Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Heidi and James Glassford appealed a superior court decision denying their motion for summary judgment and granting it to defendant Dufresne & Associates, P.C. on plaintiffs' claims of negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Plaintiffs were homeowners who purchased their home direct from the builder, D&L Homes by Design, LLC (D&L). D&L hired defendant to certify that the on-site mound sewage disposal system constructed for the home satisfied state permitting requirements. On April 19, 2005, the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources issued a Wastewater System and Potable Water Supply Permit for construction of the sewage disposal system on the property, subject to receiving a certification pursuant to 10 V.S.A 1973(e). On October 20, 2005, defendant's employee sent the certification required by the statute. On December 20, 2005, plaintiffs signed a purchase-and-sale agreement to purchase the home from D&L. Although the seller represented that the home and property had received all the necessary permits, plaintiffs never saw the certificate or the letter from the Agency stating that the certification requirement was satisfied. Sometime thereafter, plaintiffs hired an attorney in connection with the closing. On January 13, just prior, plaintiffs' attorney prepared a certificate of title that noted the wastewater and water supply permit. In February 2006, the sewage disposal system failed. In November 2008, plaintiffs hired defendant to investigate the system's failure because they knew defendant had inspected the system prior to their purchase. Defendant prepared a report stating that he had "completed the original" inspection in 2005 and found the system had been installed according to the permitted design. Plaintiffs received other opinions about the disposal system's failure both before and after hiring defendant to inspect the system. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior court alleging pecuniary losses from defendant's failure to properly inspect the sewage disposal system and subsequent misrepresentation about the construction of the system in the certification to the Agency. Upon review of the superior court decision, the Supreme Court found that the completion and filing of defendant's certificate was a prerequisite to D&L's ability to sell the home, the certificate was unrelated to the sale. The law required that it be sent only to the government agency that issued the permit. Furthermore, there was no allegation that D&L used the certificate as part of its sales pitch, and no allegation that defendant had any part in the sales. The standard for CPA liability required that a person be directly involved in the transaction that gave rise to the claimed liability. That standard was not met here. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Glassford v. Dufresne & Associates, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a verbal contract with Jerry Morrison for the construction of a log home on her property. Plaintiff entered into a second verbal contract with James Phillips to build the basement walls and a chimney with two fireplaces. Concerned about the number of apparent defects in the construction and excessive costs of the labor and materials, Plaintiff fired Morrison. Plaintiff later filed suit against Morrison and Phillips (together, Defendants), alleging fraud and misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence, among other claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff only with respect to her negligence claim against Morrison. The jury further found that Plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages and/or was comparatively negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) limiting the time the parties had to present the case to the jury; (2) placing limitations on expert testimony; (3) granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Phillips; (4) denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to her negligence and breach of warranty claims against Morrison; (5) instructing the jury on comparative negligence; (6) instructing the jury on outrageous conduct; and (7) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Sneberger v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Defendants hired various construction companies to assist in the construction of a house and barn on their property. Plaintiff was one of the subcontractors that worked on the project. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants for breach of contract, book account, and unjust enrichment seeking payment for the work it had completed but for which it had not been paid. The superior court justice entered judgment for Plaintiff on its claim of unjust enrichment but entered judgment for Defendants on the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims. The trial justice also entered an order awarding costs to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment but vacated and remanded the order, holding (1) the trial justice correctly found the three elements that a Rhode Island plaintiff must prove to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment; and (2) the trial justice erred in awarding Plaintiff’s “Application for Taxation of Costs” because the order explicitly included the fee generated by expert testimony. View "South County Post & Beam, Inc. v. McMahon" on Justia Law

In spring of 2000, Plaintiffs hired Meyer Modernizing Company to install siding, soffits, and gutters on the home they were constructing. Plaintiffs moved into the home by late 2000. No later than 2002, Plaintiffs noticed water infiltration around window and door openings when it rained. Plaintiffs did not bring suit regarding their water infiltration claim until 2010. In 2013, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the assertion that Meyer concealed the absence of installed flashing. Under the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs were permitted to file their cause of action within six years of its accrual. The circuit court granted Meyer’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to the beginning of the six-year limitations period, and Plaintiffs offered no reason why the period of limitation should be tolled. View "Gades v. Meyer Modernizing Co." on Justia Law

Since 1989 Sveum and his brother owned a Wisconsin home-building company, Kegonsa. Kegonsa’s creditor, Stoughton Lumber had sued Sveum and his brother and Kegonsa under Wisconsin law, alleging breach of contract and theft by contractors. Under Wisconsin law, money paid to a contractor by an owner for improvements, constitutes a trust fund in the hands of the contractor until all claims have been paid. The use of such money by a contractor for any other purpose until claims have been paid, is theft by contractor. The suit settled for $650,000. Sveum violated the settlement agreement. Stoughton sued again and obtained a $589,638.10 default judgment. Sveum filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, seeking to discharge his debts, including the debt to Stoughton. Stoughton responded with an adversary proceeding, claiming that Sveum’s debt to Staughton was not dischargeable. The bankruptcy judge agreed and denied discharge. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting Sveum’s false representations and use of funds held in trust for Stoughton to pay other creditors ahead of Stoughton. The Bankruptcy Code forbids discharge of a debt under those circumstances, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4).“ View "Stoughton Lumber Co., Inc. v. Sveum" on Justia Law

Appellant entered into a contract with Contractor for the construction of a new home. At some point after the project had begun, the parties had a disagreement, and Appellant ordered that Contractor cease work on the project. Contractor filed a lien on Appellant’s property claiming he was entitled to $25,821 for the labor, services, and materials that he had arranged and for which he had already paid. Contractor then filed this suit praying for judgment in the same amount and requesting that his lien be given priority over Bank, which had provided financing for the construction project. The court temporarily sustained a mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien attached to Appellant’s property. Appellant filed an interlocutory appeal alleging jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 2(a)(5), which provides that an appeal may be taken from an order that sustains an attachment. Because the court’s order in this case was not an attachment within the meaning of this rule, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as an unauthorized interlocutory appeal. View "Denney v. Denney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging a noncompetitive bid contract between Fresno Unified and Contractor for the construction of a middle school, alleging that the project should have been competitively bid because the lease-leaseback arrangement did not create a true leaseback or satisfy the criteria for the exception in section 17406 of the Education Code. The trial court sustained demurrers filed by Fresno Unified and Contractor. The court concluded that the competitive bidding process required by section 17417 is subject to the exception contained in section 17406 and plaintiff adequately alleged three grounds for why section 17406’s exception did not apply to the lease-leaseback arrangement. The court also concluded that Government Code section 1090’s prohibition of such conflicts extends to corporate consultants. Plaintiff has stated a violation of Government Code section 1090 by alleging facts showing Contractor, as a consultant to Fresno Unified, participated in the making of a contract in which Contractor subsequently became financially interested. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Davis v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a condominium construction project in Stratton. Owner-developer The Stratton Corporation and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation (collectively "Stratton") sued the project's general contractor, Engelberth Construction, Inc., seeking to recover for alleged construction defects and faulty workmanship that resulted in water damage to the project. Engelberth filed third-party complaints for indemnification against its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment to Engelberth on Stratton's claims, finding the claims barred by the statute of limitations. Given its summary judgment ruling, and without objection, the court dismissed Engelberth's third-party claims as moot. Engelberth later sought to amend the dismissal order to provide that the third-party claims were dismissed without prejudice. The court denied its request, and Engelberth appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stratton Corp. v. Engelberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant submitted a bid for a highway project in Sublette County, Wyoming and was the low bidder. The Board of County Commissioners of Sublette County awarded the contract to another bidder, a contractor that was from Sublette County. Appellant filed a complaint in the district court alleging that by not entering into the contract with Appellant, the Commissioners violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-6-102(a). The district court found in favor of the Commissioners on all claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court held section 16-6-102(a) inapplicable and remanded the case for a determination of whether the award was appropriate. On remand, the district court held generally in favor of the Commissioners, finding that the Commissioners’ award was within their discretion and appropriate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioners’ utilization of an undisclosed preference for Sublette County contractors in awarding the public contract opened for competitive bid constituted an illegal exercise of discretion. Remanded for a determination of damages. View "W. Wyo. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs" on Justia Law

The Department of Industrial Relations determined that plaintiff Vector Resources, Inc. failed to pay the appropriate prevailing wages to its workers on a public works project for the San Diego Unified School District. The Department's director's decision was based on regulatory language in a document entitled "Important Notice To Awarding Bodies And Other Interested Parties Regarding Shift Differential Pay In The Director's General Prevailing Wage Determinations," which was posted on the Department's Web site. The Important Notice addresses shift differential pay for various crafts used on public works projects, and was augmented by additional regulatory language in a "Note" that the Department placed on the cover page of prevailing wage shift provisions ("the Stamp"). Vector filed a declaratory relief action against the Department, seeking a declaration that the Important Notice and Stamp were invalid and unenforceable as "underground regulations" because they were not promulgated in compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Vector and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Department's motion on the ground that under Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g), the Important Notice and the Stamp were exempt from the notice and hearing requirements of the APA because they were part of an overall prevailing wage determination process that constituted "rate setting." Vector argued on appeal that the grant of summary judgment to the Department was made in error because: (1) the Department admitted that the shift premium rule is a regulation; (2) the Department admitted that that regulation was not adopted in compliance with the APA; (3) the Department failed to prove that the shift premium regulation establishes or fixes rates within the meaning of Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g); (4) the court erred in failing to specifically cite the evidence it relied on to grant summary judgment; (5) the court's written order ignored the law and the admissible evidence; and (6) the Department's motion relied upon inadmissible evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vector Resources, Inc. v. Baker" on Justia Law