Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

L.H. Bolduc Company, Inc. (Bolduc) was the subcontractor of Engineering and Construction Innovations, Inc. (ECI). Bolduc damaged a sewer pipe while working on a construction project. ECI repaired the damage and sought reimbursement from Bolduc's insurer, The Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut (Travelers) under an endorsement to Bolduc's policy naming ECI as an additional insured for liability caused by acts or omissions of Bolduc. Travelers denied coverage. ECI subsequently sued Bolduc and Travelers (collectively, Appellants) for negligence and breach of contract. A jury found that Bolduc was not negligent, and the district court granted summary judgment for Appellants on ECI's breach of contract claims, concluding that Appellants had no obligation to reimburse ECI for damages not caused by Bolduc. The court of appeals reversed, determining (1) ECI was entitled to coverage as an additional insured without regard to Bolduc's fault; and (2) Bolduc was required to indemnity ECI. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) ECI did not qualify as an additional insured with respect to the pipe damage; and (2) Bolduc could not be required to indemnify ECI without violating Minn. Stat. 337.02, which prohibits indemnification for the fault of others in construction contracts. View "Eng'g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a construction contract dispute between Total Industrial Plant Services, Inc. (TIPS) and Turner Industries Group, LLC (Turner). Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) was the surety for Turner's substitution bond filed in lieu of TIPS's construction lien. TIPS filed a complaint against Turner and Fidelity, alleging various causes of action. The trial court granted TIPS's motion for partial summary judgment and ordered Turner to return the retainage it had withheld. After a trial, the district court found in favor of Defendants and dismissed TIPS's remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying TIPS's claim for additional compensation under a theory of either quantum meruit or breach of contract; (2) failing to find that TIPS was the prevailing party and awarding costs and fees to Turner; (3) finding TIPS's construction lien was barred by the ninety-day statute of limitations; (4) granting partial summary judgment to TIPS and ordering Turner to return the retainage; and (5) dismissing Turner's bill of costs for being untimely. The Court, however, found the district court erred by denying TIPS prejudgment interest on the retainage. Remanded. View "Total Indust. Plant Servs. v. Turner Indust. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Forrest Construction was the named insured on a commercial general liability policy with Cincinnati Insurance. In 2004, Forrest was hired toconstruct a home for the Laughlins. A dispute arose over the amount owed and Forrest filed suit. The Laughlins counter-sued based on alleged defects in the workmanship of the construction, particularly the foundation. Forrest notified Cincinnati Insurance of the counter-complaint and requested defense. Cincinnati Insurance based its denial on an exclusion in the policy for work done by the insured its position that the underlying complaint did not allege damage caused by a subcontractor, thereby rendering the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion inapplicable. Forrest sued, alleging breach of contract, bad-faith denial, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The district court found that Cincinnati Insurance had breached its contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Cincinnati Insurance was given sufficient notice of the facts giving rise to its obligation to defend and that, under Tennessee law, “property damage” occurs when one component (here, the faulty foundation) of a finished product (the house) damages another component. View "Forrest Constr., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A pipeline owner (Owner) purchased sixty-eight mile-long pipeline constructed in the 1940s and made plans to remove the old pipeline and construct a new one that would carry butane. Owner awarded Contractor the contract to replace a certain section of the pipeline. After Contractor commenced work, Contractor filed suit against Owner for breach of contract and fraud based on Owner's failure to locate several hundred "foreign crossings" in the pipeline's path and its subsequent refusal to compensate Contractor for its additional expenses resulting from the obstacles. The trial court found in favor of Owner, finding that the parties' contract allocated the risk of any additional cost incurred because of foreign crossings to Contractor. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Owner failed to exercise due diligence in locating the foreign crossings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the contract allocated all risk to Contractor for unknown obstacles discovered during the construction process; and (2) the jury's answers to questions about Contractor's recovery for breach of contract based on due diligence were immaterial. View "El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Hospital purchased from Assurance Company of America a "builder's risk" insurance policy and contracted with Wehr Constructors for installation of subsurfaces and floors as part its project. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface done by Wehr was damaged. Hospital sought recompense under the builders risk policy. Assurance denied the claim. Meanwhile, Wehr and Hospital settled on Wehr's breach of contract claim. As part of the settlement, Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim Hospital had against Assurance arising out of the policy. Wehr, as Hospital's assignee, then sued Assurance in federal district court. Assurance moved for judgment on the pleadings, invoking the policy's anti-assignment provision and arguing that it had not consented to the assignment. The district court requested certification to answer a question of Kentucky law. The Supreme Court concluded that under Kentucky law, a clause in an insurance policy that requires the insured to obtain the insurer's prior written consent before assigning a claim for an insured loss under the policy is not enforceable or applicable to the assignment of a claim under the policy where the covered loss occurs before the assignment, and that such a clause would, under those circumstances, be void as against public policy. View "Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

A general contractor (Carlisle) for a construction project contracted with Plaintiff to perform carpentry work for the project. A bond was issued for the project. Carlisle was the principal on the bond, and International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC) was the surety. Plaintiff later filed suit against Carlisle and IFIC seeking to recover payment for the work it performed. The arbitrator issued two amended awards. Plaintiff moved the superior court to confirm the second amended awarded concerning Carlisle's liability and to modify it as to IFIC. The trial justice remanded the matter back to the arbitrator for a determination as to IFIC's liability. The arbitrator on remand found that both Carlisle and IFIC were liable to Plaintiff for $43,543. The trial justice confirmed the post-remand arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the second amended award should have been vacated under R.I. Stat. 37-16-18(2), and the trial justice was authorized, under section 37-16-19, to remand the case to the same arbitrator for a hearing; and (2) because the remand in this case accomplished the same result that could have been accomplished under section 37-16-18 and 37-16-19, the judgment was affirmed. View "Drago Custom Interiors, LLC v. Carlisle Bldg. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Kadrmas, Lee & Jackson, Inc., ("KLJ") appealed a district court judgment awarding the City of Valley City ("City") costs and expenses the City incurred defending itself in the underlying lawsuit and pursuing its indemnity claim against KLJ. The City entered into a contract with KLJ to provide engineering services for a paving and sewer project. The City hired a general contractor for the project. The contract between the City and the contractor required the contractor to furnish all labor, materials, and equipment for the project. The contractor was required to provide a payment bond under the terms of its contract with the City, and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul") was the surety under the bond. Specialized Contracting, Inc. ("SCI"), entered into a subcontract with the contractor to complete some of the work on the project. In 2007, SCI sued St. Paul for breach of its duties under the payment bond, seeking compensation for additional work SCI alleged it completed on the project for which the contractor refused to pay. St. Paul served a third-party complaint against the City for breach of contract and indemnity, alleging the concrete repair work was outside the scope of the City's contract with the contractor, the City was liable to the contractor for any additional compensation SCI was claiming against the payment bond if SCI established KLJ's decision to replace the concrete was beyond the scope of the contract, and the City was required to indemnify St. Paul for any judgments against it in favor of SCI arising from decisions made by KLJ. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded KLJ did not have a duty to defend the City. The Court reversed the district court's judgment awarding the City costs and expenses, and remanded the case for a determination of whether KLJ was entitled to recover its costs and expenses as a prevailing party. View "Specialized Contracting, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins." on Justia Law

The owners of two properties leased them to developer-tenants for the purpose of building an apartment building on each. As construction was beginning, the landlords breached the leases by refusing to provide estoppel certificates and contesting the tenants' building permits. The landlords' breach prevented the tenants from obtaining financing, which ended the development project. The tenants sued for lost profits. Before trial, the circuit court ruled against the landlords on several motions, holding in part (1) the landlords could not introduce evidence of the 2008 crash in the real estate market to show that the tenants would not have made profits, and (2) the tenants could introduce evidence of the landlords' reasons for breaching, including communications with their former counsel. The jury awarded the tenants over $36 million in damages, holding the landlords jointly and severally liable. The court of special appeals held the landlords could not be held jointly and severally liable but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did nor err in excluding all evidence of post-breach market data in measuring damages; and (2) the landlord waived the attorney-client privilege as to communications relevant to the subject matter of the claim of bad faith. View "CR-RSC Tower I, LLC v. RSC Tower I, LLC" on Justia Law

The Corps contracted with Atlantic for the construction of a child development center and Atlantic entered into a Subcontract Agreement with J-Crew for labor and materials. The Subcontract Agreement included a forum-selection clause, which provided that disputes shall be litigated in Virginia courts. Ignoring the forum-selection clause, J-Crew filed suit against Atlantic in Texas. Applying 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), the district court denied Atlantic's motion to transfer, finding that Atlantic had not met its burden of showing why the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties and their witnesses weighed in favor of transferring the case to Virginia. Atlantic subsequently petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to dismiss or transfer the case. Because the court found that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by considering enforcement of the forum-selection clause under section 1404(a), instead of under Rule 12(b)(3) and section 1406; and by conducting its analysis under section 1404(a), the court denied the petition. View "In re: Atlantic Marine Const Co. Inc." on Justia Law

In this construction defect case, defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the summary judgment ruling. The court meanwhile entered judgment, and plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. When the trial court later denied the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did not file a new notice of appeal. The question in this case was whether plaintiff needed to do so. Defendant argued that, because a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for new trial, its filing rendered plaintiff's earlier notice of appeal premature and, as a consequence, a nullity. Plaintiff argued that the motion for reconsideration did not constitute a motion for a new trial and thus had no effect on the filing of the notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that, under "Carter v. U.S. National Bank," (747 P2d 980 (1987)), a motion for reconsideration constitutes a motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, the court held that the filing of the motion did not have the effect of rendering the appeal a nullity. Consequently, the court concluded that plaintiff was not required to file a new notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Carter" and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided. In this case, plaintiff's filing of the motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment did not render the filing of the notice of appeal premature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Assoc. Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condo v. Warren" on Justia Law