Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Craig Stark entered into a contract with McCarthy Corporation to construct a storage facility for recreational vehicles and boats. The relationship turned sour after McCarthy sent Stark an invoice for work Stark believed he had already paid for in full. After the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, Stark terminated McCarthy’s contract. McCarthy then filed a lien against Stark’s property and brought suit for breach of contract and to foreclose its lien. Stark, Stark Investment Group, and U.S. Bank, Stark’s construction lender on the project, counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent misrepresentation, slander of title by the recording of an unjust lien, and breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (“ICPA”). After a bench trial, the district court largely agreed with Stark's counterclaims and dismissed McCarthy's complaint. McCarthy appealed the district court’s findings, damages award, and attorney fees award. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holdings that McCarthy breached the contract between the parties and McCarthy violated the ICPA. View "McCarthy Corporation v. Stark Investment Group" on Justia Law

BrunoBuilt, Inc. appealed a district court’s dismissal of its claims against Strata, Inc., Chris Comstock, H. Robert Howard, and Michael Woodworth (collectively, “the Strata Defendants”). BrunoBuilt filed a professional negligence action against the Strata Defendants alleging that when the Strata Defendants rendered engineering services for the Terra Nativa Subdivision they failed to identify a pre-existing landslide and negligently failed to recommend construction of infrastructure that would stabilize and prevent further landslides within the Subdivision. A home BrunoBuilt had contracted to build and the lot on which the dwelling was located were allegedly damaged as a result. The district court dismissed BrunoBuilt’s claims after holding that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement, or alternatively, that summary judgment was warranted in favor of the Strata Defendants based on the economic loss rule. After review of the situation, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment because the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. View "Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Strata, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stems from the foreclosure and lien priority case arising out of the failed Idaho Club golf course and residential housing development project. The developer, Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC (“POBD”), took out several loans on the real property, agreed to promissory notes, and mortgaged the Idaho Club real property with several lenders, including JV, LLC and, as relevant to this appeal, three other lenders: RE Loans (“REL”), LLC, Pensco Trust Co., and Mortgage Fund ’08 LLC (“MF08”) (collectively, the three “lenders”). JV’s interest in the Idaho Club arose out of a mortgage (the “JV Mortgage”) it recorded against five parcels on the Idaho Club property that JV sold to POBD. POBD ultimately defaulted on its obligations on the promissory notes associated with the mortgages. In addition to defaulting on the notes, POBD failed to pay property taxes to Bonner County for several years and failed to pay various mechanics and materialmen, one of which was Genesis Golf Builders, Inc. (“Genesis”). JV appealed the district court's conclusion that Valiant Idaho, LLC (“Valiant”) held a priority position in the mortgages on the development. JV also appealed the district court’s award of costs against it, as well as a judgment by the district court that awarded sanctions against JV and its attorney. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, finding JV's redemption deed did not subordinate it to Bonner County's right, title, claim and interested based on a tax deed. The Supreme Court also found the district court abused its discretion in the way that it applied the formula announced in Valiant Idaho, LLC v. North Idaho Resorts, LLC (No. 44583, 2018 WL 4927560) to arrive at its costs award. View "Valiant Idaho v. JV, LLC" on Justia Law

Scott and Anne Davison appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DeBest Plumbing (DeBest). In 2012, the Davisons hired Gould Custom Builders, Inc. (Gould) to perform an extensive remodel of their vacation home in Idaho. Gould hired DeBest as the plumbing subcontractor. A bathtub installed by DeBest developed a leak that caused significant damage before it was noticed and repaired. The Davisons sought damages based upon the contract between Gould and DeBest and for negligence. The district court granted DeBest’s motion for summary judgment on the contract claims because the Davisons were not in privity of contract with DeBest. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of DeBest on the negligence claim, finding that the Davisons had failed to comply with the requirements of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), Idaho Code sections 6-2501–2504. On appeal, the Davisons argued they satisfied the requirements of NORA because DeBest received actual notice of the claim and sent a representative to inspect the damage. Finding that the Davidsons satisfied the requirements of NORA when they gave DeBest actual notice, and DeBest had an opportunity to inspect the defect, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting DeBest's motion for summary judgment on the Davidsons' negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed as to negligence, but affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Davison v. DeBest Plumbing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s action to recover under an insurance policy for the loss of her house caused when a renter (who had an option to purchase) demolished it. The trial court determined the insurance policy at issue excluded for such a loss. Within two months of renting the property, plaintiff learned the renter demolished the house. The renter agreed to rebuild a house on the remaining foundation. The renter started, but did not finish, rebuilding the house. Plaintiff thereafter made a claim on her insurance policy. The Idaho Supreme Court found after review of this matter, that the words in an insurance policy were to be given the meaning applied by lay people in daily usage. One such clause implicated the intentional destruction of the house as compared to accidental loss or inadequate remodeling. The renter’s actions in demolishing plaintiff’s house down to the foundation would not be considered by lay people as the “remodeling” of the house. He did not make alterations to an existing structure; he demolished that structure. There was no house left to remodel. Plaintiff had authorized the renter to perform some remodeling, such as installing new flooring, countertops, light fixtures, paint and other cosmetic improvements, but there was no evidence in the record that he did any remodeling at all, much less that the direct cause of the loss of the Plaintiff’s house was caused by any remodeling that had been done. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the insurance company. View "Fisher v. Garrison Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a lawsuit brought by a contractor, Michael Kelly against his former client, Pamela Wagner, alleging nonpayment of amounts due to him for the performance of construction work. The district court found in favor of Kelly and awarded him a total judgment of $13,762.54 ($4,694.64 of damages and $9,067.90 of prejudgment interest). On appeal, Wagner argued that the district court erred in finding that Kelly was owed for the construction work. She further argued that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest to Kelly. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kelly v. Wagner" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal centered on whether a force majeure clause in a written contract between the county and a developer did not apply to the developer’s failure to obtain zoning approval in order to construct the cement plant required in the agreement. After review of the contract and the clause at issue here, the Supreme Court held that the clause was broad enough to apply. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Burns Concrete, Inc v. Teton County" on Justia Law

In 2013, plaintiff Fagen, Inc. filed this lawsuit seeking to recover damages for work it had done in the construction of a wind park located in Bingham County. It named as defendants Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC; Exergy Development Group of Idaho, LLC; and XRG Development Partners, LLC (collectively “Defendants”); and Tabor Wind Farms, LLC. The district court entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Tabor pursuant to a stipulation of those parties. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against the remaining defendants, alleging causes of action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, to recover damages for breach of contract, and to recover damages in quantum meruit. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking a judgment against Lava Beds and Exergy Development for breach of contract. In opposition to that motion, defendants filed two affidavits, which merely contained vague and conclusory allegations. The district court denied defendants’ motion to continue the hearing on summary judgment. During the hearing, Plaintiff stated that it withdrew its claim to foreclose a mechanic’s lien and its claims against XRG, which resolved these Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defense counsel admitted that Lava Beds and Exergy Development had breached their contract with Plaintiff, but he argued that one of the affidavits showed a need for further discovery at least as to the issue of damages. The court took the motion for summary judgment under advisement, then granted Plaintiff’s motion. It held that the conclusory affidavits submitted by Defendants were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. On the same date, the court entered an order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Lava Beds and Exergy Development's motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Fagen v. Lava Beds Wind Park" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of an amended judgment awarding damages for breach of contract, court costs, and attorney fees in connection with a contract to construct five wind farms. Because the parties had stipulated to that portion of the judgment regarding the damages for breach of contract, those issues were not subject to appellate review. Because the only challenge to the award of attorney fees was raised for the first time on appeal, the Supreme Court did not consider it. The Court therefore affirmed the amended judgment and the award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. View "Fagen v. Rogerson Flats Wind Park" on Justia Law

Richard and Lisa Keane and the companies they managed, and Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC (BFU) had a disagreement arising from a development deal involving the Houston Professional Plaza. They went to mediation, but the parties had a disagreement regarding the terms of the mediated agreement. They then turned to arbitration. The arbitrator granted two awards in favor of BFU. The award did not specify any date by which the Keanes were to pay the money, nor did the award include interest. The district court confirmed the arbitration awards, and issued a writ of execution. The sheriff returned the writ not satisfied. BFU then obtained an order for a debtor's examination. A partial satisfaction of judgment was made, but the Keanes did not direct how the payment made was to be applied to the two arbitration awards. BFU applied the partial satisfaction to one of the awards, and filed a motion to have the Keanes held in contempt for failing to pay the second. The Keanes challenged the contempt action. The Supreme Court, after its review of the matter, found that because the order confirming the arbitration award did not require the Keanes to do anything and because contempt cannot be used to enforce payment of the debt in this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding them in contempt and the order later entered awarding the respondent attorney fees and court costs. View "Bald, Fat & Ugly v. Keane" on Justia Law