Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff purchased a home from Laux. Almost two years later, she sued the homebuilder, Shapell for strict liability, negligence, and fraudulent concealment, claiming Shapell built the home on unstable and uncompacted “fill” soil and with an inadequate foundation, causing “substantial differential movement” and numerous defects such as cracked floors, walls, and ceilings. The court granted Shappel summary judgment as to fraudulent concealment and later and entered judgment for Shapell on the other claims, concluding plaintiff lacked standing because her claims accrued when Laux owned the home and he did not assign the claims to plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Shapell fraudulently concealed information about the property’s soil conditions. Plaintiff was entitled to have a jury determine the disputed factual issues of when and to whom the causes of action accrued. View "Stofer v. Shapell Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

R. Suzanne Smith hired Michael Ead to construct an addition onto her home. After receiving notice that the construction was in violation of the local zoning ordinance, Smith ceased construction and decided to sell the property. Raymond Wells and his wife offered to purchase the property on the condition that they remove the addition. Wells enlisted Plaintiff to help demolish the newly constructed addition. While working at the site, Plaintiff fell from the roof and was injured. Plaintiff sued Smith and Ead (together, Defendants), alleging negligence, among other claims. The trial justice granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in granting summary judgment as to (1) Plaintiff’s claim of negligent hiring against Smith, as Smith had no duty to ensure that what Ead built would be safe for a demolition; and (2) Plaintiff’s claims of negligent design, construction, and inspection against Ead, as Ead did not have a legal duty to make the roof safe for dismantling. View "Wells v. Smith" on Justia Law

After an exhaust pipe in the furnace in their home ruptured, Richard and Mary Horning were diagnosed with having sustained severe carbon monoxide poisoning. The Hornings sued Penrose Plumbing & Heating, Inc. and others, alleging that Penrose was negligent in installing the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system. The district court granted summary judgment for Penrose, determining that the Hornings did not file their complaint within the applicable ten-year statute of repose. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in its interpretation of the applicable statute of repose; and (2) under the facts of this case, the Hornings’ complaint was timely filed. View "Horning v. Penrose Plumbing & Heating Inc." on Justia Law

Debtors contracted with Builder to finish construction on a house. After Debtors defaulted on progress payments, Builder sued Debtors and Bank, claiming that Defendants falsely represented or concealed material information about whether Debtors could pay for the work. The district court sustained Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Builder’s fraud and conspiracy claims. Debtors then confessed judgment on Builder’s breach of contract claim. After a bench trial, the district court ruled for Defendants on Builder’s equitable and promissory estoppel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court erred in granting summary judgment to Debtors on Builder’s fraud claim and to Debtors and Bank on Builder’s civil conspiracy claim; and (2) during trial, the court did not err in finding that Builder had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bank promised to fund Builder’s work that was definite enough to induce Builder’s foreseeable reliance on the statement, but these factual findings did not preclude Builder’s proof of the same facts for its fraud claims. Remanded. View "deNourie & Youst Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

Jose Dominguez was working for D & BR Building Systems, Inc. (D&BR) on the roof of a building being constructed for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. when he was killed in an accident. D&BR had subcontracted with with Graham Construction, Inc. (Graham), the general contractor on the project, to install the steelwork necessary for the building. Guadalupe Gaytan, the special administrator of Dominguez’s estate, brought this negligence action against Wal-Mart and Graham. The district court granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart and Graham. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted to Wal-Mart, as no genuine issues of material fact existed as to any of Gaytan’s claims against Wal-Mart; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to Gaytan’s direct negligence claim against Graham arising from Graham’s alleged retention of control over the use of safety equipment on the roof. Remanded. View "Gaytan v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

The general contractor of a Wisconsin construction project, hired Harsco to supply scaffolding. Krien, injured in a fall when a plank on a scaffold on which he was standing, broke, sued Harsco. The parties settled his claim for $900,000. Harsco filed a third‐party complaint against the contractor, seeking indemnification plus interest and attorneys’ fees. The district judge granted the contractor summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded after examining the complex provisions of the contract between the two. The plank may or may have been supplied by Harsco and may or may not have been defective, as claimed by Krien, who could not sue Riley in tort, because against his employer his only remedy for a work‐related accident was a claim for workers’ compensation, but there has never been judicial resolution of these questions, because Krien’s suit was settled before there was any judgment. Indemnification, however, is a form of insurance, and could apply even if the party seeking indemnification was negligent. Riley’s duty to indemnify Harsco extends to legal expenses incurred by Harsco in defending against Krien’s suit and in litigating this suit. View "Krien v. Harsco Corp." on Justia Law

A Homeowner contracted with a Builder to build a home on property owned by the Homeowner. The Builder contracted with a Plumber to put in the plumbing at the house. After the home was completed, the Builder and the Homeowner sued the Plumber for damages allegedly caused by plumbing leaks, alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Plumber, reasoning (1) the Homeowner could not recover contract damages because it was not a party to the plumbing subcontract, nor could the Builder recover contract damages because it had not suffered any compensable damage; and (2) the plaintiffs did not have a negligence claim because they did not allege violation of any tort duty independent of the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the pleadings and summary judgment evidence negated the existence of a negligence claim. View "Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co." on Justia Law

In Spring 2008, Williams Company Construction, Inc. entered into a construction contract to remodel the Friendly Smiles Cosmetic Dentistry Office owned by Dr. Brenda Barfield. Dr. Barfield previously leased the building from Williams Company owner Glen Williams for approximately five years before she purchased the property from him in 2008. Dr. Barfield hired Williams to remodel the building because of its construction experience and familiarity and knowledge of the building. When Dr. Barfield hired Williams, she did not know whether the remodeling work would be done by Williams or subcontractors. Dr. Barfield did not deal directly with any subcontractors during the remodeling project nor did she direct Williams to hire any specific subcontractors. During the remodel, Williams served as the general contractor and hired subcontractors to do various construction tasks. In December 2008, a section of a copper water pipe froze and burst. The frozen water pipe caused minor water damage and was repaired by plumbing subcontractor Home Heating. During the repair process, a Home Heating employee cut a hole in the wall to locate the leak and discovered that the air in the plumbing wall was cold. The employee was concerned the pipe could freeze again and notified the Friendly Smiles Cosmetic Dentistry Office about the cold air. Dr. Barfield contacted Williams to express her concern about the pipes re-freezing from the cold air. According to testimony, Williams told Dr. Barfield not to worry about the pipes freezing again because of circulating warm air around the hole. Dr. Barfield also wanted the hole in the wall patched, but had difficulty in securing Williams or Home Heating to fix it. Dr. Barfield made repeated requests for Williams or Home Heating to resolve the cold air issue, but they did not fix the problem. Approximately one week after the pipe was fixed, the water pipe froze and broke again, this time causing extensive water damage to the dental office. Dr. Barfield and her insurance company, Travelers Insurance, brought suit against Williams, Home Heating (and other subcontractors) for negligence, and breach of contract. Before trial, the parties stipulated that the total amount of damages was $220,046.09. Williams requested the trial court to include a jury instruction concerning the independent contractor distinction (C-55.25), and a jury instruction pertaining to the failure of a party to produce witnesses (C-80.30). The court denied the two requests. At the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated that the case would be tried before the jury based on comparative fault. The jury was given a special verdict form and found Williams seventy percent at fault, Home Heating twenty-five percent at fault, and Dr. Barfield five percent at fault. Judgment was entered against Williams. Williams subsequently filed a motion for a new trial arguing the court erred in denying its requested jury instructions and there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find Williams seventy percent at fault for the damages. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Williams appealed the district court's judgment, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of America v. Williams Co. Construction" on Justia Law

Defendants, two architectural firms, were the sole entities that provided architectural services for a collection of condominium units in San Francisco. The homeowners association sued several parties involving in the construction of the condominiums, including Defendants, alleging that negligent architectural design work performed by Defendants resulted in several defects. The trial court sustained a demurrer in favor of Defendants, determining that because the final decision regarding how the homes would be built rested with the owner, Defendants owed no duty to the future condominium owners. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that, under both the common law and the Right to Repair Act, Defendants owed a duty of care to the homeowners in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an architect owes a duty of care to future homeowners in the design of a residential building where the architect is a principal architect on the project, and the duty of care extends to such architects even when they do not actually build the project or exercise ultimate control over construction; and (2) the complaint int his case sufficiently alleged the causal link between Defendants’ negligence and the condominium association’s injury. View "Beacon Residential Cmty. Ass’n. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill" on Justia Law

Susan and David Conrad purchased a home constructed by J-McDaniel Construction Company (McDaniel) and later discovered defects in the home. The Conrads sued McDaniel. McDaniel filed a third-party complaint against three subcontractors (collectively, Appellees). The subcontractors then filed cross-claims against each other seeking contribution, indemnity and apportionment of fault. The Conrads settled their claims against McDaniel. The circuit court ultimately dismissed McDaniel’s third-party claims against Appellees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that unresolved issues of fact remained regarding whether McDaniel had a right of indemnity against Appellees under the facts of this case. View "J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd." on Justia Law