Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Redondo Construction Corporation pled guilty to aiding and abetting the making of false statements during its work on a federal highway project. The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) and the Puerto Rico Public Guildings Authority (“PBA”) subsequently revoked the bids it had awarded Redondo before the plea and suspended Redondo from bidding on new contracts. Redondo challenged both decisions, which resulted in settlement agreements with both agencies allowing Redondo to resume bidding for contracts. After Puerto Rico passed Law 458, which prohibited Puerto Rico agencies from awarding contracts corporations convicted of offenses involving public funds, the PBA cancelled several of Redondo’s bids and the contract it had executed with Redondo, and the PRHTA withdrew from its settlement with Redondo. Redondo sued PRHTA, PBA, and several officials at both agencies, alleging that Defendants were in breach of the settlement agreements, that this caused Redondo’s bankruptcy, and that Defendants were liable in damages. The district court granted the PRHTA’s and the individual defendants’ motions for summary judgment and sua sponte dismissed Redondo’s claims against the PBA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the entry of summary judgment as to the PRHTA and the individual defendants, as Redondo had no record of evidence of damages against these defendants; but (2) vacated the dismissal of the claim against the PBA, as the court did not meet the necessary conditions for entering judgment sua sponte.View "Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo" on Justia Law

Appellant Edged in Stone, Inc. (EIS) sought damages for breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence and unjust enrichment when a skid loader it purchased experienced mechanical problems. The district court dismissed all of EIS's claims except breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Later, the district court entered a judgment in favor of Northwest Power Systems, LLC (NWPS), dismissing EIS's remaining claims and awarded NWPS attorney's fees and costs. EIS appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to NWPS. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed that court's grant of summary judgment.View "Edged In Stone v. NW Power Systems" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a construction corporation, contracted to construct a wharf for Respondent, the Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texas. After the construction was to be completed, Petitioner sued, claiming damages from delays caused by the Port. The Port, in turn, claimed that a no-damages-for-delay provision in the construction contract between the parties precluded delay damages. Petitioner also sought recovery of $2.36 million in delay damages withheld by the Port for Petitioner’s failure to meet deadlines. After a trial, the jury found that the Port had breached the contract for deliberately and wrongfully interfering with Petitioner’s work, causing Petitioner to incur $18,602,697 in delay damages. The jury also found Petitioner had not released its claim to the $2.36 million liquidated damages the Port withheld. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the Local Government Contract Claims Act waives governmental immunity from suit on a contract claim for delay damages the contract does not call for; (2) the no-damages-for-delay provision in the parties’ contract did not shield the Port from liability for deliberately and wrongfully interfering with the contractor’s work; and (3) Petitioner was entitled to recover the liquidated damages withheld by the Port. View "Zachry Constr. Corp. v. Port of Houston Auth. of Harris County" on Justia Law

Carnell, a "minority-owned" corporation, filed suit against the Housing Authority and Blaine based on claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. The court held that a corporation can acquire a racial identity and establish standing to seek a remedy for alleged race discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, but that the district court properly dismissed one of the defendants from liability on plaintiff's race discrimination claims; the district court abused its discretion in permitting the use of particular impeachment evidence, which should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; and the district court properly reduced certain damages awarded to plaintiff on its contract claims, but decided that the strict notice requirements of the Virginia Public Procurement Act, Virginia Code 2.2-4300 through 4377, required the court to narrow further the scope of recoverable contract damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.View "Carnell Construction Corp. v. Danville RHA" on Justia Law

A Homeowner contracted with a Builder to build a home on property owned by the Homeowner. The Builder contracted with a Plumber to put in the plumbing at the house. After the home was completed, the Builder and the Homeowner sued the Plumber for damages allegedly caused by plumbing leaks, alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Plumber, reasoning (1) the Homeowner could not recover contract damages because it was not a party to the plumbing subcontract, nor could the Builder recover contract damages because it had not suffered any compensable damage; and (2) the plaintiffs did not have a negligence claim because they did not allege violation of any tort duty independent of the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the pleadings and summary judgment evidence negated the existence of a negligence claim. View "Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Washington State courts have jurisdiction over a civil case arising out of a contract in which the tribal corporation waived its sovereign immunity and consented to jurisdiction in Washington State courts. The Washington Supreme Court held that it did not infringe on the sovereignty of the tribe to honor its own corporation's decision to enter into a contract providing for jurisdiction in Washington State courts. View "Outsource Servs. Mgmt. v. Nooksack Bus. Corp." on Justia Law

The Developer converted a vacant building into a residential condominium by gutting and refitting it. The Developer purchased Commercial Lines Policies covering bodily injury and property damage from Nautilus, covering periods from June 1998 through June 2000. The policies define occurrence as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” but do not define accident. The policies exclude damage to “that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations;” eliminate coverage for damage to “that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it;” and contain an endorsement entitled “Exclusion—Products-Completed Operations Hazard.’ Construction was completed in 2000; the Developer transferred control to a board of owners. By May 2000, one homeowner was aware of water damage. In 2005, the Board hired a consulting firm, which found that the exterior brick walls were not fully waterproofed and concluded that the deterioration had likely developed over many years, even prior to the condominium conversion, but that the present water penetration was the result of inadequate restoration of the walls. The Board sued the Developer. Nautilus denied coverage and obtained a declaratory judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reviewing the policy and finding that the shoddy workmanship, of which the board complained, was not covered by the policies; that Nautilus did not unduly delay pursuing its declaratory suit; and that the alleged damage to residents’ personal property occurred after the portions of the building were excluded from coverage.View "Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Dirs. of Regal Lofts Condo Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiff purchased a home in Bar Harbor, Maine from Defendants for $2.9 million. After his purchase, Plaintiff spent in excess of $1.5 million in repairs to the property. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant to recover damages for the repairs, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. A federal district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding (1) Maine’s implied warranty of habitability did not apply under the circumstances of this case, and Defendants had no duty of disclosure; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to attorney’s fees. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims; and (2) properly entered judgment on the record for Plaintiff on Defendants’ counterclaim for attorney’s fees. View "Thompson v. Miles" on Justia Law

The respondents, two developers and an architectural firm, Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W), entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the City of Columbia as part of a larger project team to develop a publicly-funded hotel for the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. The City eventually abandoned its plan under the MOU, and the respondents brought suit on several causes of action including breach of contract and equitable relief. The City moved for summary judgment arguing the MOU was not a contract and therefore the contract claims failed. The circuit court agreed and, rejecting the equitable claims as well, granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The respondents appealed and the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the MOU was comprised of agreements to execute further agreements, there was no meeting of the minds on numerous material terms which had not yet been defined. Accordingly, the court of appeals was reversed with respect to that portion of the court's judgment; the Supreme Court held the MOU was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court and reinstated its judgment in favor of the City. View "Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

In April 2003, the City of Columbia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W) and several other parties, to develop a publicly-funded hotel adjacent to the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. As architect, S&W was to complete sufficient preliminary design work to determine a guaranteed maximum price for the project, which would be used by the City to obtain municipal bond funding to cover the cost of the hotel. Pursuant to the MOU, the construction company was to pay S&W directly. On June 26, 2003, the City received a letter stating S&W would complete its preliminary design on July 10, 2003, and would then stop working until the bond financing for the hotel was finalized. Realizing this could delay the start of construction, S&W offered to continue working the remaining ninety days until the anticipated bond closing date of October 13, 2003, but required assurance it would be compensated for the work it performed during this time frame. It provided an estimate requiring $650,000 and $75,000 per week after that. On July 30, the City approved "$650,000 for interim architectural design services for a period of 90 days prior to bond closing." The bond closing did not occur as scheduled, but S&W nevertheless continued to work. S&W submitted an invoice to the City for $697,084.79 for work that took place from July 10 to December 15, 2003. By letter dated December 17, 2003, S&W informed the construction company that the City had voted that day "to advance [$705,000.000] to the design team for design services and expenses. Because under the MOU the construction company was to pay S&W, not the City, the construction company agreed to reimburse the City for the funds paid to S&W after the bond closing. The City paid S&W's invoice. S&W continued to work on the project, but in March 2004, the City abandoned its plans under the MOU and ended its relationship with S&W. S&W received no further compensation and sued the City for breach of contract under the MOU and the July 2003 agreement. The City argued there was no separate agreement and the payment of interim fees was merely an advance on fees under the MOU and furthermore, the MOU provided that S&W was to be paid by the construction company, not the City. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of S&W, finding a contract existed between it and the City. On certiorari, the City conceded a contract exists, but argued the contract terms have been satisfied. The Supreme Court found the City's arguments were unpreserved and affirmed as modified. View "Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law