Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

CLR Properties and Choice Land Corporation (collectively, CLR) hired Waynco Construction (Waynco) as the general contractor for a commercial real estate improvement project. Waynco solicited a bid from AAA Construction of Missoula (AAA) to perform concrete work. After AAA submitted its bid, Waynco used AAA's bid to formulate Waynco's general contract bid to CLR. CLR accepted Waynco's bid. While AAA completed a majority of the work outlined in its bid by the time it left the project, a dispute arose between Waynco and AAA about the parties' subcontract agreement. Waynco eventually failed to pay AAA for any labor or materials. AAA filed a complaint against CLR and Waynco, alleging that Waynco had breached the contract and CLR had been unjustly enriched from AAA's work. The district court granted CLR's motion for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claims and, after a trial, held for AAA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly concluded that AAA's bid constituted a binding contract between the parties; (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Waynco was the materially breaching party; and (3) the district court properly denied CLR's claim for attorney fees. View "AAA Constr. of Missoula, LLC v. Choice Land Corp." on Justia Law

In 1999 plaintiff pled guilty to making false statements while working on a project funded by the Federal Highway Administration (18 U.S.C. 2, 1014, and 1020). The agreement prohibited plaintiff from participating in any FHWA-funded project for a year. Plaintiff challenged Puerto Rico agencies' subsequent actions. The parties negotiated settlements; plaintiff entered into an agreement allowing it to bid on FHWA projects. Puerto Rico then enacted Law 458, which prohibits award of government contracts to any party convicted of a crime constituting fraud, embezzlement, or misappropriation of public funds and requires rescission of any contract with a party convicted of a specified offense. The statute states that it does not apply retroactively. One agency cancelled plaintiff's successful bids, another withdrew its consent to the settlement. The district court rejected claims of violation of the federal Contracts Clause and breaches of contract under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit affirmed with respect to the constitutional claim. Any breach of the settlement agreements did not violate the Contracts Clause, even if committed in an attempt to unlawfully enforce Law 458 retroactively; defendants have not impaired plaintiff's ability to obtain a remedy for a demonstrated breach. Given the stage of the litigation, the district court should have retained the breach of contract claims. View "Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unlicensed subcontractor, filed a complaint against Defendants, licensed contractors, alleging that it was entitled to a judgment in the amount that Defendants agreed to pay for home improvement work that Plaintiff performed as a subcontractor for Defendants. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that contracts made by unlicensed home improvement contractors or subcontractors were illegal. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding that the Maryland Home Improvement Law, which regulates contracts between contractors and owners, did not bar Respondent from recovering on its subcontract with Petitioner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Maryland Home Improvement Law did not render unenforceable a contract between a home improvement general contractor and an unlicensed subcontractor. View "Stalker Bros. v. Alcoa Concrete Masonry, Inc. " on Justia Law

Town & Country Property, L.L.C., and Town & Country Ford, L.L.C. (T&C), sued Amerisure Insurance Company and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company (Amerisure) and its insured, Jones-Williams Construction Company, Inc., alleging that Amerisure was obligated to pay a $650,100 judgment entered in favor of T&C and against Jones-Williams in a separate action pursuant to a commercial general-liability insurance policy Amerisure had issued Jones-Williams. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Amerisure, and T&C appealed. Specifically, the trial court held that Amerisure was not required to indemnify Jones-Williams because there had been no occurrence invoking coverage under the policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment to the extent the awarded damages represented the costs of repairing or replacing faulty work covered under the liability policy. The Court remanded the case to the trial court so that it could consider arguments from the parties to determine if any of the damages awarded represented compensation for damaged property. View "Town & Country Property, L.L.C.v. Amerisure Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court which granted the "Motions to Compel Arbitration" of Pass Marianne, LLC (Pass) and Alfonso Realty, Inc. (Alfonso). On appeal, the Supreme Court considered: (1) whether Pass waived its right to arbitration, and (2) whether a principal’s waiver of its contractual right to arbitrate operates to waive that right for its agent. In 2005, Pass entered into a contract with Carl E. Woodward, LLC (Woodward) for the construction of a new condominium development, Pass Marianne Condominiums, in Pass Christian, Mississippi. In February, Pass and Lemon Drop Properties, LLC (Lemon Drop) entered into a "Preconstruction Sales and Purchase Agreement" for Unit No. 209 within the Pass Marianne Condominiums. Because of Hurricane Katrina, construction of the Pass Marianne Condominiums was not completed until 2007. On October 3, 2007, Pass executed a warranty deed conveying Unit No. 209 to Lemon Drop, and Woodward furnished a "Warranty of Completion of Construction" to Lemon Drop. On October 28, 2008, Lemon Drop filed a Complaint in the circuit court against Pass and Woodward, which sought, inter alia, rescission of the Agreement due to alleged defects in design and construction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while Pass waived its right to compel arbitration, that waiver was not imputed to its agent, Alfonso. As there was no evidence of waiver by Alfonso, it should have been entitled to proceed in arbitration. Therefore, as to Alfonso the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting arbitration was affirmed. But regarding Pass, Court reversed and remanded the circuit court's order for further proceedings. View "Lemon Drop Properties, LLC. v. Pass Marianne, LLC" on Justia Law

Ronald Bacon was injured while working at a construction site. Bacon sued the general contractor, the general contractor's commercial liability insurer, the subcontractor, and the parent company of the subcontractor. Bacon settled with the insurer, which together with the general contractor's separate liability insurer, made payments to Bacon pursuant to the settlement agreement. After Bacon settled with the subcontractor's parent company, the general contractor's two insurers filed a breach of contract action because Bacon received the proceeds of his second settlement but refused to make payment to the insurers under the terms of the first settlement agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers, finding Bacon, his lawyer, and the lawyer's law firm liable in the amount of $437,500. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's finding that lawyer and law firm were personally liable on the contract, holding that an attorney and/or law firm is not liable on a contract negotiated on behalf of a client when the contract provides that both the client and the attorney "agree to and will pay" a certain sum of money and the attorney signs the contract under the legend "Agreed to in Form & Substance". The Court otherwise affirmed. View "RSUI Indemnity Co. v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. (Turquoise) appealed a circuit court judgment that denied its motion to alter, amend or vacate an arbitration award in an action filed by Clark A. Cooper, David L. Faulkner, Jr., and Hugh and Adrienne Overmyer (collectively, Claimants). Claimants signed purchase and escrow agreements to purchase condominiums to be built as part of "phase I" of a complex Turquoise was developing in Orange Beach. In conjunction with the purchase, they each posted a letter of credit for 20% of the purchase price. When construction neared substantial completion, the Claimants declined to "close" on the purchases on their respective units, allegedly because Turquoise had failed to build an outdoor pool and sundeck area or to provide individual storage units and private cabanas which it had agreed to build and to provide. The purchase and escrow agreements contained an arbitration provision. Claimants' initial demands contained claims of breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The arbitrator entered a lengthy arbitration award containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately in favor of the Claimants. Turquoise filed a motion to modify the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had made a computational error in his calculation of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator did mistakenly calculate damages owed to the claimants. The Court vacated the arbitrator's award and remanded the case for recalculation of damages. View "Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. v. Overmyer" on Justia Law

Frederick and Mandelena Harmon bought a home pursuant to a buy-sell agreement that realtor Dianne Burright, a licensed real estate salesperson who worked for Fiscus Realty, prepared at the Fiscus Realty office. The home was built by Dianne's husband, Jerry. The Harmons subsequently discovered numerous construction problems. The Harmons sued Defendants Jerry and Dianne Burright and Fiscus Reality, raising several causing of action, including a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (the Act). A jury returned a verdict against the Burrights on breach of warranty and negligent misrepresentation claims and held for Defendants on all other claims. After trial, Defendants filed motions for attorney fees as prevailing parties under the Act, which the district court denied. Fiscus Realty appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to Fiscus Realty as the Harmons' claims had a basis in fact and law and were not frivolous, unreasonable or unfounded. View "Harmon v. Fiscus Realty" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from a contract dispute between Douglas Asphalt Company (Douglas) and the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) where GDOT had awarded Douglas two paving contracts to mill and resurface certain stretches of interstate highway. GDOT subsequently retained QORE, Inc., an engineering and materials testing company, to remove asphalt samples from the first project site and conduct tests to determine the samples' lime content. QORE retained, at GDOT's direction, Applied Technical Services, Inc. (ATS), to perform a test that GDOT developed, called an atomic absorption test. QORE and ATS sent the data that those tests produced to GDOT for its analysis and consideration and GDOT concluded from those data that the asphalt that Douglas had laid did not contain enough hydrated lime; GDOT then relied, in part, on those test results to justify its decision to place Douglas in default on both highway contracts. Douglas responded by filing this action against QORE, ATS, and several individual GDOT officials. On appeal, Douglas contended that the district court erred by dismissing its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, claims and by granting summary judgment for QORE on its claims for defamation and negligence. ATS maintained that the district court erroneously failed to grant its motions for judgment as a matter of law on both the defamation and negligence claims. The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing Douglas's RICO claim and that QORE and ATS were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the defamation and negligence claims. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the judgment against ATS, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of ATS. View "Douglas Asphalt Co., et al. v. QORE, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Sammy Thomas and Pam Thomas appealed the Blount Circuit Court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Sloan Homes, LLC ("Sloan Homes"), David Sloan, and Teresa Sloan in the Thomases' action alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct in relation to the construction of a house by Sloan Homes, the grantor under the residential sales agreement. The question presented by this appeal was whether, under the doctrine of merger, the execution and delivery of the deed in this case nullified an arbitration clause included in the antecedent residential sales agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause was still valid, thereby affirming the circuit court's order granting Sloan Homes and the Sloans' motion to compel arbitration of the Thomases' claims. View "Thomas v. Sloan Homes, LLC" on Justia Law