Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Circle D Contractors filed suit in district court to collect from the Bartletts money owed for the installation of a swimming pool. The district court ruled in favor of Circle D. The Barletts appealed. Circle D did not refile an additional complaint within thirty days, and the Barletts moved to dismiss Circle D's complaint as untimely. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Circle D had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of District Court Rule 9 by failing to timely refile its complaint in circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) only substantial compliance with the rule that a plaintiff refile its complaint in circuit court is required; and (2) Circle D substantially complied with rule 9 because all of its pleadings that were previously filed in district court were filed in circuit court, albeit by the Bartletts, and moreover, Circle D also refiled its complaint in circuit court. Remanded. View "Circle D Contractors, Inc. v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

Construction Company contracted with Subcontractor for construction of elements of an HVAC system. As partial collateral for a revolving line of credit, Subcontractor assigned to Bank its right to receive payment under the contract with Construction Company. Construction Company instead made twelve payments to Subcontractor. Subcontractor subsequently ceased business operations, leaving an outstanding debt to Bank on its line of credit. Bank filed an action against Construction Company for breach of contract and violation of the UCC. A jury found (1) Construction Company liable on both counts for ten of the twelve checks that it had delivered to Subcontractor, and (2) Bank was estopped from recovering with respect to the final two checks. The judge entered judgment on the statutory claim in the amount of $3,015,000, the full face value of the ten checks. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the trial judge (1) properly entered judgment on Bank's statutory claim in the amount of the wrongfully midirected payments; but (2) erred in denying the bank's motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the final two checks, as there was insufficient evidence to support Construction Company's defense of estoppel. View "Reading Coop. Bank v. Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants Stryker Biotech, LLC, Stryker Sales Corporation (collectively Stryker) and Turner Construction Company, appealed a superior court ruling which found them liable on a theory of unjust enrichment and awarded damages to the plaintiff, Axenics, Inc. f/k/a RenTec Corporation. Axenics cross-appealed, challenging the amount of damages awarded and the trial court's failure to find the defendants liable on its breach of contract and New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claims. This case arose from the construction of a biotech facility for Stryker for which Turner served as the general contractor. Axenics subcontracted with Turner to furnish labor, materials, equipment, and services for the installation of "process pipe" at the facility. A dispute arose when Axenics notified Turner of additional change orders related to delays and work that it believed to be outside the scope of the contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the subcontract addressed the subject matter of Axenics' unjust enrichment claim. The Court reversed the trial court's decision finding Turner liable to Axenics on its theory of unjust enrichment. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence that Stryker accepted a benefit that would be unconscionable to retain. Therefore the Court held that the trial court erred in allowing Axenics to recover against Stryker under a theory of unjust enrichment. The Court found that an internal memorandum was admitted into evidence in error; the trial court erred in relying upon it in assessing damages. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision with respect to Axenics' CPA claims. The case was ultimately affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co." on Justia Law

Travelers moved to dismiss Postel's appeal of the district court's stay of Postel's lawsuit seeking payment from Travelers on a surety bond for work that it performed as a subcontractor. Postel brought its suit pursuant to the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131 et seq. Travelers argued that Postel's appeal, which was not filed until fifty-five days after the district court's order, was untimely. Because Postel did not argue that the United States had any involvement in this case, but instead relied solely on the statutory requirement that it bring its Miller Act claim in the name of the United States, the court concluded that it was required to file its notice of appeal within thirty days under Rule 4(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, the court granted Travelers' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States for the use and benefit of Postel Erection Group, L.L.C., et al v. Travelers Casualty and Surety, et al" on Justia Law

Matrix Construction Co. was a South Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in South Carolina. Matrix was the general contractor on a project to renovate schools in South Carolina. Matrix hired Contract Supply as a subcontractor. Contract Supply had a relationship with BlueTarp Financial, a company providing commercial credit to the construction industry that had its principal place of business in Maine. After Matrix accepted Contract Supply's bid, Matrix signed BlueTarp's account agreement, which stated that disputes would be governed by the laws of Maine. Matrix later learned that Contract Supply was not paying its suppliers and stopped paying Contract Supply. BlueTarp filed this action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the federal district court for the District of Maine invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Matrix. BlueTarp appealed, arguing that the forum selection clause in the account agreement authorized jurisdiction in the Maine district court and, in any event, Matrix had sufficient connections with Maine to satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, having found the relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness factors satisfied, the district court had personal jurisdiction over Matrix. View "Bluetarp Fin., Inc. v. Matrix Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Jack Bays, Inc. did site work on the construction of a new church (New Life). Jack Bays contracted with several subcontractors, eleven of which were parties to this action. New Life obtained additional funds for the project through three lenders. The Lenders were listed on the deed of trust for the new financing. After New Life stopped making to Jack Bays due to lack of funding, Jack Bays recorded its memorandum of mechanics' lien against New Life and terminated the construction contract. All Contractors timely filed complaints against the Lenders. The circuit court ordered that the property be sold at public auction with the proceeds to be applied in satisfaction of the mechanics' liens in the following order of priority: Subcontractors, Jack Bays, and Lenders. The Lenders appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that Jack Bays' lien was valid; (2) was not plainly wrong in determining that the Contractors' liens had priority over the Lenders' deed of trust; but (3) erred in approving the sale of the entire parcel of land to satisfy the Contractors' liens, where no evidence was introduced to support this decision. Remanded. View "Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, Inc." on Justia Law

While a lawsuit by Appellees David and Elizabeth Speaks was pending against Rosemary and Byron Baker for damages related to poor construction workmanship, the Bakers transferred two parcels of real property to their son, Nathan Baker. The case resulted in a judgment against Byron but a dismissal of the claims against Rosemary. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Five days later, Nathan transferred the properties to a limited liability company (LLC) he and his family controlled. Appellees subsequently filed this case under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. While the case was pending, the LLC transferred the two pieces of property to trusts controlled by Rosemary Baker. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees permitting execution on the properties, finding that all of the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly found the conveyances to be fraudulent; but (2) Appellees failed to make the required prima facie showing that the properties were subject to execution on a judgment against Byron Baker alone. View "Baker v. Speaks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Terence and Rachel Barrett appealed the dismissal of their claims against Defendant-Appellee Harry Gilbertson (dba Harry Gilbertson Construction) in a contract dispute. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their breach of contract claims related to the construction of their house, and that the court abused its discretion in denying their motion for attorney's fees. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish Defendant breached the terms of the construction contract or that the trial court did abused its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees. View "Barrett v. Gilbertson" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from a contract for construction of a baseball stadium and home field for the Seattle Mariners baseball team. In its first trip to the Supreme Court, "Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Construction Company," (202 P.3d 924 (2009) (PFD I)), the Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the owner’s suit against the general contractor because the action was brought for the benefit of the State, and therefore the exemption from the statute of limitations set out in RCW 4.16.160 applied. This case raised questions about whether the construction statute of repose barred suit against the general contractor and, if not, whether the general contractor may pursue third party claims against two of its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment of dismissal in favor of the general contractor and the subcontractors on statute of repose grounds. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "the statute of repose does not bar suit against the general contractor. In accord with several provisions in the subcontracts, the subcontractors are subject to liability to the same extent that the general contractor may be liable for any defective materials or work under the subcontracts. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the statute of repose bars Hunt Kiewit’s third party claims against the subcontractors." View "Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant, a general contractor, subcontracted with Plaintiff, who was unlicensed under Florida law at the time, to perform work on a parking garage. After a dispute, Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. During litigation, Defendant argued that because Plaintiff was unlicensed, its breach of contract claim was barred under Fla. Stat. 489.128, which provides that contracts entered into by an unlicensed contractor shall be unenforceable. Plaintiff countered that Defendant was also barred from enforcing the contract because the parties were in pari delicto based on Defendant's alleged knowledge of Plaintiff's unlicensed status. The trial court ruled against Plaintiff, holding that the common law defense of in pari delicto was unavailable under section 498.128. The fifth district court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party's knowledge that a contractor or subcontractor does not hold the state-required license to perform the construction work of the contract is legally insufficient to establish the defense that the parites stand in pari delicto. In so holding, the Court expressly disapproved the third district court of appeals' decision in Austin Building Co. v. Rago, Ltd., which directly conflicted with the fifth district's decision. View "Earth Trades, Inc. v. T&G Corp." on Justia Law