Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

An owner and contractor entered into an agreement for the construction of a new home. During construction, the owner refused to pay the contractor after discovering markups on the cost of materials. In response, the contractor halted construction and filed an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. The contractor subsequently filed a petition to foreclose the mechanic's lien. Although the contractor did not complete construction, the district court found the contractor rendered substantial performance under the contract and entered a judgment against the owner. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the contractor had substantially completed work for the owner. Remanded. View "Flynn Builders, L.C. v. Lande" on Justia Law

Northstar Battery Company, LLC ("Northstar"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Cullman Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Northstar's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Apel Steel Corporation ("Apel") and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The case stemmed from a contract in which Apel Steel was working as a subcontractor for a battery manufacturing plant in Springfield, Missouri. Northstar Battery, owner of the plant, contracted with Walton Construction to serve as general contractor. Apel had further subcontracted a portion of its work to JS Nationwide, who erected structural steel at the plant. Sparks from welding started a fire which resulted in the destruction of property/equipment, and caused heat and smoke damage in the affected area of the plant. The contract between Apel and Walton contained a provision by which Apel allegedly waived all rights against JS Nationwide. Counts against Northstar alleged negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, misrepresentation and conspiracy. Northstar moved to dismiss citing lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that Apel failed to carry its jurisdictional burden, the Supreme Court held that the trial court "clearly" erred in denying Northstar's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court granted Northstar's petition and issued the writ. View "Apel Steel Corporation v. JS Nationwide Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law

Circle Y filed a complaint alleging, among other things, breach of contract when the school district terminated a construction management services contract with Circle Y. The trial court denied the school district's motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that, in light of the determination by the court of appeals that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss because Circle Y's complaint alleged facts that, when taken as true, established that the contract was not void as a matter of law due to voter approval of the educational local option sales tax, it was not necessary for the court of appeals to construe OCGA 20-2-506(h) in order to resolve the appeal. Accordingly, the court remanded to the court of appeals with direction that it vacate that portion of the Division order that addressed OCGA 20-2-506. View "Greene Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Circle Y Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint challenging a number of agreements entered into by the City of New York with respect to labor conditions on certain City construction projects. Plaintiffs argued that the agreements regulated the labor market and were therefore preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169. The court found the project labor agreements in this case materially indistinguishable from agreements the Supreme Court found permissible under the market participation exception to preemption in Building and Construction Trades Council of Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island Inc. Because the City acted as a market participant and not a regulator in entering the agreements, its actions fell outside the scope of NLRA preemption. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Building Industry Electric Contractors Assoc., et al. v. City of New York et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when a real estate developer hired HOD to act as general contractor for the construction of two multi-family residences. HOD entered into a subcontract with Well Built for the masonry work. At issue was whether a general contractor acted as a joint employer of masonry workers, who were employed by one of its subcontractors, thereby owing unpaid wages to the subcontractor's workforce. The court held that the Board erred as a matter of law in relying on the federal six-factor test in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc. in reaching its determination of joint employment. Because the Board's factual findings indicated nothing more than that the usual contractor/subcontractor relationship existed between HOD and Well Built during the three-month period that Well Built's principal, Martin Bruten, was on the job, the court need not resort to federal precedent to resolve the issue. In any event, even if the court were to apply the Zheng test, the court would hold that HOD was not a joint employer of Well Built's employees. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the matter remitted with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings. View "Matter of Ovadia v Office of the Indus. Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

V&M filed suit against Centimark alleging breach of contract and negligence after metal roof sheeting panels being installed at its steelwork facility fell into an electrical substation, causing loss of power for more than 30 hours. Damages for repairs and lost profits were around $3 million The district court granted Centimark summary judgment, ruling that V&M failed to produce sufficient evidence of causation to sustain either legal claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist.View "V&M Star Steel v. Centimark Corp." on Justia Law

A developer contracted with B&R Construction Management (B&R) for the demolition a redevelopment and housing authority facility (hereafter referred to as the Contract). B&R subcontracted some of the demolition work to Beamon Enterprises (Beamon). Beamon, in turn, subcontracted with Environmental Staffing Acquisition Corporation (En-Staff) to provide labor. After Beamon failed to pay En-Staff for the work performed, En-Staff filed a complaint against B&R seeking the amount it was owed under its contract with Beamon. En-Staff asserted it had standing to bring a breach of contract claim against B&R as a third-party beneficiary of the Contract. B&R filed a demurrer disputing En-Staff's status as a third-party beneficiary. The circuit court sustained B&R's demurrer and dismissed En-Staff's claims against B&R with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that the language of the Contract precluded third-party action against B&R, but the error was harmless; and (2) En-Staff was not a third-party beneficiary of the Contract because it benefitted only incidentally from the Contract. View "Envtl. Staffing Corp. v. B & R Constr. Mgmt." on Justia Law

In 2003, Shaw Construction obtained a line of credit from Rocky Mountain Hardware (RMH). Over the years, RMH supplied hardware for several jobs on which Shaw was the general contractor. In 2007, Shaw began work on a project for Snake River Sporting Club in which it acted as construction manager rather than general contractor. Although RMH was chosen as the hardware supplier, no separate contract was executed between RMH and either Shaw or Snake River. After none of the balance due was paid, RMH filed the instant action against Shaw, claiming Shaw was obligated to pay the outstanding balance and that RMH had a written contract with Shaw by virtue of the 2003 credit agreement. Shaw claimed Snake River was responsible for all payments to suppliers. The district court ordered Shaw to pay for the hardware furnished by RMH on the project as well as contractual interest and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly ruled the credit agreement applied in this case and, pursuant to its terms, Shaw was responsible for the principal balance due on the hardware contract, together with contractual interest and attorney fees. View "Shaw Constr., LLC v. Rocky Mountain Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

When Plaintiffs' efforts to act as general contractors on a new home foundered because of faulty work performed by a framing subcontractor, they made a claim on the homeowner's insurance policy issued to them by Defendant, Peerless Insurance Company. After Defendant denied the claim, citing two exclusions in the policy, Plaintiffs filed a declaratory-judgment action against the carrier. A hearing justice determined that the terms of the policy were ambiguous. Consequently, the hearing justice construed the policy against the insurer and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err when she determined that the policy was ambiguous; and (2) Plaintiffs were entitled to coverage for the repairs that were necessary to bring their home into compliance with the applicable building code. View "Koziol v. Peerless Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Lake Cabin Development entered into two separate written agreements with the Robert Hurly and John Hurly families to purchase their respective properties. Pursuant to an agreement, Lake Cabin provided Robert Hurly with a $250,000 option payment. After public opposition to Lake Cabin's proposed development on the land forced Lake Cabin to extend the deadline on the closing date of its agreement with the Hurlys, Lake Cabin declared the contract to be null and void and demanded return of its option payment. Both Hurly families brought separate breach of contract actions. The district court concluded that Robert Hurly was required to refund the $250,000 option payment to Lake Cabin because there was never an enforceable contract between the parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that the parties had not entered into a binding agreement, and (2) Lake Cabin was not entitled to a refund of the option payment. Remanded. View "Hurly v. Lake Cabin Dev., LLC" on Justia Law