Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This case centered on the design and construction of a single-family residence in Pitkin County, Colorado. Heritage Builders, Inc. (“Heritage”) was retained as the general contractor by the original owners of the property, Karen and Courtney Lord. Pitkin County issued a certificate of occupancy for the home in September 2006. In November 2011, Richard Goodman purchased the property from the Lords. Then, sometime between March and June 2012, Goodman discovered the alleged construction defects in the home. Goodman gave Heritage informal notice of his construction defect claims in July 2013. In this original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the statute of repose in section 13-80-104(1)(a), C.R.S. (2016), barred a general contractor’s third-party claims brought in response to a homeowner’s claim for construction defects discovered in the fifth or sixth year following substantial completion of an improvement to real property. The Court held that such claims were timely, irrespective of both the two-year statute of limitations in section 13-80-102, C.R.S. (2016), and the six-year statute of repose in section 13-80-104(1)(a), so long as they are brought at any time before the ninety-day timeframe outlined in section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II). View "In re Goodman v. Heritage Builders" on Justia Law

Homeowners obtained loans from Bank for the construction of a new home and entered into an agreement with Contractor to complete the new home construction. When Homeowners defaulted on payments owed to Contractor and on both loans, the house was sold at foreclosure, and Homeowners filed for bankruptcy. Contractor filed a fourth amended complaint against Homeowners, who were later dismissed as parties, and Bank. Following a trial the court granted summary judgment for Bank on Contractor’s claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. The Supreme Court reversed. After remand, Contractor filed a fifth amended complaint, which differed from the fourth amended complaint in several respects. The district court determined that the election of remedies doctrine and judicial estoppel required a dismissal of Contractor’s claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Contractor’s claims were consistently premised on the existence of a contract, and therefore, no election was required; and (2) Contractor’s claims were based on different facts and obligations, and therefore, both could be pursued. View "deNourie & Yost Homes, LLC v. Frost" on Justia Law

The Subcontractor for a hotel construction project obtained materials for its part of the project from Supplier but failed to pay for them. Supplier claimed a lien against the hotel property. Because Supplier’s filing placed a cloud on the title, affecting the hotel owner’s refinancing, the General Contractor filed a bond with the district court to secure payment of Supplier’s claim. The district court approved the bond, which discharged the lien. Supplier then filed suit for payment for the materials it had supplied for the hotel. The district court granted summary judgment to the General Contractor. The court of appeals reversed and directed that judgment be granted to Supplier. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1110 discharged the lien when the approved bond was filed, and any defenses General Contractor may have had against the lien filing had no relevance now. View "Wagner Interior Supply of Wichita, Inc. v. Dynamic Drywall, Inc." on Justia Law

Rick Snider and Janan Snider, doing business as RJ Snider Construction ("Snider"), appealed the grant of summary judgment, forfeiting a construction lien against the property that formerly housed the Dickinson Elks Lodge later owned by private investors, the Dickinson Elks Building, LLC ("DEB"), and prohibiting Snider from recording additional liens against the property without performing additional work. The North Dakota Supreme Court was not convinced that perfecting a lien amounted to creating a lien, as argued by the Sniders. As such, the Court concluded that when a Court declares a lien is deemed forfeited or satisfied, the right to the lien for the construction services or materials provided is deemed forfeited, not just the document recording the lien and establishing its priority. The district court correctly interpreted N.D.C.C. 35-27-25 in concluding the statute barred Snider from recording another construction lien against DEB's property for the same work. The district court also correctly concluded Snider forfeited its construction lien created and attached as a matter of law under N.D.C.C. sections 35-27-02 and 35-27-03 when it failed to comply with DEB's demand to enforce the lien. View "Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the notice and time requirements of the Right to Repair Act (the act), Civil Code section 895 et seq. The Court granted petitioner William Blanchette's petition for a writ of mandate and directed that the trial court vacate its order staying proceedings pending Blanchette's compliance with the act. Blanchette's compliance with the act was relieved by virtue of real party GHA Enterprises, Inc.'s (GHA) failure to timely acknowledge receipt of Blanchette's notice of a claim. "Contrary to GHA's argument, the act's goal of promptly resolving claims without resort to litigation cannot be achieved by permitting homebuilders to serve tardy responses to claims or to ignore them entirely." View "Blanchette v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 1991 and 1992, defendant Rodney Bull was sentenced to two extended-term sentences, the second of which was imposed for crimes that occurred before defendant’s first sentencing took place. In 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.J.S.A.2C:44-5(b)(1) prohibited the imposition of a second discretionary extended-term sentence for an offense committed before entry of the first extended-term sentence. There is no question that defendant’s second extended-term sentence would have been illegal under “New Jersey v. Hudson,” (209 N.J.513 (2012)). The question this case presented for the Court’s review was whether “Hudson” should be applied retroactively. The Court found “Hudson” : “illuminated a longstanding rule of law rather than announce[d] a new one.” The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s determination that “Hudson” applied retroactively. Defendant’s second extended-term sentence was remanded for re-sentencing. View "New Jersey v. Bull" on Justia Law

The Riverwalk at Arrowhead Country Club and Magnolia North Horizontal Property Regime developments were constructed between 1997 and 2000. After construction was complete and the units were sold, the purchasers became aware of significant construction problems, including building code violations, structural deficiencies, and significant water-intrusion problems. In 2003, the purchasers filed suit to recover damages for necessary repairs to their homes. Lawsuits were filed by the respective property owners' associations (POAs), which sought actual and punitive damages for the extensive construction defects under theories of negligent construction, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of warranty. As to the Riverwalk development, individual homeowners also filed a class action to recover damages for the loss of use of their property during the repair period. The defendants in the underlying suits were the related corporate entities that developed and constructed the condominium complexes: Heritage Communities, Inc. (the parent development company), Heritage Magnolia North, Inc. and Heritage Riverwalk, Inc. (the project-specific subsidiary companies for each separate development), and Buildstar Corporation (the general contracting subsidiary that oversaw construction of all Heritage development projects), referred to collectively as "Heritage." The issues presented to the Supreme Court by these cases came from cross-appeals of declaratory judgment actions to determine coverage under Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policies issued by Harleysville Group Insurance. The cases arose from separate actions, but were addressed in a single opinion because they involved virtually identical issues regarding insurance coverage for damages. The Special Referee found coverage under the policies was triggered and calculated Harleysville's pro rata portion of the progressive damages based on its time on the risk. After review of the arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Special Referee in the Magnolia North matter, and affirmed as modified in the Riverwalk matter. View "Harleysville Group Ins. v. Heritage Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over the construction of a backyard patio at Defendant’s property. Defendants, the property owners, hired a general contractor, who contracted with Plaintiff for masonry work. Plaintiff filed suit, asserting that Defendants owed it money beyond that paid to it by the general contractor. At issue during the bench trial was whether Plaintiff was paid to construct Defendants’ backyard patio. The trial justice ultimately entered judgment for Defendants. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in his factual determinations and credibility assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice neither overlooked nor misconceived material evidence. View "A. Salvati Masonry Inc. v. Andreozzi" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for, inter alia, two counts of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence, ruling that the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act applied to the case despite ex post facto concerns. The jury then convicted Defendant as charged. The jury sentenced Defendant to life sentences without the possibility of parole for the murders. The court of criminal appeals upheld Defendant’s convictions and sentences. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court should modify the Tennessee ex post facto analysis found in Miller v. State in light of Collins v. Youngblood. The Supreme Court affirmed on separate grounds, holding (1) Miller v. State is overruled; (2) the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee Constitution has the same definition and scope as the federal ex post facto clause; (3) the application of the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act to this case was not an ex post facto violation; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining issues. View "State v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is when a notice of completion has been “issued” for purposes of determining the commencement date under Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.2055(1)(b) for Chapter 11’s construction defect statutes of repose. Appellants owned homes developed by Respondent. Approximately ten years after notices of completion of Appellants’ residences were signed, notarized, and recorded, Appellant served notices of construction defect on Respondent. Respondent moved to dismiss the claims on the grounds that their claims were untimely under Chapter 11’s statutes of repose for construction defect claims. Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that the statutes of repose began to run on the date the notices of completion were recorded rather than the dates the notices of completion were signed and notarized. The district court dismissed the claims, concluding that they were time-barred under the ten-year statute of repose in Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.203. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a notice of completion is “issued” on the date it is recorded, not when it is signed and notarized. View "Dykema v. Del Webb Communities, Inc." on Justia Law