Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Ryan Nelson agreed to perform an errand for his employer, a subcontractor, on the Appellant's day off. While on in the errand, the Appellant was injured at the job site. His employer filed a "notice of controversion" on the basis that Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the injury and his injuries were proximately caused by his intoxication. Appellant sued the general contractor and the Municipality of Anchorage (the owner of the job site) for negligence. The defendants asked the superior court to dismiss the action under the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. The superior court granted summary judgment to the general contractor and the Municipality. Appellant appeals, arguing that lack of a workers' compensation remedy permits him to bring a common law negligence action or, alternatively, that the exclusivity provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act denied him due process. He also argued as a matter of statutory construction, that the Municipality could not be a project owner. Because the worker has not shown that the employer’s controversion of benefits left him to his common law remedies, the Supreme Court determined Appellant's statutory construction and constitutional claims were not ripe. The Court also held that the Municipality could be a project owner. View "Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the 2007 collapse of the Interstate 35W Bridge. Individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against two contractors that performed work on the bridge pursuant to contracts entered into with the State. The contractors brought third-party complaints against Jacobs Engineering Group on the basis that Jacobs' predecessor negligently designed the bridge. One contractor also filed a third-party complaint against the State. The State cross-claimed against Jacobs for contribution, indemnity, and statutory reimbursement. Jacobs moved to dismiss the State's cross-claim as time-barred, arguing that the reimbursement provision of the compensation statutes compensating survivor-claimants of the collapse did not retroactively revive causes of action against Jacobs that had been previously extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision retroactively revived the State's action for statutory reimbursement against Jacobs; (2) the provision did not violate Jacob's constitutional right to due process; and (3) revival of the action for statutory reimbursement did not unconstitutionally impair Jacobs' contractual obligations. View "In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the 2007 collapse of the Interstate 35W Bridge. Individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against a contractor that performed work on the bridge pursuant to a contract entered into with the State. The contractor brought a third-party complaint against Jacobs Engineering Group for indemnity and contribution on the basis that Jacobs' predecessor negligently designed the bridge. Jacobs moved to dismiss the lawsuits as time-barred and argued that the 2007 amendments to Minn. Stat. 541.051 did not revive actions for contribution or indemnity that had previously been extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the 2007 amendments to section 541.051 did not retroactively revive the contractor's action for contribution against Jacobs. View "In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against 96 Rockaway, LLC, Novalex Contracting Corp., and T-Construction Co., Inc., alleging among other things, violations of Labor Law 240(a) and 241(6). Discovery and a third-party action ensued. T-Construction moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint, and all cross-claims against it. 96 Rockaway and Novalex cross-moved for identical relief. Supreme Court granted defendants' motions, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. The Appellate Division reversed so much of Supreme Court's order as granted defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims, denied the motions, and reinstated those claims. The court held that, given that Labor Law 240(1) should be construed with a common sense approach to the realities of the workplace at issue, defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing that claim. Plaintiff's Labor Law 241(6) cause of action, predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1)(i), failed for similar reasons. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Salazar v Novalex Contr. Corp." on Justia Law

Danny O'Neall was injured while working for Sadler Line Construction, a subcontractor of Alliance Construction. Sadler had commercial general liability (CGL) coverage with Federated Service Inusrance Company. In the underlying personal injury action, O'Neall sued Alliance and Sadler for negligence. In the instant action, Federated filed a declaratory judgment action against Alliance, alleging that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Alliance against O'Neall's personal injury action. The district court granted summary judgment for Federated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the parties, by requiring Sadler to name Alliance as an additional insured on its CGL policy, intended that Sadler would insure against loss caused by Alliance's negligence; and (2) Sadler's additional insured endorsement, which provided coverage for liability arising out of Sadler's operations, was broad enough to include coverage for Alliance's negligence even if Sadler was not negligent. Remanded. View "Federated Serv. Ins. Co. v. Alliance Constr." on Justia Law

While making a delivery during the course of his employment, Appellant George Pool walked through a stream of running water that flowed across a parking lot. As a result, Appellant slipped and fell on black ice and suffered injuries. Appellant sued Defendants, the construction company that allegedly pumped the water into the parking lot and the owner of the parking lot, alleging negligence. Several additional defendants were subsequently added. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the original defendants and the two defendants named in Appellant's amended complaint on the ground that Appellant had assumed the risk of his injury. Appellant appealed. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the original defendants because Appellant did not assume the risk of his injury as a matter of law; (2) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of one later-named defendant and the dismissal in favor of the other later-named defendant; and (3) disavowed the reasoning related to assumption of the risk in Allen v. Marriott Worldwide Corp. View "Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

After the district court determined that the parties involved in this appeal were not in a special relationship, a jury found Appellants Eric Rolland and Rolland Building Corporation not negligent in an incident in which a skid loader attachment used to perform landscaping at Respondent Bradley Domagala's home fell on Respondent's foot, resulting in the amputation of three toes. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellants did not have a specific legal duty to warn Respondent arising in the context of a special relationship, but (2) Appellants had a general duty to warn as an exercise of the general duty of reasonable care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's special instructions to the jury that Appellants had no duty to warn and no duty to protect Respondent were misleading as to the crucial elements of duty and breach of duty, and (2) the instructions were prejudicial to Respondent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Domagala v. Rolland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of appeals in "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" (641 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2011)): "[i]s the proposed jury instruction in this case, which state[d] that '(a) Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act,' a correct statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the severing of an underground cable located on property owned by one of the alleged trespass[e]rs, and the property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep it, as an existing cable, underneath the property?" MCI alleged that co-Defendant James Joubert negligently excavated with a backhoe in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act. MCI alleged Defendant Wayne Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. The underground cable at issue was buried under land owned by Hagan. After a trial in the federal district court, a jury found for Hagan and Joubert. MCI appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Upon review of the issue presented by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: the proposed jury instruction in this case was not a correct statement of Louisiana law. View "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" on Justia Law

Defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, Defendant hired an independent contractor to make repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in a large insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners' rights and claims arising out of the fire, Plaintiff insurance company sued Defendant in tort and contract. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that because Defendant had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters " on Justia Law