Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

A homeowner sued a general contractor for allegedly shoddy and incomplete work in connection with a major home remodeling contract. The homeowner’s complaint also contained a cause of action against the general contractor’s license bond company, seeking to recover for the contractor’s having “grossly deviated” from the plans and specifications for the job. To support his action, the homeowner explicitly alleged in the complaint that the contractor was licensed at all times. The contractor cross-complained against the homeowner for unpaid work. The cross-complaint included a copy of their written contract which showed the contractor’s license number. To that, the homeowner simply filed a general denial of all allegations. When the case came to trial, the homeowner (contrary to the applicable local rule requiring plaintiffs to identify all controverted issues) did not identify licensure as a controverted issue. The contractor’s attorney did not obtain a verified certificate from the Contractors’ State License Board showing the contractor was licensed at all times during his performance. But when the contractor was about to rest his case on the cross-complaint, the homeowner’s attorney made a motion for nonsuit based on the absence of such a verified certificate as required under Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (d). The trial judge deferred immediate ruling on the homeowner’s nonsuit motion. "As the contractor learned to his chagrin, it [...] takes at least six days to obtain a verified certificate from the License Board even if one drives overnight to Sacramento to pick it up in person." While the contractor was eventually able to obtain a verified certificate of licensure from the License Board, he could not do so until after the close of the trial, in which he prevailed on his claim for unpaid work from the homeowner. Because no certificate of licensure could be produced, the trial judge reluctantly granted the homeowner’s nonsuit motion, by judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). This appeal followed. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed that judgment in favor of the homeowner, with instructions to the trial judge to grant judgment in favor of the general contractor as against the homeowner. "We conclude this is one of those relatively rare cases where a party can be bound by a judicial admission made in an unverified complaint. Here, the judicial admission that the general contractor was licensed, compounded by the homeowner’s failure to comply with the local rule requiring identification of all controverted issues, rendered the question of licensure assuredly uncontroverted for purposes of section 7031. Because of the judicial admission, the rule of 'Advantec Group, Inc. v. Edwin’s Plumbing Co., Inc.' (153 Cal.App.4th 621 (2007)) does not apply." View "Womack v. Lovell" on Justia Law

In 2003, the governors of Cedar Rapids Lodge obtained the rights to build an AmericInn franchise. The company used Lightowler as the project architect. Lightowler used a standard form agreement that specified that its terms would be governed by the law of North Dakota. After changes requested by the Fire Marshal and for compliance with franchise standards, Lightowler submitted revised plans in February, 2004. Construction began in January 2004. In July, 2004, Lidberg of AmericInn led a construction site visit attended by the governors, and Olson, a Lightowler engineer. Lidberg and Olson prepared reports detailing deficiencies. The last act performed by Lightowler on the project was a response to the contractor in September, 2004. Lidberg led a second site visit in October, 2004, produced a report identifying additional deficiencies, and sent it to Siebert and Lightowler. The hotel opened for business in December, 2004, but problems continued. In December, 2009 Cedar Rapids Lodge brought claims against its former governors and others involved in the hotel project and alleging professional negligence by Lightowler. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lightowler, concluding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under either North Dakota or Iowa law. View "Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites, LLC v. Lightowler Johnson Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this residential construction dispute was whether the statutory cap on exemplary damages is waived if not pleaded as an affirmative defense or avoidance. The trial court affirmed an exemplary damages award in excess of the statutory cap because Petitioner did not assert the cap until her motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the exemplary damages award, concluding that the statutory cap on exemplary damages did not apply because Petitioner failed to expressly plead the cap as an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in relation to the exemplary cap, holding (i) the exemplary damages cap is not a matter ”constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” and need not be affirmatively pleaded because it applies automatically when invoked and does not require proof of additional facts, and (ii) because Petitioner timely asserted the cap in her motion for new trial, the exemplary damages must be capped at $200,000; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a verbal contract with Jerry Morrison for the construction of a log home on her property. Plaintiff entered into a second verbal contract with James Phillips to build the basement walls and a chimney with two fireplaces. Concerned about the number of apparent defects in the construction and excessive costs of the labor and materials, Plaintiff fired Morrison. Plaintiff later filed suit against Morrison and Phillips (together, Defendants), alleging fraud and misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence, among other claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff only with respect to her negligence claim against Morrison. The jury further found that Plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages and/or was comparatively negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) limiting the time the parties had to present the case to the jury; (2) placing limitations on expert testimony; (3) granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Phillips; (4) denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to her negligence and breach of warranty claims against Morrison; (5) instructing the jury on comparative negligence; (6) instructing the jury on outrageous conduct; and (7) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Sneberger v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Defendants hired various construction companies to assist in the construction of a house and barn on their property. Plaintiff was one of the subcontractors that worked on the project. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants for breach of contract, book account, and unjust enrichment seeking payment for the work it had completed but for which it had not been paid. The superior court justice entered judgment for Plaintiff on its claim of unjust enrichment but entered judgment for Defendants on the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims. The trial justice also entered an order awarding costs to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment but vacated and remanded the order, holding (1) the trial justice correctly found the three elements that a Rhode Island plaintiff must prove to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment; and (2) the trial justice erred in awarding Plaintiff’s “Application for Taxation of Costs” because the order explicitly included the fee generated by expert testimony. View "South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon" on Justia Law

In spring of 2000, Plaintiffs hired Meyer Modernizing Company to install siding, soffits, and gutters on the home they were constructing. Plaintiffs moved into the home by late 2000. No later than 2002, Plaintiffs noticed water infiltration around window and door openings when it rained. Plaintiffs did not bring suit regarding their water infiltration claim until 2010. In 2013, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the assertion that Meyer concealed the absence of installed flashing. Under the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs were permitted to file their cause of action within six years of its accrual. The circuit court granted Meyer’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to the beginning of the six-year limitations period, and Plaintiffs offered no reason why the period of limitation should be tolled. View "Gades v. Meyer Modernizing Co." on Justia Law

Appellant submitted a bid for a highway project in Sublette County, Wyoming and was the low bidder. The Board of County Commissioners of Sublette County awarded the contract to another bidder, a contractor that was from Sublette County. Appellant filed a complaint in the district court alleging that by not entering into the contract with Appellant, the Commissioners violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-6-102(a). The district court found in favor of the Commissioners on all claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court held section 16-6-102(a) inapplicable and remanded the case for a determination of whether the award was appropriate. On remand, the district court held generally in favor of the Commissioners, finding that the Commissioners’ award was within their discretion and appropriate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioners’ utilization of an undisclosed preference for Sublette County contractors in awarding the public contract opened for competitive bid constituted an illegal exercise of discretion. Remanded for a determination of damages. View "W. Wyo. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs" on Justia Law

Pacific appealed the Board's suspension of its license as the sanction for failing to notify the Board that a judgment had been entered against Pacific. Jerry McDaniel and his wife Delma own two corporations, Pacific and Gold Coast Drilling, Inc. The trial court found that Pacific did not substantially comply with the requirement that the contractor be licensed while performing work. Pacific argued that the judgment was not “substantially related” to its “construction activities” within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code 7071.17, and so Pacific’s license should not have been suspended. The court concluded that Gold Coast was obligated to notify the Board of the unsatisfied stipulated judgment where the stipulated judgment falls within the ambit of section 7071.17 and the stipulated judgment was unsatisfied; the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Gold Coast did not “act[] reasonably and in good faith” to maintain its license; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Pacific Caisson & Shoring v. Bernards Bros." on Justia Law

Weitz contracted with Hyatt to build an Aventura, Florida assisted-living facility, which was completed in 2003. Hyatt obtained post-construction insurance from defendants. Weitz was neither a party nor a third-party-beneficiary. The policies exclude faulty workmanship and mold, except to the extent that covered loss results from the faulty workmanship, such as business interruption losses. The construction was defective. Hyatt notified defendants of a $11 million loss involving moisture and mold at the care center, settled that claim for $750,000, and released defendants from claims relating to the care center. Hyatt next discovered moisture, mold, and cracked stucco at the residential towers. Hyatt gave defendants notice, but bypassed inevitable defenses based upon policy exclusions, and sued Weitz. Weitz sued its subcontractors and its own construction contract liability insurers. Weitz settled with Hyatt for $53 million and was indemnified by its insurers for $55,799,684.69. Weitz sued, claiming coverage under defendants’ policies, based on equitable subrogation or unjust enrichment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal, recognizing that Weitz, as subrogee, was subject to any defense Hyatt would have faced, and that Hyatt had discharged defendants from liability; that suit was barred by the contractual period of limitations; that Weitz was barred from suing for damage to the plaza because Hyatt did not give defendants notice of that damage; and that Weitz had already collected several million more than it paid. View "Weitz Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Oklahoma law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In April 2008, plaintiffs Shannon and Eric Walker requested several samples of hardwood flooring from BuildDirect.com Technologies, Inc., a Canadian corporation, through BuildDirect's website. The next month they arranged, over the telephone, to purchase 113 boxes of flooring from BuildDirect. BuildDirect emailed a two-page written Contract entitled "Quotation" to Ms. Walker, who signed and dated the Contract and returned it to BuildDirect via fax. The Contract described the type, amount, and price of the flooring purchased by the Walkers. And, it included 14 bullet points setting forth additional terms. The sixth bullet point stated: "All orders are subject to BuildDirect's 'Terms of Sale.'" The Walkers alleged that after they installed the flooring, they discovered that their home was infested with nonindigenous wood-boring insects. According to the Walkers, the insects severely damaged the home, and caused the home to be subject to quarantine and possible destruction by the United States Department of Agriculture. The question the federal appeals court posed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a written consumer contract for the sale of goods incorporated by reference a separate document entitled "Terms of Sale" available on the seller's website, when the contract stated that it was "subject to" the seller's "Terms of Sale" but did not specifically reference the website. In response, the Oklahoma Court held that Oklahoma law did not recognize a "vague attempt at incorporation by reference" as demonstrated in this case. Under the Oklahoma law of contracts, parties may incorporate by reference separate writings, or portions thereof, together into one agreement where: (1) the underlying contract makes clear reference to the extrinsic document; (2) the identity and location of the extrinsic document may be ascertained beyond doubt; and (3) the parties to the agreement had knowledge of and assented to its incorporation. View "Walker v. BuildDirect.com Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law