Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

General Contractor hired several subcontractors to assist in contracting an IMAX theater. After the theater was completed and three of the subcontractors (“Subcontractors”) had not been paid in full for their services, the Subcontractors filed mechanic’s liens against the IMAX property and sued the General Contractor to foreclose on their respective liens in the amount due on their contracts. The trial court awarded the Subcontractors judgments against the General Contractor and awarded attorney’s fees. At issue in this case was whether, under Indiana’s mechanic’s lien statute, the Subcontractors were entitled to collect attorney’s fees incurred in foreclosing on their liens from the General Contractor, which posted a surety bond and filed an undertaking obligating it to pay attorney’s fees upon recovery of a judgment against it. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s fee award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Subcontractors attorney’s fees incurred in their foreclosure suits under the circumstances of this case. View "Goodrich Quality Theaters, Inc. v. Fostcorp Heating & Cooling, Inc." on Justia Law

The Judicial Council of California, (JCC) entered into a contract with Jacobs Facilities, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jacobs. Performance of the contract required a license under the Contractors’ State License Law. Facilities was properly licensed when it commenced work. Later, Jacobs, as part of a corporate reorganization, transferred the employees responsible for the JCC contract to another subsidiary and caused the new subsidiary to obtain a contractor’s license, while permitting the Facilities license to expire. Facilities remained the signatory on the JCC contract until a year later, when the parties entered into an assignment to the new, licensed subsidiary. JCC sued under Bus. & Prof. Code 7031(b), which requires an unlicensed contractor to disgorge its compensation. Defendants contended that Facilities had “internally” assigned the contract to the new subsidiary prior to expiration of its license; JCC ratified the internal assignment when it consented to the assignment to the new subsidiary; and Facilities had “substantially complied” with the law. After the jury found for defendants on the other defenses, the substantial compliance issue was not decidedd. The court of appeal reversed, concluding Facilities violated the statute when it continued to act as the contracting party after its license expired, and remanded for a hearing on substantial compliance. View "Judicial Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc." on Justia Law

Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. (EWS) filed this action seeking payment for electrical materials it supplied to a commercial building remodel. EWS sued, among other defendants, Alane Fraser, the owner of the commercial property, and M.J. Bishop Concrete & Construction, Inc. (Bishop Construction), the general contractor, for foreclosure of a construction lien, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and third party beneficiary. The circuit court denied EWS’s claims. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the circuit court (1) applied the wrong statute to the lien notice issue and erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Fraser on the lien claim; but (2) did not err in concluding that EWS did not prove its unjust enrichment claim against Fraser and Bishop Construction. View "Elec. Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Fraser" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over the adequacy of concrete work Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. performed on a condominium construction project as a subcontractor to LPIHGC, LLC. The parties proceeded to arbitration. An arbitrator selected by the parties issued an arbitration award in favor of LPIHGC. LPIHGC moved to confirm, and Nordic moved to vacate, the arbitration award. The circuit court denied the motion to vacate and granted the motion to confirm. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator failed to disclose various relationships with the law firms of LPIHGC’s attorneys. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment on appeal and the circuit court’s final judgment, thereby vacating the associated orders granting LPIHGC’s motion to confirm the arbitration award and denying Nordic’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, holding that because the factual and/or legal bases upon which the circuit court denied the motion to vacate were unascertainable, the Supreme Court was unable to appropriately review the circuit court’s ruling. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing and entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on Nordic’s motion to vacate. View "In re Arbitration of Nordic PCL Constr., Inc. v. LIPHGC, LLC" on Justia Law

Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, entered into an oral contract with Defendant, a construction firm, for the assembly of a prefabricated house on a lot that they owned. The parties subsequently entered into a second oral agreement for the assembly of a smaller and cheaper home. Defendant failed to complete construction of Plaintiffs’ home as agreed. Citing diversity of citizenship, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court alleging breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The jury found Defendant to have defaulted on its contractual obligations and awarded $150,000 in damages. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that it could not be said that no rational jury could have found in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Magee v. BEA Constr. Corp." on Justia Law

The predecessor in interest to dck Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (together, Worldwide) entered into a contract with Spanish Peaks Lodge, LLC to serve as the general contractor for for a construction project. Spanish Peaks procured financing with the predecessor in interest to CH SP Acquisition LLC (together, CHSP), and CHSP took a mortgage against Spanish Peaks’ development property. When Spanish Peaks breached the parties’ contract Worldwide filed a construction lien claiming the unpaid portion of the contractor’s fee and the amount Worldwide owed to a subcontractor, Allied Steel, Inc. Allied Steel also filed a construction lien for unpaid services and materials. Allied Steel, Spanish Peaks, and Worldwide entered into a settlement agreement, and CHSP and Worldwide reached a partial settlement under which Worldwide released all of its claims against CHSP except for those at issue on appeal. The district court concluded that the unpaid portion of the contractor’s fee and the subcontractor’s fee were both secured by Worldwide in the amount of $5,476,277 and $661,767, respectively, and lienable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by concluding that the unpaid portion of the contractor’s fee was lienable; and (2) erred by concluding that the subcontractor’s fee remained alienable after Allied Steel settled its claim. View "dck Worldwide Holdings Inc. v. CH SP Acquisition LLC" on Justia Law

John and Jane Couto entered into a contract with Joseph General Contracting, Inc. for the purchase and construction of a home and carriage house. The trial court found that the contract existed also between the Coutos and Anthony Silvestri, the owner and president of Joseph General. After disputes arose regarding the construction of the dwellings, Joseph General sued the Coutos for, inter alia, breach of contract. The Coutos counterclaimed against Joseph General, Silvestri and Landel Realty, LLC. The trial court held Joseph General, Landel and Silvestri each jointly and severally liable for breach of contract and implied warranty, trespass and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Silvestri appealed the propriety of these adverse rulings with respect to his personal liability. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment pertaining to Silvestri in an individual capacity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court as to the claims of breach and contract and implied warranty against Silvestri in his individual capacity and affirmed in all other respects, holding that the Appellate Court (1) erred in determining that Silvestri had incurred contractual obligations to the Coutos in his individual capacity; and (2) properly determined that Silvestri could be held individually liable for alleged violations of CUTPA. View "Joseph Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Couto" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The issue centered on how the term "collapse" was interpreted under Washington law in an insurance policy that insured "accidental direct physical loss involving collapse," subject to the policy's terms, conditions, exclusions and other provisions, but did not define "collapse" except to state that "collapse [did] not include settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging or expansion." The Washington Court concluded that in the insurance contract, "collapse" means "substantial impairment of structural integrity." "Substantial impairment of structural integrity" means substantial impairment of the structural integrity of a building or part of a building that renders such building or part of a building unfit for its function or unsafe and, under the clear language of the insurance policy here, must be more than mere settling, cracking, shrinkage, bulging, or expansion. View "Queen Anne Park Homeowners Ass'n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

The Montara Owners Association (homeowners) sued developer and general contractor, La Noue Development, LLC for damages caused by design and construction defects in the building of the Montara townhomes. The defects included problems with the framing, siding, decking, and windows, resulting in water intrusion and water damage. La Noue, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against multiple subcontractors, including Vasily Sharabarin, dba Advanced Construction (Sharabarin), who provided siding work on four buildings. Before trial, La Noue settled with the homeowners for $5 million (eliminating the first-party litigation from the case) and also reached settlements with most of the third-party subcontractors. La Noue did not settle with Sharabarin. Because of various pretrial rulings, the only claims submitted to the jury were La Noue’s breach of contract claims against Sharabarin and two other subcontractors. Before trial, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sharabarin on La Noue’s claim for contractual indemnity, on the ground that the indemnification provision on which La Noue had relied was void under ORS 30.140. The trial court also held that the court would decide whether La Noue could recover the attorney fees that it had incurred in defending against the homeowners’ claims as consequential damages for Sharabarin’s breach of contract and that the court would resolve that issue after trial. In its post-trial ruling on the attorney fee issue, the court ultimately held that La Noue could not recover attorney fees as consequential damages in the case, even after trial, and denied La Noue’s claim for those attorney fees. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on: the proper application of ORS 30.140; whether it was error for the trial court to give an instruction on the economic waste doctrine in the absence of any evidence on the alternative measure of damages, diminution in value; and whether a third-party plaintiff can recover attorney fees as consequential damages for a third-party defendant’s breach of contract when the attorney fees were incurred in the first-party litigation in the same action. The Supreme Court concluded that it was error to have given the economic waste instruction. The Court affirmed on the Court of Appeals' decisions as to the other issues presented, and remanded for the trial court to consider the general contractor’s substantive right to attorney fees. View "Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC" on Justia Law