Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Jamie Edward Bock was charged with nine counts of theft for actions occurring between November 2014 and November 2016. He was accused of taking initial payments from homeowners for construction work, some of which he started but did not complete, and others he did not begin at all. Bock requested and received additional funds for four projects but failed to complete any of them or return the money.The trial court joined five cases into a single trial and instructed the jury that Bock could not be convicted of four counts unless the prosecution proved multiple acts of theft within six months of each other. Bock argued that this instruction constructively amended his charges, which were originally under a statute punishing single acts of theft, and claimed this amendment was a structural error requiring reversal. The jury convicted Bock on all counts, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the jury instructions constituted a constructive amendment but held that it did not require reversal, applying plain error review.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and agreed that the jury instructions constructively amended the charges. However, the court held that such an amendment is not a structural error and should be reviewed for plain error. The court concluded that Bock did not demonstrate plain error because he had sufficient notice to mount a defense, and the prosecution's burden of proof was not materially lessened. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals and upheld Bock's convictions. View "Bock v. People" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Agustin Vinas, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 for attempting to hire a hitman to murder a contractor and his business partner. Vinas, a subcontractor, claimed that the contractor owed him $8,500 for construction work and had threatened to harm him and his family when he tried to collect the debt. Vinas was arrested after a series of meetings with an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a hitman. He pleaded guilty to using facilities of interstate commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire, and the government agreed to dismiss the second count related to interstate travel in the commission of murder-for-hire.The District Court for the District of Rhode Island sentenced Vinas to time served, which amounted to nearly two years in pretrial detention. The government had recommended a sentence of ten years' imprisonment, arguing that a substantial sentence was necessary for specific and general deterrence. However, the defense argued for a sentence of time served, citing Vinas's attempts to peacefully collect the debt, the threats he received from the contractor, his mental health issues, and his efforts towards rehabilitation while in pretrial custody.The government appealed the sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that the sentence was substantively unreasonable given the seriousness of the crime. The government also contended that the District Court had categorically refused to consider general deterrence and had created a disparity with defendants in other cases who were given longer sentences for the same statutory violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, finding that the sentence was within the expansive universe of reasonable sentences and that the District Court had adequately considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court of Appeals also found that the government had not preserved its arguments regarding general deterrence and sentencing disparity, and that these arguments did not meet the plain error standard. View "United States v. Vinas" on Justia Law

In 2018, Kousisis and Alpha Painting were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The charges arose from false documents filed concerning “disadvantaged business enterprise” status in transportation construction projects for which the U.S. Department of Transportation provided funds through the Federal Highway Administration to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The district court imposed a 20-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), which corresponds to a loss of $9.50 million-$25 million, noting that the actual loss to the government was not measurable at the time of sentencing and concluding that Alpha’s “ill-gotten profits” represented an appropriate measure of loss.The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions. The defendants secured PennDOT’s money using false pretenses and the value PennDOT received from the partial performance of those painting and repair services is no defense to criminal prosecution for fraud. The court vacated the calculation of the amount of loss for sentencing purposes, noting the extreme complexity of the case. The victim’s loss must have been an objective of the fraudulent scheme; it is insufficient if that loss is merely an incidental byproduct of the scheme. The court separately vacated a forfeiture order of the entire profit amount on the contracts. View "United States v. Alpha Painting & Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Scean Mitchell appealed his convictions for malice murder and other offenses in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Calvin Clark, Jr. Mitchell argued the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other acts under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). He also argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the trial court instructed the jury to disregard evidence of self-defense and for failing to request a jury instruction on self-defense. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected both claims: there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the Rule 404 (b) evidence because it was relevant to the issue of intent and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect; and trial counsel was not ineffective because the self-defense claim was not supported by strong evidence and was inconsistent with the defense theory counsel had reasonably pursued instead. View "Mitchell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the decision of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress his answers to the medical rule-out questions given subsequent to a traffic stop, holding that the ICA erred in affirming the district court's suppression of Defendant's answers to the medical rule-out questions.In granting Defendant's motion to suppress, the district court found that Defendant was subject to custodial interrogation without being given the required warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under this Court's decision in State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 511 P.3d 782 (Haw. 2022), Defendant was not in custody when he was asked the medical rule-out questions because the circumstances of the stop had not risen to those of a formal arrest. View "State v. Tronson " on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and a gun in 2007. He was sentenced to 107 months of incarceration. In a violation of parole hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to consecutive 24-month sentences after finding he violated the conditions of his supervised release by possessing two guns and ammunition.On appeal, Defendant argued that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g)’s requirement that a judge impose a term of imprisonment based on conduct that constitutes a federal crime violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and that his violations should therefore have been determined beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. He also challenged his sentences on Double Jeopardy grounds.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that Sec. 3583(g) is more like “ordinary revocation” than “punishment for a new offense,” and that Defendant’s argument is not supported by Justice Breyer’s controlling concurring opinion in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). Defendant's Double Jeopardy challenges similarly failed because 1.) He possessed more than one weapon and 2.) The violations related to separate counts in the indictment. View "USA V. JAMES RICHARDS" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Antoine Frazier appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a roadside search of his vehicle in 2019. A Utah state trooper pulled defendant over for speeding. The trooper did not begin the standard procedures necessary to issue a citation. Instead, he immediately began trying to contact a canine handler with the local sheriff’s office, so he could come to the scene and perform a dog sniff of the vehicle. At first, the trooper tried contacting the deputy via the instant-messaging system on his vehicle’s computer. When the deputy failed to respond to several messages, the trooper tried callling him on the radio. When the deputy again failed to respond, the trooper asked dispatch to locate him and send him to the scene. Approximately thirty minutes from the initial stop did the canine search defendant's vehicle, alerting to potential contraband. In this time, a records check from dispatch revealed defendant had pled guilty in 2006 to manslaughter; a pat-down search revealed defendant had a .22 caliber pistol in his pants pocket. Defendant was ultimately arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and for possession of fentanyl and cocaine with the intent to distribute. Defendant argued the evidence obtained from that search was inadmissible because the trooper improperly prolonged the traffic stop to facilitate a dog sniff and thereby obtain probable cause to search his vehicle. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the trooper departed from the traffic-based mission of the stop by arranging the dog sniff, "an investigative detour that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion and that added time to the stop. ...The trooper’s consultation of the DEA database, a second investigative detour, only aggravated that ongoing violation. Accordingly, the evidence discovered because of that seizure is tainted by its unlawfulness and is inadmissible." View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Tyler Clapp appealed his conviction for driving under the influence. After stopping Clapp for “spinning cookies” in a parking lot, police became suspicious that Clapp was intoxicated. Clapp refused to submit to any field sobriety tests. Police then obtained a warrant for a blood draw, which showed that Clapp’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was 0.152 several hours after initially detaining him. At trial, the State sought to introduce the results of the blood draw. Over Clapp’s objection, the district court allowed the nurse who conducted the blood draw to testify telephonically to his qualifications in order to lay sufficient foundation to admit the results of the blood draw. The results of the blood draw were ultimately admitted, and the jury convicted Clapp of driving under the influence. Clapp appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found the telephonic testimony violated Clapp’s right to confrontation, "'the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not absolute does not, of course, mean that it may be easily dispensed with. ... [A] defendant’s right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.' Both requirements must be met." Further, the Supreme Court determined the State failed to meet its burden establishing harmless error. The conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Clapp" on Justia Law

Officers responded to a shooting in an apartment building's parking lot. Three victims were transported to the hospital. Officers observed a security camera in the window of apartment 1, pointed toward the parking lot. After interviewing two witnesses, Detective Dunn viewed video footage from a business across the street, which corroborated their account. He learned that Haney, an occupant of unit 1, was involved in a dispute with the sister of two shooting victims. Dunn obtain a warrant to search Unit 1; other officers executed the warrant. An officer moved clothes in the bedroom closet and saw a sawed-off shotgun. He also seized a baggie of white powder, a laptop, and cell phones from the bedroom. Other officers seized cameras, a computer monitor, a Kindle, shotgun shells, pieces of a scale with traces of drug residue, photographs, and documents bearing the names of Haney and Saddler.Saddler later unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence seized during the search and an incriminating statement she later made concerning the shotgun. The Eighth Circuit affirmed her subsequent conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The affidavit described facts that connected Haney to the shooting and created a fair probability that evidence that would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction would be found. Dunn’s reliance on the issuance of the warrant was objectively reasonable. In addition, the seizure of the shotgun satisfied the “plain view” exception. View "United States v. Saddler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court convicting Defendant of battery of a law enforcement officer and ordering Defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $2,649 to reimburse the workers compensation insurance carrier that paid the officer's medical bills arising out of the battery, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) criminal restitution does not violate the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the current structure of criminal restitution violates section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights but is remedied by severance. With today's holding, restitution may still be imposed by a judge either as part of the sentence, as contemplated by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6604(b), or as a condition of probation, as contemplated by Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6607(c)(2). View "State v. Robison" on Justia Law