Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions “for a violent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e). To determine whether a prior conviction is a listed crime, courts apply the “categorical approach,” asking whether the elements of the offense sufficiently match the elements of the generic (commonly understood) version of the enumerated crime. When a statute defines multiple crimes by listing multiple, alternative elements, a sentencing court must discern which of the alternative elements was integral to the defendant’s conviction, by employing the “modified categorical approach” and examining a limited class of documents from the record of a prior conviction. Mathis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had five prior Iowa burglary convictions. Under the generic offense, burglary requires unlawful entry into a “building or other structure.” The Iowa statute (702.12) reaches “any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle.” The district court applied the modified categorical approach, found that Mathis had burgled structures, and imposed an enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Iowa statute’s list of places did not establish alternative elements, but rather alternative means of fulfilling a single locational element. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the elements of Iowa’s law are broader than those of generic burglary, Mathis’s prior convictions cannot give rise to ACCA’s sentence enhancement. The “underlying brute facts or means” by which the defendant commits his crime make no difference; even if the defendant’s conduct fits the generic definition, the mismatch of elements saves him from an ACCA sentence. Construing ACCA to allow a sentencing judge to go further would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns because only a jury, not a judge, may find facts that increase the maximum penalty. A statute’s listing of disjunctive means does not mitigate the possible unfairness of basing an increased penalty on something not legally necessary to the prior conviction. View "Mathis v. United States" on Justia Law

Nagle and Fink were co-owners and executives of concrete manufacturing and construction businesses. The businesses entered into a relationship with a company owned by a person of Filipino descent. His company would bid for subcontracts on Pennsylvania transportation projects as a disadvantaged business enterprise. Federal regulations require states that receive federal transportation funds to set annual goals for participation in transportation construction projects by disadvantaged business enterprises, 49 C.F.R. 26.21. If his company won the bid for the subcontract, Nagle and Fink’s businesses would perform all of the work. Fink pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States. A jury found Nagle guilty of multiple charges relating to the scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed Nagle’s conviction, upholding the admission of electronic evidence discovered during searches of the businesses’ offices, but vacated both sentences, based on loss calculation errors. View "United States v. Nagle" on Justia Law

Churn, the owner of a Tennessee construction company, was convicted of seven counts of bank fraud stemming from two schemes in which he received bank loans ostensibly to construct houses, but performed little to no work. The district court sentenced him to 33 months in prison and ordered restitution of $237,950.50. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court made evidentiary errors concerning admission of an email statement, admission of testimony concerning a permit, and admission of evidence about another transaction, and that the amount of restitution exceeded a statutory maximum under the Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A. View "United States v. Churn" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Ryan Ridens received a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence enhancement established by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for certain felons with three or more prior convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].” He claimed the district court erred in imposing the enhancement because: (1) a burglary conviction used to trigger the sentence should not have counted as a “violent felony” because there was insufficient proof that it was a qualifying burglary within the meaning of the ACCA; and (2) triggering the mandatory minimum with the judicially found fact of his three prior qualifying convictions violated the Sixth Amendment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Ridens" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony theft. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that Defendant possessed the requisite intent to deprive; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed no sanction for the State’s discovery violation; (3) the district court erred when when it allowed evidence of Defendant’s prior felony conviction, but the error was harmless; (4) the district court did not commit plain error when it prohibited defense counsel from questioning a police officer about Defendant’s “nonstatements” made during his interview following his arrest; and (5) Defendant waived his right to challenge the district court’s response to the jury question under the invited error doctrine. View "Toth v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1983, Petitioner was found guilty of murder in the first degree and aggravated robbery. Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate term of life imprisonment. In 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se petition requesting permission to proceed in the trial court with a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petition was denied. Petitioner then filed a second petition requesting permission to proceed in the trial court with a petition for writ of error corm nobis. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) to the extent Petitioner again alleged a Brady violation and asserted that erroneous evidence was used to establish that he was a habitual offender, these two claims were asserted in Petitioner’s first petition and were an abuse of the writ; (2) Petitioner’s remaining claims were either without merit or outside the purview of a coram-nobis proceeding; and (3) even if Petitioner had presented grounds sufficient to support issuance of the writ, his failure to act with due diligence would constitute good cause to deny the petition. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

In 1988, Defendant pled guilty to sexual intercourse without consent and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment with ten years suspended. In 1992, Defendant escaped from prison. After he was apprehended, he was convicted with escape and other charges. In 2007, Defendant was discharged to serve the suspended portion of his sentence. In 2011, the district court orally found that Defendant had substantially violated the conditions of his parole. The court then imposed a new sentence of ten years with all time suspended and imposed fourteen new conditions to Defendant’s suspended sentence. Thereafter, the district court revoked Defendant’s suspended sentence, sentenced Defendant to ten years imprisonment with five years suspended, and reimposed the fourteen new conditions on his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the imposition of fourteen new conditions on Defendant’s suspended sentence for his 1988 crime did not violate ex post facto principles. Remanded. View "State v. Piller" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded not guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, obstructing a peace officer, and driving while license suspended. Defendant filed two motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, contending that the City had not diligently prosecuted the case. The municipal court denied both motions, concluding that Defendant’s conduct had caused the delay. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of obstructing a police officer and driving while license suspended. The district court affirmed the municipal court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the municipal court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions to dismiss, as Defendant’s rights to a speedy trial were not violated. View "City of Kalispell v. Gabbert" on Justia Law

Twelve years after he pled guilty to capital murder in exchange for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole Appellant filed a motion to vacate his sentence. Appellant, who was seventeen years old when he committed the murder, argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama applied retroactively to his case. The circuit denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing scheme applicable to Appellant’s conviction was not a mandatory life without the possibility of parole scheme; and (2) therefore, even if Miller applied retroactively, it was not applicable to the Virginia sentencing statutes at issue in this case. View "Jones v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Leticia Garcia was charged with sexually abusing a girl she babysat. At trial, the prosecutor attempted to show she was a lesbian. The prosecutor asserted during closing argument that her supposed attraction to other women gave her a motive to sexually abuse the victim. While disavowing the notion that all lesbians are child molesters, she nonetheless argued it was very telling that appellant “is attracted to females” and the victim was “a female child.” In the end, the jury convicted appellant, and the trial court sentenced her to 16 years in prison. After review of appellant's argument on appeal, the Court of Appeal believed appellant’s sexual orientation was not relevant to any issue in this case. The trial court was largely successful in limiting the jury’s exposure to evidence regarding appellant’s sexual orientation, so the Court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of appellant’s requests for a mistrial during the evidentiary phase of the trial. "But we cannot overlook the fact the prosecutor repeatedly attempted to make an issue out of appellant’s sexual orientation and emphasized this issue to the jury in closing argument. This was prejudicial misconduct. It leaves us with no confidence the jury could have evaluated the charges against appellant in a fair and impartial manner and requires us to reverse the judgment." View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law