Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Victor Virgin Construction Corporation appealed a Superior Court remitting a jury award following an advisory jury finding of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation by defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT cross-appealed, asking that the award be further reduced. In 2008, Virgin bid on a DOT project to replace a stone box culvert located underneath Depot Road in Hollis. Virgin submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the contract. After completion of the project, DOT paid Virgin the sum agreed to in the contract with only a minor upward adjustment. Virgin sued DOT for both breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court denied DOT's request to bifurcate the trial; subsequently the jury found in favor of Virgin. DOT then moved for a new trial or to set aside the jury's damages award. The trial court granted remittitur, but did no enter a finding of liability on the breach of contract claim, finding that the award could only be sustained on the negligent misrepresentation claim. Virgin then appealed, seeking the full amount of damages awarded by the jury. The Supreme Court found that Virgin's negligent misrepresentation claim for money damages was capped by statute, therefore it was not entitled to the full amount of damages originally awarded by the jury. That cap does not apply to breach of contract, however, and because the trial court did not include findings with regard to liability on the breach of contract claim, the case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Victor Virgin Construction Corp. v. New Hampshire Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

At the heart of this appeal was a mechanic's lien filed against the Black Rock North Development in Coeur d?Alene, Idaho, and an uncompleted golf course community development. American Bank (the Bank) was the lender to BRN Development, Inc. (BRN). BRN hired Wadsworth Golf Construction Company of the Southwest (Wadsworth) to construct a golf course. BRN failed to pay Wadsworth for a portion of the work it performed, and Wadsworth filed a mechanic's lien against the property. BRN defaulted on the loan, and the Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. Wadsworth's claim of lien was subordinate to the Bank's mortgage interest in the property. In order to proceed with a foreclosure sale, the Bank posted a lien release bond in order to secure the district court's order releasing Wadsworth's lien. The Bank was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale. The district court ruled that priority of the parties? claims against the property was irrelevant once the property was replaced by the lien release bond as security for Wadsworth's claim and the Bank (by way of the bond) was responsible for payment of Wadsworth's lien claim. The Bank appeals that decision, arguing that Wadsworth should have been prevented from recovering against the lien release bond because its interest would have been extinguished if it had attempted to foreclose its mechanic's lien and the bond merely served as substitute security in place of the property. Wadsworth cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in holding that Wadsworth waived its right to file a lien for the unpaid retainage on the contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court allowing Wadsworth to recover against the lien release bond and vacated the district court's judgment in favor of Wadsworth. View "Americn Bank v. Wadsworth Golf" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute in this matter centered on the sale and demolition of a bridge across the Ohio River between West Virginia and Ohio. Advanced Explosives Demolition, Inc. (AED) entered a contract to sell the bridge to KDC Investments, LLC (KDC) for $25,000. AED alleged that it also entered into another contract in which KDC hired it to perform explosive demolition work prior to removal of the bridge. After the bridge sale was complete, KDC terminated its relationship with AED and hired another demolition contractor. AED brought an action for fraud and breach of contract against KDC and asked the district court to rescind the sales contract. The district court denied the request for rescission and granted summary judgment in favor of KDC on the fraud and breach of contract claims, holding that AED had provided no evidence of fraud and concluding that the demolition contract was illegal because AED did not have the necessary West Virginia contractor's license when it entered into the contract. AED appealed the district court's denial of its request. The Supreme Court held that AED waived the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in striking certain affidavits presented at trial. However, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of KDC and the district court's order quieting title to a Toll Bridge in KDC. View "AED, Inc v. KDC Investments" on Justia Law

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed.View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the construction of a commercial building. Before the property was purchased, Respondent Bryan Causey hired GS2 Engineering and Environmental Consulting, Inc. (GS2) to perform an engineering analysis of the soils on the property to determine whether the land was suitable for construction. Causey formed Causey Consulting, LLC (of which he was the sole member), and Causey Consulting purchased the property to construct the commercial building. Appellant Crouch Construction Company was retained as the general contractor. The parties' dispute began over the amount of unsuitable soils excavated from the building site: during construction, it became apparent that more unsuitable soil needed to be removed than was initially anticipated, and the removal of additional soil increased the cost of the project. The construction project was substantially completed then occupied by Respondent Celebrations of Columbia, LLC, of which Causey is also a member. When Appellant did not receive final payment for the work, it filed a mechanic's lien and a suit to foreclose the lien. The circuit court ordered arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the construction contract. The arbitrator determined Appellant was owed money under the contract, plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. Respondents moved to vacate the award, seeking to have it set aside based on several unfavorable evidentiary rulings and general allegations that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. The circuit court denied Respondents' motion. However, before an order was entered, Respondents learned that an engineer employed by GS2 was the brother of one of the arbitrator's law partners. Respondents filed a supplemental motion to vacate the arbitration award, reiterating their previous arguments and raising several new claims, citing the arbitrator's failure to disclose his law partner's relationship with an employee of GS2. The circuit court found that vacatur was warranted, and , the circuit court held the award should be set aside. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator was not evidently partial towards GS2 or either party. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for confirmation of the arbitration award.View "Crouch Construction v. Causey" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a dispute between developer, Birchwood Land Company, Inc., and contractor, Ormond Bushey & Sons, Inc. over a construction contract.  The developer sued for breach of contract, claiming mainly that the contractor had removed excavated sand from the construction site without permission.  The contractor counterclaimed for amounts due under the contract. The court found that the contractor breached the contract and granted the developer damages for the lost sand. The unpaid balance owed on the contract was offset by the damages. On appeal, the contractor argued that the court erred in denying its request for interest penalties and attorney's fees as the substantially prevailing party. The developer argued that the court erred in limiting damages for the sand removal, denying its request for punitive damages, granting prejudgment interest on contractor's net recovery, and denying its claim for slander of title. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence in the record supported the trial court's judgment in this case and affirmed the outcome.View "Birchwood Land Company, Inc. v. Ormond Bushey & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant constructed a home that it sold to its initial purchaser. The initial purchaser, in turn, sold the home to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs later learned the home's hillside retaining wall and home site had been constructed in a dangerously defective manner. Plaintiffs requested that Defendant cover the cost of repair, but Defendant claimed it was no longer responsible for any construction defects. Plaintiffs then filed an action against Defendant to force Defendant to cover the cost of repair. The trial court dismissed all of the claims, concluding, among other things, that Plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by Arizona's economic loss doctrine. The court of appeals remanded for resolution of Plaintiffs' various negligence claims, concluding that, because Plaintiffs had no contract with Defendant, the economic loss doctrine did not bar their tort claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs' negligence claims to recover damages resulting from the construction defects. Remanded.View "Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two construction companies, Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant contracted with Plaintiff to build grain storage facilities at two locations. After beginning construction, Plaintiff stopped work for Defendant's alleged failure to make progress payments. Plaintiff then filed two lawsuits against Defendant seeking to foreclose liens on the property and asserting, ultimately, claims for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. The trial court dismissed the mechanic's liens claims, granted Defendant's motions for default judgment on the counterclaims, and granted Defendant's motions for summary judgment in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of the default judgments and summary judgments, holding that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in granting the motions for default judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims and in failing to grant Plaintiff's motions for enlargement of time; and (2) erred in granting the motions for summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract. Remanded.View "Donald Bucklin Constr. v. McCormick Constr. Co." on Justia Law

The Rineharts contracted with Morton Buildings for a preengineered building to serve as their personal residence and business location for their business, Midwest Slitting. Upon disputes regarding the structure's quality, the Rineharts and Midwest Slitting sued. A jury found for the Rineharts on several of their claims and for Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claim. The court of appeals affirmed and granted the Rineharts appellate attorney fees. Morton appealed, arguing that the economic loss doctrine, which originated with product liability litigation to prohibit tort claims when the only damages were to the product itself, should extend to bar the negligent misrepresentation claim in this case. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in favor of Midwest Slitting on its negligent misrepresentation claims, holding that the economic loss doctrine does not bar negligent misrepresentation claims because the duty at issue arises by operation of law, and the doctrine's purposes would not be further by extending it to such claims; and (2) reversed the appellate attorney fee award because the Court could not determine from the record whether the court of appeals included time and expenses in the award not reimbursable under the applicable statute. Remanded.View "Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs., Inc." on Justia Law

Musson Brothers, Inc. was conducting sewer removal and installation as a contractor for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) when Mark Showers' property was flooded. Showers filed a complaint against Musson and the City alleging that the two entities were jointly and severally liable for the negligent acts or omissions that caused Showers' building to flood. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City and Musson, finding that the entities were entitled to governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment for Musson, finding that Musson was entitled to governmental contractor immunity as a statutory "agent" under Wis. Stat. 893.80(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Musson failed to show it was acting as a governmental entity's agent for purposes of the alleged injury-causing conduct because it was not acting pursuant to "reasonably precise specifications" as required under section 893.80(4); and (2) in asserting the defense of immunity Musson failed to assert that the acts for which it claimed immunity were "acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" as required under section 893.80(4). Remanded.View "Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc. " on Justia Law