Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

A group of homeowners brought suit against respondent, a developer and general contractor. Respondent then filed a third-party complaint against appellant, its subcontractor, pursuant to the indemnity clause in their contract. During trial, the district court granted respondent’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury found respondent ninety-nine percent at fault, and the district court held appellant liable for the resulting judgment. Appellant appealed. At issue was whether an indemnity clause in a construction contract obligates the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for its partial negligence for constructional defects, regardless of whether the subcontractor is also negligent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the indemnification clause in the parties’ contract did not explicitly or expressly state that appellant would need to indemnify respondent for respondent’s own negligence but linked appellant’s indemnification duties to defects caused by appellant only.

Appellant brought an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The appellee argued that appellant’s appeal was untimely filed. To be timely, appellant was required to file its notice of appeal within thirty days of the order denying the motion to compel arbitration, which was entered on December 28, 2009. At issue was whether appellant’s January 4, 2010 motion to dismiss constituted a post-order motion that would have extended the time for filing the notice of the appeal under Ark. R. of App. P. Civ. 4(b). The Court concluded that because the motion substantively sought to correct procedural defects in a December 21, 2009 motion, the January 4 motion was not a new motion and was treated by the circuit court as one for reconsideration. Because it was a collateral motion, it did not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. The Court held the appellant’s notice of appeal filed on March 19, 2010 was untimely and dismissed the appeal.

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.