ponderosa Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The Department of Industrial Relations determined that plaintiff Vector Resources, Inc. failed to pay the appropriate prevailing wages to its workers on a public works project for the San Diego Unified School District. The Department's director's decision was based on regulatory language in a document entitled "Important Notice To Awarding Bodies And Other Interested Parties Regarding Shift Differential Pay In The Director's General Prevailing Wage Determinations," which was posted on the Department's Web site. The Important Notice addresses shift differential pay for various crafts used on public works projects, and was augmented by additional regulatory language in a "Note" that the Department placed on the cover page of prevailing wage shift provisions ("the Stamp"). Vector filed a declaratory relief action against the Department, seeking a declaration that the Important Notice and Stamp were invalid and unenforceable as "underground regulations" because they were not promulgated in compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Vector and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Department's motion on the ground that under Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g), the Important Notice and the Stamp were exempt from the notice and hearing requirements of the APA because they were part of an overall prevailing wage determination process that constituted "rate setting." Vector argued on appeal that the grant of summary judgment to the Department was made in error because: (1) the Department admitted that the shift premium rule is a regulation; (2) the Department admitted that that regulation was not adopted in compliance with the APA; (3) the Department failed to prove that the shift premium regulation establishes or fixes rates within the meaning of Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g); (4) the court erred in failing to specifically cite the evidence it relied on to grant summary judgment; (5) the court's written order ignored the law and the admissible evidence; and (6) the Department's motion relied upon inadmissible evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vector Resources, Inc. v. Baker" on Justia Law

The general contractor of a Wisconsin construction project, hired Harsco to supply scaffolding. Krien, injured in a fall when a plank on a scaffold on which he was standing, broke, sued Harsco. The parties settled his claim for $900,000. Harsco filed a third‐party complaint against the contractor, seeking indemnification plus interest and attorneys’ fees. The district judge granted the contractor summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded after examining the complex provisions of the contract between the two. The plank may or may have been supplied by Harsco and may or may not have been defective, as claimed by Krien, who could not sue Riley in tort, because against his employer his only remedy for a work‐related accident was a claim for workers’ compensation, but there has never been judicial resolution of these questions, because Krien’s suit was settled before there was any judgment. Indemnification, however, is a form of insurance, and could apply even if the party seeking indemnification was negligent. Riley’s duty to indemnify Harsco extends to legal expenses incurred by Harsco in defending against Krien’s suit and in litigating this suit. View "Krien v. Harsco Corp." on Justia Law

A contractor entered into a public works contract to modernize a building at a Santa Clara County community college. Will was the subcontractor for the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) work. The subcontract provided that the project was to be built according to the specifications of the prime contract. The subcontract and general contract did not specify whether Will was required to fabricate any material necessary to complete the HVAC work. The subcontract required Will to “pay not less than the [applicable prevailing wage] to all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by him at the project site.” California’s prevailing wage law generally requires that workers employed on public works be paid the local prevailing wage for work of a similar character. (Lab. Code,1771.) Since 1991, Will has fabricated materials at a permanent, offsite facility it operates in Hayward. An employee of Will complained to the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement alleging he should have been paid prevailing wages for work related to the project, involving the fabrication of sheet metal at the Hayward facility. DLSE issued a civil wage and penalty assessment. The Department of Industrial Relations reversed, in favor of Will. The trial court reversed. The court of appeal held that offsite fabrication is not covered by the prevailing wage law if it takes place at a permanent, offsite manufacturing facility and the location and existence of that facility is determined wholly without regard to the particular public works project. View "Sheet Metal Workers’ Int'l. Ass'n v. Duncan" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act, N.J. Stat. 34:11-56.25 (PWA) provides that laborers on certain public works projects are to be paid the prevailing wage. Carpenters hired to work on the Revel Casino Project in Atlantic City claimed that the Revel Casino Project is a “public work” within the meaning of the PWA because it received financial assistance in the form of incentives, tax exemptions, and tax reimbursements from the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (EDA), which, they argued is a “public body” within the meaning of the Act. They assigned their claims for unpaid prevailing wages to the plaintiffs, employee benefit plans within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and trust funds within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 141. The district court held that the claims were completely preempted under ERISA section 502(a). Although it did not directly address LMRA complete preemption, the court also noted that the complaint “seeks interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.” The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand to state court, holding that neither statute completely preempts the PWA. View "NJ Carpenters v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of NJ" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Mechanics' Lien Law of 1963 authorized a union employee benefit trust to file a lien on behalf of union members who performed work for a construction contractor. Developer raised a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer as to each complaint, alleging that the Trustees lacked standing to assert a mechanics' lien claim on behalf of the unionized workers because such workers were employees of Contractor and, as such, were neither "contractors" nor "subcontractors." The Supreme Court concluded that the union workers were not subcontractors, and the Trustees, by corollary in their representative capacity, were not entitled file a lien claim on the workers' behalf. Although the 1963 Act was intended to protect subcontractors who suffer harm occasioned by the primary contractor’s failure to meet its obligations, we have determined that the Legislature did not intend the term "subcontractor" to subsume employees of the primary contractor. Furthermore, the Superior Court erred in overturning the demurrers based on an implied-in-fact contract theory. The order of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the county court’s order. View "Bricklayers of Western PA v. Scott's" on Justia Law

Project labor agreements (PLAs) are used in the construction industry to set common conditions of employment for large projects involving multiple subcontractors and unions. On a public construction project, a PLA can be entered into by the governmental unit paying for the project or by its general contractor; the other party is a labor organization. If the governmental unit enters into a PLA, all contractors bidding on the project must agree to abide by it. Opponents argue that PLAs discourage nonunion contractors from bidding on government contracts and increase construction costs. Proponents, such as the trades councils, claim that PLAs enhance job-site cooperation and reduce labor disputes. The federal government has gone back and forth on allowing PLAs. Michigan passed the first version of the Fair and Open Competition in Governmental Construction Act in 2011, restricting the use of PLAs on publicly funded projects. Following entry of an injunction, that version was superseded by an amended act, passed in 2012. The district court enjoined the current version as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the act furthers Michigan’s proprietary goal of improving efficiency in public construction projects, and is no broader than necessary to meet those goals. View "MI Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Snyder" on Justia Law