Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Brentwood Glass filed a petition against the County and several other defendants, asserting, inter alia, a mechanic’s lien claim against all defendants for unpaid work on a construction project and an action against St. Louis County for failing to require a public works construction bond mandated by Mo. Rev. Stat. 107.170. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the mechanic’s lien claim. The County also asserted it was entitled to summary judgment on the bond claim because section 107.170 did not apply. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants.The Supreme Court reversed judgment on the mechanic’s lien claim and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on the lien claim for lack of proof of notice, and genuine issues of material fact existed preventing summary judgment on the lien claim; and (2) judgment was proper on Brentwood Glass’s bond claim against the County. View "Brentwood Glass Co. v. Pal's Glass Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, the City of Omaha enacted an ordinance requiring contractors doing work within the City to obtain a license. Appellant challenged the ordinance on various grounds. As relevant on appeal, Appellant alleged that the passage of the ordinance did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Omaha City Charter, that the ordinance placed an unfair restriction on and monopolized the City’s contracting industry, and that the ordinance violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on all but one of Appellant’s claims. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the City, concluding that the City was empowered to enact the ordinance and that the ordinance did not prevent Appellant from working on his own property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City had the authority to enact the ordinance. View "Malone v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Dickinson Elks Building, LLC, appealed after the district court forfeited a construction lien filed by Rick and Janan Snider, doing business as RJ Snider Construction, and awarded the Dickinson Elks attorney's fees. In December 2011, Snider contracted with Beaver Brinkman to perform work on real property owned by the Dickinson Elks. Snider recorded a construction lien in January 2013 against the property after it did not get paid for all of its work. In May 2014, the Dickinson Elks served Snider with a demand to start a lawsuit to enforce the lien and record a lis pendens within 30 days of the demand. Snider sued the Dickinson Elks in June 2014, seeking foreclosure of the construction lien and a money judgment. Snider recorded a notice of lis pendens in July 2014. The Dickinson Elks moved for summary judgment, arguing Snider's complaint should have been dismissed because Snider was not a licensed contractor when it started the work on the property. The Dickinson Elks also argued Snider did not have a valid construction lien, because Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving the demand to enforce the lien. The district court granted the motion in part and entered a judgment forfeiting Snider's construction lien because Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving the Dickinson Elks' demand to enforce the lien. After review, the Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) contracted with Mathy Construction Company for a public highway project. Mathy subcontracted with Storms, Inc. for excavation and fill work. After Storms completed its work, MnDOT issued a deductive change order reducing Mathy’s contract amount by $327,064 because of errors in the estimated quantities of excavation and fill required for Storms’ work. Mathy reduced Storms’ subcontract by the same amount. Storms subsequently sued Mathy for the reduction in the subcontract price. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Storms, concluding that Mathy had breached the subcontract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mathy did not breach its subcontract with Storms by issuing a corresponding deductive change order to Storms. View "Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Concrete Construction (Contractor) was sued by employees of Nibbi Concrete, who were injured after a shoring system designed by Contractor collapsed. Subsequently, Contractor sued Employer for indemnification based on a specific provision in the parties’ contract. The trial court dismissed, relying on the allegations in the underlying lawsuit that set forth claims only against Contractor and not against Employer. The court of appeal reversed, stating that the allegations in the underlying lawsuit are not determinative of Contractor’s claim for indemnity. View "Aluma Systems Concrete Constr. of Cal. v. Nibbi Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Rizvi and his company, Prime Builders, performed repair work for Alikhan, whose house was damaged in a fire. When the work was completed in 2009, Alikhan paid Rizvi only part of what he owed. Rizvi sued for breach of contract in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. (Rizvi and Prime are Illinois citizens. Alikhan is a citizen of Texas.) When Alikhan failed to appear, plaintiffs obtained a default judgment, then served a citation to discover assets on Allstate under an Illinois statute that governs supplementary proceedings to assist in collecting on a judgment. Allstate responded that Alikhan had no accounts of any sort with Allstate, had no claims pending with Allstate, and was not owed any insurance payments by Allstate. Plaintiffs then asked the court to order Allstate to remit “outstanding insurance proceeds of $110,926.58” and to impose sanctions, arguing that Allstate had participated in negotiating the repair contract and had made a partial payment to Alikhan in 2008. The court ultimately dismissed the supplemental action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Allstate is a citizen of Illinois, the supplemental proceeding against Allstate was sufficiently independent of the underlying case as to require its own basis for subject matter jurisdiction. View "Rizvi v. Allstate Corp." on Justia Law

Pulte Homes Corporation sued Williams Mechanical, Inc. for defective performance of a plumbing subcontract. Even before the action was filed, however, Williams was defunct; first, it was suspended by the Secretary of State, and thereafter, it dissolved voluntarily. Pulte served Williams though an attorney whom Williams had designated as its agent for service of process. The attorney, however, did not notify Williams of the action; he also did not identify or notify Williams’s liability insurer. Williams failed to respond to the complaint, and Pulte obtained a default judgment. Pulte then notified Williams’s liability insurer of the default judgment. About four and a half months later, the insurer retained counsel to represent Williams, and Williams’ counsel filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted the motion. Pulte appealed, arguing (1) Williams lacked the capacity to defend this action because it had been suspended; and (2) Williams failed to establish that it was entitled to relief from the default and default judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Williams was entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Court did not address whether Williams had the capacity to defend. View "Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical" on Justia Law

RGW entered into a contract with Watson for the delivery of 146 sealed expansion joints for use on the Caltrans project for the construction of Highway 99. Watson filed a breach of contract action, contending it was entitled to an adjustment of the price on RGW’s original purchase order because the items ordered were changed. The trial court concluded that RGW’s purchase order was ambiguous and allowed the jury to decide what the contract meant and what price was appropriate. The jury decided in favor of Watson, finding the amount of the subject agreement was $605,990. The jury awarded Watson damages of $383,032. The court concluded that the trial court correctly (1) determined that RGW’s purchase order was ambiguous and (2) allowed the jury to evaluate the conflicting parol evidence before deciding the meaning of the contract. The court also concluded that the price adjustment owed to Watson for the change in the order was sufficiently certain to meet the statutory requirements for an award of prejudgment interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, except for its failure to award prejudgment interest to Watson. View "Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the construction of Cypress Point, a luxury condominium complex in Hoboken. Co-defendants Adria Towers, LLC, Metro Homes, LLC, and Commerce Construction Management, LLC (collectively, the developer) served as the project's developer and general contractor, and subcontractors carried out most of the work. During construction, the developer obtained four CGL policies from Evanston Insurance Company, covering a four-year period, and three from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company, covering a subsequent three-year period (collectively, the policies). In this appeal, issue before the Supreme Court was whether rain water damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence under the developer's commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In a published decision, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the CGL policies, the unintended and unexpected consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, finding that the consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage, and the event resulting in that damage water from rain flowing into the interior of the property due to the subcontractors faulty workmanship was an occurrence under the plain language of the CGL policies at issue here. View "CypressPoint Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Meagher & Geer, PLLP (MG) represented Ryan Contracting Company (Ryan) in an action to foreclose on several mechanic’s liens. Later, represented by O’Neill & Murphy, LLP (O’Neill), Ryan brought suit against MG for legal malpractice arising out of MG’s allegedly defective filing and foreclosure of Ryan’s mechanic’s liens. The district court granted MG’s motion to dismiss on the ground that O’Neill failed to timely file expert witness affidavits. Ryan then brought suit against O’Neill for legal malpractice arising out of O’Neill’s representation of Ryan in the MG lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment for O’Neill, concluding that the mechanic’s liens were not perfected, not because of MG’s conduct, but because of Ryan’s error in not filing the pre-lien notice to the property owner required by Minn. Stat. 514.011. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that Ryan was exempt from the pre-lien notice requirement under section 514.011, and there were genuine issues of fact regarding the other issues. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Ryan was not required to give pre-lien notice to enforce its mechanic’s liens. View "Ryan Contracting Co. v. O’Neill & Murphy, LLP" on Justia Law