Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Border States Paving was awarded the prime contract by the state DOT for a road project. Border States entered into a subcontract with Morris, Inc. for aggregates and work on the project. During work on the project, the DOT orally informed Morris that certain materials passed the soundness test. However, the materials actually failed. Ultimately, the paving was not completed by the seasonal deadline. When the project was completed the next year, the DOT paid Border States in full. Border States withheld several thousand dollars from Morris for costs associated with the project because it believed Morris defaulted in its contractual obligations under the subcontract. Morris brought suit against the DOT, alleging that the DOT breached its express and implied contractual obligations owed to Morris and that the DOT breached its implied contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The circuit court ruled in favor of Morris and awarded Morris damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the DOT's erroneous pass report proximately damaged Morris where there was no evidence in the record that this error alone caused the project to not get completed by the deadline. View "Morris, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

After Leon Coleman failed to perform eight construction contracts for detached homes, he was convicted of eight counts of theft by deception and eight counts of failure to escrow under Deposits on New Homes Subtitle (Act). The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Act did not apply and that there was insufficient evidence of intent to support the theft convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to conclude that Coleman intentionally deprived buyers of their property, as required under the theft statute; and (2) the plain meaning of the Act indicated that it did not apply to Coleman. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

A construction company (Contractor) entered into a contract with the State to restructure an interstate interchange. The contract contained an incentive clause stating that no incentive payment would be made if work was not completed in its entirety by December 15, 2006. After the work was completed, Contractor filed a complaint alleging that the State had breached the contract by refusing to grant an appropriate time extension of the completion date, the disincentive date, and the incentive date. The claims commission (1) found that the contract contained a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, and (2) considered extrinsic evidence in concluding that Contractor was entitled to the maximum incentive payment and an extension of the contract completion date. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous and did not permit an extension of the incentive date, and (2) therefore, Contractor was not entitled to an incentive bonus. Remanded. View "Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendant in contract and tort, alleging that defendant failed to take necessary precautions to protect its premises from water damage. At issue on appeal was the trial judge's decision not to grant prejudgment interest on the amounts that were awarded by the jury to plaintiffs. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right and remanded to the Superior Court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest owed. View "Brandywine Smyrna, Inc., et al. v. Millennium Builders, LLC" on Justia Law

The Weitz Company sued MacKenzie House and MH Metropolitan for breach of construction contract. Arrowhead and Concorde were third-party defendants. MH Metropolitan counterclaimed for breach of the same contract, seeking liquidated damages and the cost to complete the project. Arrowhead also counterclaimed. The jury returned a verdict for MH Metropolitan, Arrowhead, and Concorde on Weitz's claim. The district court denied post-judgment motions and Weitz appealed. The court held that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict; the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence of other projects; the district court correctly decided that the issue of liquidated damages and completion costs were issues of fact that were properly submitted to the jury; there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court to deny judgment as a matter of law for Weitz's breach-of-contract claims against Arrowhead; the district court did no err in refusing to enter a default judgment against Concorde when it failed to appear at trial, or in the alternative, refusing to grant Weitz judgment as a matter of law on its claims against Concorde; and because the district court properly found against Weitz on all issues, there was no reason to consider the issue of vicarious liability. View "The Weitz Co. v. MacKenzie House, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the 2007 collapse of the Interstate 35W Bridge. Individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against two contractors that performed work on the bridge pursuant to contracts entered into with the State. The contractors brought third-party complaints against Jacobs Engineering Group on the basis that Jacobs' predecessor negligently designed the bridge. One contractor also filed a third-party complaint against the State. The State cross-claimed against Jacobs for contribution, indemnity, and statutory reimbursement. Jacobs moved to dismiss the State's cross-claim as time-barred, arguing that the reimbursement provision of the compensation statutes compensating survivor-claimants of the collapse did not retroactively revive causes of action against Jacobs that had been previously extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision retroactively revived the State's action for statutory reimbursement against Jacobs; (2) the provision did not violate Jacob's constitutional right to due process; and (3) revival of the action for statutory reimbursement did not unconstitutionally impair Jacobs' contractual obligations. View "In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the 2007 collapse of the Interstate 35W Bridge. Individual plaintiffs commenced lawsuits against a contractor that performed work on the bridge pursuant to a contract entered into with the State. The contractor brought a third-party complaint against Jacobs Engineering Group for indemnity and contribution on the basis that Jacobs' predecessor negligently designed the bridge. Jacobs moved to dismiss the lawsuits as time-barred and argued that the 2007 amendments to Minn. Stat. 541.051 did not revive actions for contribution or indemnity that had previously been extinguished by a prior version of the statute of repose. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the 2007 amendments to section 541.051 did not retroactively revive the contractor's action for contribution against Jacobs. View "In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant David Egan, a business manager for Defendant Foxhollow Construction and Trucking, Inc. (Foxhollow), met with Wayne Johnson of Defendant L.N. Johnson Paving, LLC (Johnson) to discuss a bid for excavation and paving work for a new public high school. Foxhollow wanted to bid on the project but lacked the requisite public works license. Johnson thought its license could cover Foxhollow if the two companies submitted a bid in Johnson's name. Egan submitted a subcontract bid in Johnson’s name to Plaintiff Harris, the general contractor for the school project, and was the successful bidder. Over the course of the business relationship, a contract dispute arose. Harris brought this action, alleging that (1) Foxhollow, Johnson, and another subcontractor breached their subcontracts with Harris. Egan filed a counterclaim for indemnification from Harris. The district court dismissed Foxhollow as a party for lack of proof of notice because there was no indication that Foxhollow was ever served. After a bench trial, the court granted Harris’ motion for "directed verdict" as to Egan’s counterclaim. The court concluded however that Harris failed to prove any of its remaining claims against any of the defendants and therefore was not entitled to relief. The court also awarded fees and costs to Johnson. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Harris argued that the district court: (1) erred in concluding Harris failed to prove contract damages; (2) erred in concluding that no defendant was unjustly enriched; (3) erred in concluding that no defendant is liable for fraud; (4) erred in concluding that Harris was not entitled to indemnity; (5) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion to amend findings and conclusion; (6) abused its discretion in granting fees and costs to Johnson; and (7) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment except for its attorney fee awards, which were vacated. View "Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, Inc. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was the City of Lewiston's rejection of a bid for a public works project on the grounds that the lowest bidder lacked sufficient experience for the project. In 2009, the City of Lewiston (City) advertised for bids to replace the irrigation system at the City golf course. Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. (Hillside) desired to bid on the project, but prior to doing so it sent a letter to City stating that if City insisted upon having qualifications other than a current Idaho public works license to bid on the project, the City must follow the Category B procedures set forth in the Idaho Code and pre-qualify the bidders. Hillside asked that the qualification of prior experience be removed. City’s attorney denied the request, stating that City’s specifications and bidding process complied with state law. Hillside and four others submitted bids for the project. City notified the bidders that Hillside Landscape Construction submitted the lowest bid but that the company lacked the required experience specified within the bid documents. City awarded the contract to Landscapes Unlimited, the next lowest bidder. Hillside filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. The district court held that City complied with the bidding statutes, vacated a temporary restraining order, denied the motion for an injunction then dismissed Hillside’s complaint. In its review, the Supreme Court found that because the City chose to follow the "Category A" procedures set forth in the Idaho Code rather than the Category B procedures, the district court erred in holding that City could reject the bid on that ground. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. v. City of Lewiston " on Justia Law