Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This case began as a dispute over construction costs between Appellee TriBuilt Construction Group, LLC and Appellants NISHA, LLC and Centennial Bank. After Appellee filed suit against Appellants, the circuit court ordered arbitration with regard to Appellee's claims. Appellee subsequently decided to represent itself in the arbitration and circuit court proceedings. Appellants filed a petition for a permanent injunction requesting the circuit court to enjoin the corporation's officers, director, or employees from representing Tribuilt in the circuit court or arbitration proceedings. The circuit court denied Appellants' petition so far as it pertained to arbitration proceedings, holding (1) nonlawyer representation in an arbitration proceeding does not constitute the practice of law; and (2) an arbitrator, rather than the court, should determine issues regarding legal representation during arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a corporate officer, director, or employee who is not a licensed attorney, engages in the unauthorized practice of law by representing the corporation in arbitration proceedings; and (2) issues regarding legal representation during arbitration proceedings fall squarely within the ambit of the court's constitutional powers and may not be decided by an arbitration body. View "NISHA LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Roxco, Ltd., was hired as the general contractor for several public-construction projects for the State of Mississippi, including four building projects at the University of Mississippi, Jackson State University, and Alcorn State University. State law requires that a certain percentage of the cost of construction be retained to ensure completion. However, Mississippi Code Section 31-5-15 (Rev. 2010) allows the contractor to access that retainage by depositing with the State other acceptable security. Pursuant to Section 31-5-15, Roxco substituted securities valued at $1,055,000, deposited in a safekeeping account at Trustmark National Bank. Upon being notified of Roxco's default, the State instructed Trustmark to transfer the funds from the treasury bills into the state treasury account. By letter, Roxco directed Trustmark not to transfer the funds from the treasury bills to the State's account. Notwithstanding Roxco's letter, Trustmark deposited the funds into the State's account. Roxco filed suit against Trustmark for breach of contract and conversion. Trustmark argued that Section 31-5-15 permitted the release of the funds in the safekeeping account. A jury found in favor of Roxco and awarded $3,720,000 in damages. Aggrieved, Trustmark appealed. Finding that the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trustmark National Bank v. Roxco Ltd." on Justia Law

An employee of a concrete subcontractor was injured in a workplace accident during the construction of a stadium. The employee sought to recover damages for negligence from the project's construction manager by whom she was not employed but whom she contended had a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety. The trial court ruled in the employee's favor that the construction manager could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the subcontractor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) the construction manager was not vicariously liable to the worker for any negligence of the subcontractor because the construction manager and subcontractor did not have the requisite relationship; and (2) the construction manager did not have, either by the terms of its contracts or by its actions, a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety, and therefore the construction manager could not be held liable to the employee for negligence. Remanded. View "Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Maine School Administrative District 61 (MSAD 61) contracted with International WoodFuels for the installation of a heating system at a school owned by MSAD 61. Woodfuels contracted with Thayer Corporation to assemble and install the boiler. Thayer provided the materials and performed the work as required under the contract, but WoodFuels failed to make payments to Thayer. Thayer timely recorded a mechanic's lien against the school for the materials and services it provided to WoodFuels and subsquently filed an action to enforce the lien against WoodFuels and MSAD 61. The superior court granted MSAD 61's cross-motion for summary judgment and denied Thayer's motion for summary judgment with respect to the lien action, concluding that Thayer's services were not lienable pursuant to the mechanic's lien statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in concluding that WoodFuels's heating system was not intended to become a permanent part of the school's property and was therefore not lienable by Thayer. View "Thayer Corp. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. 61" on Justia Law

Appellants, homeowners, filed suit against Centex Homes, alleging various causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranty, and failure to perform in a workmanlike manner. Centex Homes moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants had waived all warranties except the specific limited warranty that Centex Homes provided in the sales agreements. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a trial on Appellants' tort claims that Centex Homes breached its duty to construct their homes in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care, as (1) in Ohio a duty to construct houses in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care is imposed by law on all home builders; and (2) a home buyer cannot waive his right to enforce the home builder's duty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Jones v. Centex Homes" on Justia Law

This case concerns the payment for architectural services provided by SHA to Ladco in conjunction with a large office building project. In its breach of contract claim, SHA contended that it was not paid for the services it completed under the project. The district court denied Ladco's motion for summary judgment and ultimately, the jury found in favor of SHA. Ladco subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case for entry of judgment for SHA and against Ladco, but only for unpaid invoices, rather than the amount awarded by the jury. The court agreed with the district court that the parties' contract was ambiguous and there was no sufficient evidence as to who drafted the Statement of Intent. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a contra preferentem instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Shaw Hofstra & Assoc. v. Ladco Development, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Scottie and Dawn Pederson (the Pedersons) and Rocky Mountain Bank (the Bank) entered into a construction loan agreement pursuant to which the Bank agreed to lend the Pedersons several thousand dollars. In 2008, the Pedersons and the Bank agreed to finance the construction loan through three short term loans. In 2009, the Pedersons tried to refinance their loans but were unable to do so. Due to alleged failures on the part of the Bank, the Pedersons brought suit against the Bank in 2011, asserting claims for, inter alia, negligence, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. After it was served with the complaint, the Bank filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting the statutes of limitations had run on all of the Pedersons' claims. The district court granted the Bank's motion and dismissed the Pedersons' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the applicable statutes of limitations began to run in 2008 because the Pedersons' claims had accrued and they had discovered the facts constituting the claims; and (2) by filing their complaint more than three years later, the Pedersons failed to commence their action within any of the applicable statutes of limitations. View "Pederson v. Rocky Mountain Bank" on Justia Law

This declaratory judgment action was brought by Secura, an insurer for Horizon, a subcontractor on a troubled construction project. Horizon's two other insurers, State Auto and Federated later joined. Their dispute with Weitz arose out of a construction project in which Weitz was the general contractor for Metropolitan. After Weitz and Metropolitan brought breach of contract claims against each other, both filed third party complaints against Horizon for defective plumbing. Horizon's insurers defended and settled all claims against it and reimbursed Weitz for its defense of claims against Horizon. Weitz then contended that since it was an "additional insured" on Horizon's policies, the insurers should pay for attorney fees and costs it incurred in defending against Metropolitan's entire counterclaim. The insurers filed this action seeking a final judgment that they not be required to pay the attorney fees and costs. Applying Missouri law, the court rejected Weitz's argument that Metropolitan's counterclaim asserted potentially covered losses under the policies. Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurers because Metropolitan's counterclaim did not state an "occurrence" giving rise to a possibility of coverage under the policies. View "Secura Ins. v. Weitz Co., et al." on Justia Law

Patterson Enterprises hired Archie Johnson Contracting (AJC) to perform blasting on a road construction project. During the project, an entire section of rock above one of Patterson's excavators collapsed, crushing it. Patterson filed suit against AJC, asserting various claims, including negligence and strict liability. AJC asserted various affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. AJC also filed a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract. The jury (1) returned a verdict finding that AJC's blasting caused the damages sustained by Patterson and that Patterson and its employees assumed the risk of harm; (2) allocated fifty-one percent of the fault to AJC and forty-nine percent to Patterson, and awarded damages to Patterson in the amount of $50,000; and (3) returned a verdict in favor of AJC on its breach of contract claim, awarding damages to AJC in the amount of $19,255. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it permitted the defense of assumption of the risk to go to the jury; and (2) in failing to instruct the jury regarding the subjective knowledge requirement set forth in Lutz v. National Crane Corp. View "Patterson Enters., Inc. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist. View "Redco Constr. v. Profile Props., LLC " on Justia Law