Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This action arose from a bidding dispute between Bidder and Owner over a contract to install rubber flooring for a renovation project. Bidder filed a complaint against Owner, alleging that the biding specifications were ambiguous, the bidding process was unfair, and that Owner improperly imposed a sole source specification in violation of law. Bidder also sought recovery of attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this action. Later, Owner withdrew the solicitation, rendering Bidder's complaint moot. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Bidder's request for attorneys' fees. The Court of Chancery granted Owner's motion for summary judgment, holding that Bidder failed to demonstrate that Owner's conduct warranted an award of attorneys' fees and expenses. View "Marra v. Brandywine Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of condominium units that were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, sued defendants after defendants failed to complete construction of the rebuild. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, based on the district court's finding that the 24-month construction obligations in the Purchase Agreements were not illusory and, therefore, the parties' contracts were exempted from the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosures Act (ILSA), 15 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. The court found that the language of the Purchase Agreements did not negate plaintiffs' abilities to seek damage and specific performance remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Hillman, et al v. Loga, III, et al" on Justia Law

This litigation arose from the construction of a 143-unit condominium complex. Plaintiff Long Trail House Condominium Association appealed a trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendant general contractor Engelberth Construction, Inc. on its complaint. The Association argued that the court erred in: (1) applying the economic loss rule to bar its negligence claim; and (2) dismissing its breach of implied warranty claim. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the trial court's decision. View "Long Trail House Condominium Assoc. v. Engelberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a contractor's bid was responsive to the Delaware Department of Transportation's (DelDOT) Request for Proposals (RFP). The contractor's bid did not include required paint certifications. In addition, the bid reflected the contractor's plan to use new steel beams, rather than refurbish the existing ones, as required by the RFP. The contractor chose to submit a bid that did not conform to the project specifications. The Supreme Court concluded that the contractor therefore did so at its own risk. DelDOT's decision that the bid was non-responsive was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in DelDOT's favor. View "Julian v. Delaware Dep't. of Transportation" on Justia Law

For some years, the Board of Education of Baltimore County belonged to a governmental group purchasing consortium, which competitively bid a roofing services contract on behalf of its members. The Board relied on that contact to fulfill its needs for roofing repair services. Appellant Building Materials Corporation of America, a nationwide manufacturer of roofing materials, questioned the Board's authority for that practice under the pertinent statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when viewed in the context of the entire education law and regulations promulgated under that law, the competitive bidding statute did not bar the Board from using its membership in an intergovernmental purchasing consortium for the procurement of roofing repair services. View "Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Patrick Engineering signed a 2007 contract with the City of Naperville for work on a stormwater management system. Some work was done and some payments were made, but the parties fell into a dispute over “additional services.” Patrick terminated the agreement and sued Naperville, seeking $436,392. The agreement provided that if Naperville made a verbal request for additional services, the engineers were required to confirm that request in writing and were not obligated to perform the changes until authorized in writing. This procedure was not followed; equitable estoppel became the crux of the case. The trial court dismissed. The appellate court reversed. The city did not appeal with respect to claims of quantum meruit and under the Illinois Local Government Prompt Payment Act, which remain pending in the trial court. The supreme court reversed with respect to other claims and reinstated the dismissals. While equitable estoppel may apply against municipalities in extraordinary and compelling circumstances, Illinois courts have never held that apparent authority may be applied against municipalities. To recover in equitable estoppel, plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that municipal officials possessed actual, rather than apparent, authority on which plaintiff reasonably relied.View "Patrick Eng'g v. City of Naperville" on Justia Law

A home remodeling contractor (Contractor) received a demand for arbitration regarding allegedly defective work it performed on a remodeling project. Contractor's insurer (Insurer) accepted defense of the claim under a reservation of rights. The arbitrator issued an arbitration award in favor of the homeowners. When Insurer refused to pay the award, Contractor paid the homeowners and sued Insurer for indemnification under the policy. The district court granted Contractor's motion for summary judgment, concluding that a vague arbitration award made it impossible to determine whether the insurance policy covered any of the homeonwers' successful claims and was directly attributable to the inaction of the attorney appointed by Insurer to represent Contractor. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a portion of the homeowners' claim may be covered under the policy; (2) Insurer was not vicariously liable of the absence of an explanation of the arbitration award; and (3) Insurer was directly liable to Contractor for the failure of the attorney to request an explanation of the arbitration award to determine what portion of the award, if any, was for the covered claim. Remanded. View "Remodeling Dimensions, Inc., v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Lexington Insurance Company and Chartis, Inc. appealed a circuit court order that appointed a third arbitrator to the arbitration panel established to settle a dispute between Lexington and Southern Energy Homes, Inc. ("SEH"). From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH purchased from Lexington three commercial general-liability ("CGL") policies. An endorsement to a CGL policy insuring SEH from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2002, provided that SEH is responsible for a $100,000 self-insurance retention ("SIR") "per occurrence." Endorsements to two successive CGL policies that together provided coverage to SEH through October 31, 2004, provide that SEH is responsible for a $250,000 SIR per occurrence. The SIR applied both to costs of defense incurred by SEH and to amounts SEH pays in settlement or pursuant to a judgment. From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH was named as a defendant in 46 lawsuits alleging property damage and personal injury resulting from SEH's using a vinyl-on-gypsum product in the homes it manufactured. SEH gave notice of these lawsuits to Lexington, and that it had exhausted its SIR amounts in the litigation and was entitled to reimbursement from Lexington. More than 120 days passed without SEH receiving a decision from Lexington as to whether it agreed with SEH's claim for this amount. SEH made an arbitration demand pursuant to the arbitration clauses of the CGL policies, including the SIR endorsement to the 2002 policy. Upon review of the policies in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in appointing the third arbitrator. The order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lexington Insurance Co. v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. " on Justia Law

WR sought to develop a medical office building by executing a long-term ground lease to a developer, who would design, finance, construct, and own the facility, leasing space to WR. WR requested proposals, describing a 30-year ground lease for a 30,000 square foot medical facility. Citadel submitted a proposal. Negotiations followed. WR signed an “Authorization to Proceed” stating that WR “will only be responsible for architectural and engineering fees in the event [W R] does not execute its space leases and ground lease.” Citadel hired attorneys, architects, engineers; refined plans: conducted zoning review, and began securing financing. Negotiations failed. WR terminated the relationship, just as Citadel was preparing to commence construction. WR refused to pay expenses unless it received the plans; entered into contracts with Citadel’s architect and engineer; used their plans and built the facility. The district court rejected Citadel’s claims. The parties settled with respect to pre-construction costs and fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Citadel failed to show that WR agreed to complete the arrangement. When the relationship ended, they had not agreed on essential lease terms. No language in the agreement required the parties to negotiate in good faith, nor did it establish a framework for the negotiation process. View "Citidal Grp. Ltd. v. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

After Claimant's attempt to obtain a refund of sales tax on building materials used in the construction of an ethanol production plant was administratively denied in part, Claimant sought judicial review. This appeal turned on a statutory limitation of the exemption for manufacturing machinery and equipment and the limited statutory authority for appointment of a purchasing agent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute limited the exemption to purchases by the manufacturer; and (2) a contractual provision purporting to entitle the manufacturer to all tax credits for taxes paid by a construction contractor was not effective as a purchasing agent appointment. View "Bridgeport Ethanol v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law