Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a Hampton Inn & Suites renovation and construction in Rhode Island. Stonestreet Construction, as the construction manager and general contractor, entered into a construction contract with Weybosset Hotel. Because of cost overruns and other delays, Allstate Interiors & Exteriors, one of the subcontractors on the project, filed a complaint against Stonestreet. Stonestreet counterclaimed against Allstate and brought a third-party complaint against Weybosset, bringing several state law causes of action arising from the construction project. After a trial on Stonestreet's third-party complaint against Weybosset, the district court ruled in favor of Stonestreet on its breach of contract claim and awarded damages in the amount of $571,595. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) exercising supplemental jurisdiction following Allstate and Stonestreet's partial settlement; (2) interpreting the construction contract for the purpose of calculating damages; and (3) denying Weybosset's discovery motion regarding supplemental expert reports. View "Stonestreet Constr., LLC v. Weybosset Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law

Elliot, which provides construction and maintenance services, owns and leases bucket trucks. In 1996, Elliot entered into a lease with TECO, a manufacturer of such trucks, agreeing agreed to hold TECO harmless from liability arising from injuries resulting from use, operation, or transportation of the vehicle or its location or condition. In 2000, Large was injured while operating a truck, which his employer, Elliot, had leased from TECO. Large sued TECO. TECO’s successor in interest (Mobile) filed a third-party complaint against Elliot, seeking defense and indemnification pursuant to the lease. Mobile later settled with Large without Elliot’s participation, leaving the third-party complaint against Elliot as the only outstanding issue. After a change in Virginia law, Mobile again moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding Elliot responsible to defend and indemnify Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Elliot’s argument that a later invoice superseded the terms of the lease, eliminating Elliot’s duty to defend and indemnify except in the case that Elliot violated obligations under the invoice by failing to either adequately train Large in the use of the truck or to provide him with copies of the truck’s operation and maintenance manuals. View "Large v. Mobile Tool Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Clark, the owner and president of an East St. Louis Illinois company, was charged with making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Clark’s company had entered into a hauling services subcontract with Gateway, general contractor on a federally funded highway project in St. Louis, Missouri. Employers must pay laborers working on certain federally-funded projects the “prevailing wage,” calculated by the Secretary of Labor based on wages earned by corresponding classes of workers employed on projects of similar character in a given area, and maintain payroll records demonstrating prevailing wage compliance, 40 U.S.C. 3142(b) The indictment charged that Clark submitted false payroll records and a false affidavit to Gateway, representing that his employees were paid $35 per hour, when they actually received $13-$14 per hour. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that when a false document is filed under a statute that makes the filing a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction, venue is proper only in the district where the document was filed for final agency action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the effects of the alleged wrongdoing may be felt more strongly in Missouri than in Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Association filed an action against Maronda Homes for breach of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, also referred to as the implied warranty of habitability in the residential construction context. The underlying cause of action arose from alleged defects in the construction and development of a residential subdivision that Maronda Homes and T.D. Thomson Construction Company developed. Lakeview Reserve served as the homeonwers association of the division. Maronda Homes filed a third-party complaint against T.D. Thomson for indemnification based on the alleged violations by Maronda Homes. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Maronda Homes and T.D. Thompson, finding that the common law implied warranties of fitness and merchantability do not extend to the construction and design of the private roadways, infrastructure, or any other common areas in a residential subdivision. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the common law warranty of habitability applied in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability applied to the improvements that provided essential services to the homeowners association. Remanded. View "Maronda Homes, Inc. of Fla. v. Lakeview Reserve Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mary Soileau was injured while working for the Town of Mamou when a front-end loader detached from a tractor and struck her in the leg. She named the tractor manufacturer, the Town, Smith's Hardware (where the Town rented the tractor for employees' use), the hardware store's owners and their insurance company. Trial began with only the owners and their insurer as the remaining defendants in the suit. On the third day, Plaintiff moved to dismiss the owners and their company in the presence of the jury, stating that she did not seek any damages personally against them. Hearing no objections, the trial court granted the request, but made no written (and therefore signed) judgment of dismissal. On day four, the insurer moved for a directed verdict, based on contract language that it was obligated to pay only if its insureds were legally obligated to pay. The insurer's motion was denied, and ultimately over $9 million in damages were awarded to Plaintiff. Concluding that the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion, the appellate court reversed, dismissing the insurance company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the effect Plaintiff's in-court dismissal of the insured parties was during her personal injury action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Solieau v. Smith True Value & Rental" on Justia Law

ACT brought this suit against PCI and First National, alleging claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and recovery on a payment bond under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131(b). Because United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority, the court overruled it and held that the Miller Act's statute of limitations was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Because nothing on the face of ACT's complaint indicated that it did not work on the project or rent equipment to PCI within one year of the date it filed the complaint, the complaint could not have been dismissed if the district court had treated the Miller Act's statute of limitations as a claim-processing rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Air Control Tech. v. Pre Con Indus." on Justia Law

After a general contractor (Perini) was sued in connection with alleged reinforcing steel defects on commercial construction project, Perini filed a counterclaim against the steel installer (Century) and the company to whom the steel installer assigned its assets (PCS). Century and PCS in turn filed third- and fourth-party complaints against several entities, including the company that provided structural engineering services for the project (Halcrow), alleging negligence, indemnity, contribution, an declaratory relief. Halcrow moved to dismiss the third- and fourth-party complaints, arguing that unintentional tort claims against design professionals in commercial construction projects are barred when the claimant incurs purely economic losses. The district court granted Halcrow's motion. The district court subsequently granted Century's and PCS's motions to amend their complaints to allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Halcrow then filed this petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court issued the writ and directed the district court to vacate its order granting PCS and Century leave to amend their third- and fourth-party complaints, holding that, in commercial construction defect litigation, the economic loss doctrine applies to bar claims against design professionals for negligent misrepresentation where the damages alleged are purely economic. View "Halcrow, Inc. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The Utilities Board of the City of Opp appealed a circuit court's order that denied its motion to dismiss a third-party complaint filed by Shuler Brothers, Inc. The Alabama Electric Company (AEC) had filed suit against Shuler Brothers seeking recovery for services performed and for breach of contract when Shuler Brothers refused to pay an invoice for repairs AEC made to some equipment. Shuler Brothers argued that the repairs did not solve its equipment issue. Shuler Brothers alleged the Utilities Board was negligent in maintaining power lines going to its facility that was part of its equipment troubles. In its motion to dismiss, the Utilities Board argued that a two-year statute of limitations applied to Shuler Brothers' claim, and that the alleged negligence was not discovered until AEC served Shuler Brothers with its complaint. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment to deny the Utilities Board's motion to dismiss; reversed the circuit court's decision denying Shuler Brothers' breach-of-contract claim; and reversed the circuit court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss Shuler Brothers' negligence claim. View "Utilities Board of the City of Opp v. Shuler Brothers, Inc. " on Justia Law

Richard and Lisa Keane and the companies they managed, and Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC (BFU) had a disagreement arising from a development deal involving the Houston Professional Plaza. They went to mediation, but the parties had a disagreement regarding the terms of the mediated agreement. They then turned to arbitration. The arbitrator granted two awards in favor of BFU. The award did not specify any date by which the Keanes were to pay the money, nor did the award include interest. The district court confirmed the arbitration awards, and issued a writ of execution. The sheriff returned the writ not satisfied. BFU then obtained an order for a debtor's examination. A partial satisfaction of judgment was made, but the Keanes did not direct how the payment made was to be applied to the two arbitration awards. BFU applied the partial satisfaction to one of the awards, and filed a motion to have the Keanes held in contempt for failing to pay the second. The Keanes challenged the contempt action. The Supreme Court, after its review of the matter, found that because the order confirming the arbitration award did not require the Keanes to do anything and because contempt cannot be used to enforce payment of the debt in this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding them in contempt and the order later entered awarding the respondent attorney fees and court costs. View "Bald, Fat & Ugly v. Keane" on Justia Law