Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Jose Dominguez was working for D & BR Building Systems, Inc. (D&BR) on the roof of a building being constructed for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. when he was killed in an accident. D&BR had subcontracted with with Graham Construction, Inc. (Graham), the general contractor on the project, to install the steelwork necessary for the building. Guadalupe Gaytan, the special administrator of Dominguez’s estate, brought this negligence action against Wal-Mart and Graham. The district court granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart and Graham. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted to Wal-Mart, as no genuine issues of material fact existed as to any of Gaytan’s claims against Wal-Mart; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to Gaytan’s direct negligence claim against Graham arising from Graham’s alleged retention of control over the use of safety equipment on the roof. Remanded. View "Gaytan v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

A certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Karen White and her development company, Elkhorn, LLC, sought to recover $166,496 paid to Valley County for "capital investments for roads in the vicinity of [their] White Cloud development." Phase I of White Cloud was completed and it was undisputed by the parties that the tax monies paid for Phase I were used by the County to complete capital investments for roads in the vicinity of the White Cloud development. The County conceded that it did not adopt an impact fee ordinance or administrative procedures for the impact fee process as required by the Idaho Development Impact Fees Act (IDIFA). The County also conceded it did not enact an IDIFA-compliant ordinance, because, at the time, the County believed in good faith that none was required. Plaintiff filed suit against the County claiming that the road development fee imposed by the County as a condition for approval of the White Cloud project violated Idaho state law and deprived Plaintiff of due process under both the federal and Idaho constitutions. In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raised two claims for relief. The first claim for relief alleged that “Valley County’s practice of requiring developers to enter into a Road Development Agreement ("RDA," or any similar written agreement) solely for the purpose of forcing developers to pay money for its proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a disguised impact fee, is illegal and therefore should be enjoined." The first claim for relief also alleged that, because the County failed to enact an impact fee ordinance under IDIFA, the imposition of the road development fees constituted an unauthorized tax. Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleged that the County’s imposition of the road development fee constituted a taking under the federal and Idaho constitutions. The County argued Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the RDA monies. Plaintiff denies that the payment was voluntary since it was required to obtain the final plat approval. The issue the federal district court presented to the Idaho Supreme Court centered on when the limitations period commences for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax. The Court answered that the limitations period for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax commences upon payment of the tax. View "White v. Valley County" on Justia Law

In 1999, Redondo Construction Corporation pled guilty to aiding and abetting the making of false statements during its work on a federal highway project. The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) and the Puerto Rico Public Guildings Authority (“PBA”) subsequently revoked the bids it had awarded Redondo before the plea and suspended Redondo from bidding on new contracts. Redondo challenged both decisions, which resulted in settlement agreements with both agencies allowing Redondo to resume bidding for contracts. After Puerto Rico passed Law 458, which prohibited Puerto Rico agencies from awarding contracts corporations convicted of offenses involving public funds, the PBA cancelled several of Redondo’s bids and the contract it had executed with Redondo, and the PRHTA withdrew from its settlement with Redondo. Redondo sued PRHTA, PBA, and several officials at both agencies, alleging that Defendants were in breach of the settlement agreements, that this caused Redondo’s bankruptcy, and that Defendants were liable in damages. The district court granted the PRHTA’s and the individual defendants’ motions for summary judgment and sua sponte dismissed Redondo’s claims against the PBA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the entry of summary judgment as to the PRHTA and the individual defendants, as Redondo had no record of evidence of damages against these defendants; but (2) vacated the dismissal of the claim against the PBA, as the court did not meet the necessary conditions for entering judgment sua sponte.View "Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo" on Justia Law

Appellant Edged in Stone, Inc. (EIS) sought damages for breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence and unjust enrichment when a skid loader it purchased experienced mechanical problems. The district court dismissed all of EIS's claims except breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Later, the district court entered a judgment in favor of Northwest Power Systems, LLC (NWPS), dismissing EIS's remaining claims and awarded NWPS attorney's fees and costs. EIS appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to NWPS. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed that court's grant of summary judgment.View "Edged In Stone v. NW Power Systems" on Justia Law

Sudan Drilling, Inc. filed a complaint against Glen and Clarice Anacker seeking to foreclose on a construction lien. The district court granted summary judgment for the Anackers and directed the county clerk and recorder to remove Sudan’s lien from the public record. The Anackers recorded the judgment with the clerk and record’s office. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. On remand, the Anackers filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the lien was unenforceable because the recording of the district court’s prior judgment effectively discharged and released the lien, even though the Supreme Court reversed the judgment on appeal. The district court once again granted summary judgment for the Anackers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the recording of the previous judgment did not discharge Sudan’s construction lien or render Sudan’s claims moot.View "Sudan Drillings Inc. v. Anacker" on Justia Law

The general contractor of a Wisconsin construction project, hired Harsco to supply scaffolding. Krien, injured in a fall when a plank on a scaffold on which he was standing, broke, sued Harsco. The parties settled his claim for $900,000. Harsco filed a third‐party complaint against the contractor, seeking indemnification plus interest and attorneys’ fees. The district judge granted the contractor summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded after examining the complex provisions of the contract between the two. The plank may or may have been supplied by Harsco and may or may not have been defective, as claimed by Krien, who could not sue Riley in tort, because against his employer his only remedy for a work‐related accident was a claim for workers’ compensation, but there has never been judicial resolution of these questions, because Krien’s suit was settled before there was any judgment. Indemnification, however, is a form of insurance, and could apply even if the party seeking indemnification was negligent. Riley’s duty to indemnify Harsco extends to legal expenses incurred by Harsco in defending against Krien’s suit and in litigating this suit. View "Krien v. Harsco Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a construction corporation, contracted to construct a wharf for Respondent, the Port of Houston Authority of Harris County, Texas. After the construction was to be completed, Petitioner sued, claiming damages from delays caused by the Port. The Port, in turn, claimed that a no-damages-for-delay provision in the construction contract between the parties precluded delay damages. Petitioner also sought recovery of $2.36 million in delay damages withheld by the Port for Petitioner’s failure to meet deadlines. After a trial, the jury found that the Port had breached the contract for deliberately and wrongfully interfering with Petitioner’s work, causing Petitioner to incur $18,602,697 in delay damages. The jury also found Petitioner had not released its claim to the $2.36 million liquidated damages the Port withheld. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the Local Government Contract Claims Act waives governmental immunity from suit on a contract claim for delay damages the contract does not call for; (2) the no-damages-for-delay provision in the parties’ contract did not shield the Port from liability for deliberately and wrongfully interfering with the contractor’s work; and (3) Petitioner was entitled to recover the liquidated damages withheld by the Port. View "Zachry Constr. Corp. v. Port of Houston Auth. of Harris County" on Justia Law

Two subcontractors employed by Petitioner, a homebuilder, asserted claims on behalf of a class of subcontractors whose pay Petitioner had docked when the subcontractors did not furnish proof of adequate general liability insurance coverage. The parties settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Petitioner would issue refunds checks, sending them to existing subcontractors as it would their paychecks or by mailing checks to the last known addresses of former subcontractors. The class representatives agreed, on behalf of the settlement class members, that refund checks not negotiated within ninety days of issuance would be void and that those and other unclaimed funds would be given to The Nature Conservancy as a cy pres award. The trial court approved the settlement and rendered final judgment accordingly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Texas Unclaimed Property Act prohibited the imposition of a ninety-day deadline for negotiating settlement checks and the cy pres award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act did not apply in this case and that the judgment approving the settlement agreement was binding on all settlement class members. View "Highland Homes Ltd. v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Leticia Garcia was charged with sexually abusing a girl she babysat. At trial, the prosecutor attempted to show she was a lesbian. The prosecutor asserted during closing argument that her supposed attraction to other women gave her a motive to sexually abuse the victim. While disavowing the notion that all lesbians are child molesters, she nonetheless argued it was very telling that appellant “is attracted to females” and the victim was “a female child.” In the end, the jury convicted appellant, and the trial court sentenced her to 16 years in prison. After review of appellant's argument on appeal, the Court of Appeal believed appellant’s sexual orientation was not relevant to any issue in this case. The trial court was largely successful in limiting the jury’s exposure to evidence regarding appellant’s sexual orientation, so the Court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of appellant’s requests for a mistrial during the evidentiary phase of the trial. "But we cannot overlook the fact the prosecutor repeatedly attempted to make an issue out of appellant’s sexual orientation and emphasized this issue to the jury in closing argument. This was prejudicial misconduct. It leaves us with no confidence the jury could have evaluated the charges against appellant in a fair and impartial manner and requires us to reverse the judgment." View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Brothers Daniel and John owned four companies that offered remodeling services to homeowners. They provided honest work on construction jobs for cash customers, but duped numerous people into refinancing their homes and paying the loan proceeds directly to their companies, then left the jobs unfinished. They targeted neighborhoods on the South and West sides of Chicago, using telemarketers who looked for “elderly, ignorant homeowners,” and had customers sign blank contracts. They referred homeowners to specific loan officers and required the homeowners to sign letters of direction, so the title companies sent checks directly to the companies. From 2002 to 2006, the brothers collected about $1.2 million from more than 40 homeowner-victims. They were convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The district court found that the loss calculation was more than $400,000 but less than $1,000,000 and accordingly increased the offense level, then applied enhancements because the conduct involved: vulnerable victims; violation of a prior court order; sophisticated means; mass-marketing; and leadership or organization of the scheme. The district court sentenced each brother to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court reasonably estimated the amount of loss and properly enhanced the offense level further for the other five aggravating factors View "United States v. Sullivan" on Justia Law