Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

L.G. Barcus & Sons, Inc. (Barcus) was held liable to the Village of Hallam under the state One-Call Notification System Act (Act) for damage to Hallamâs sanitary sewer system. The Act established a one-call notification center so that excavators can learn of any underground facilities in the area where excavation is planned. The general contractor in this case complied with the Act. Acting under its contractorâs compliance, Barcus excavated on a private landownerâs property that ultimately ruptured Hallamâs sewer lines. Among the issues Barcus raised on appeal is whether the excavator can delegate its duties under the Act to another party to escape liability. The Supreme Court found that Barcus could not rely on anotherâs compliance to excuse its own noncompliance. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Cable company employee David Marble was injured when he touched a live electrical wire while attempting to splice a new cable into an old one. He brought suit against Deviney Construction Company, Inc. (Deviney), alleging that Deviney negligently dug up the electrical wire and failed to secure it. Before trial, the trial judge ruled that witnesses could only be called once. Deviney objected, arguing that the defense should not be âhandcuffedâ and should be able to call its witnesses in its own case-in-chief. Mr. Marble ultimately called fourteen witnesses in his case, including two of Devineyâs fact witnesses. During trial, Deviney renewed its objection to the trial judgeâs ruling, but the trial judge affirmed her earlier ruling. Mr. Marble would win a $2.5 million verdict against Deviney. Deviney appealed the verdict, arguing among other things, that the trial judgeâs ruling on the presentation of witnesses constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court agreed that âa court has broad discretion . . . to manage the pace of a trial by placing âreasonableâ limitsâ on the presentation of evidence but found that the trial judge âundulyâ interfered with Devineyâs presentation of its case. The Court reversed the trial courtâs decision, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Duane Peterson, Mid Am Group, LLC, and Mid Am Group Realty (collectively âMid Amâ), Village Homes at Harwood Groves, LLC (Village Homes), and First International Bank and Trust (First International) all had a stake in the insurance proceeds from a 2007 hail storm that damaged their respective properties. The trial court granted summary judgment to Village Homesâ Homeownersâ Association that represented ten property owners of the Village Homes community impacted by the storm. Mid Am developed and built the insured properties, but Mid Am had only sold ten of fifty units. When the hail storm hit, Mid Am submitted a proof of loss with its insurance company for the residences it still owned. First American was in the process of foreclosing on those unsold Mid Am properties. The insurance check was sent to Mid Am, but First American sued to get possession of the proceeds, and the individual owners were permitted to intervene. The court took control of the proceeds, and held that neither Mid Am nor First International were entitled to them. The court ruled that Mid Am, as fiduciary to the ten owners, should distribute the proceeds among them. Mid Am appealed, arguing that the ownersâ association did not have standing to intervene in the suit for the proceeds. The Supreme Court concluded that the ownersâ association had standing to intervene, and that it was not an error of the trial court to allow the owners to make their claim for the proceeds. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Defendant was arrested and charged with illegal entry into the United States and appeared at a group plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona as part of the district's "Operation Streamline." At issue was whether the taking of guilty pleas at a large group plea hearing violated a criminal defendant's rights protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The court held that any Rule 11(b)(1) error was harmless where defendant would not have changed her plea of guilty if the magistrate judge had conducted sixty-seven separate advisements of rights and that, although the district court failed to comply strictly with Rule 11(b)(2), such failure was not plain error where the record reflected that defendant's plea was fully informed and the record did not demonstrate that such a plea would have changed if the magistrate had expressly inquired into the voluntariness of her decision. The court also held that the record did not suggest that defendant misunderstood her rights or involuntarily entered her plea and there was no question that this procedure complied with due process. The court further held that the plea hearing did not deprive defendant of her right to counsel where she was provided with adequate, even superior, representation by counsel and failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had not been temporarily separated from her during the group advisement. Accordingly, the court confirmed defendant's conviction and sentence.

Respondents Dr. Rajbir Sarpal and his wife Carol purchased a parcel of property in 2003 on which they built their home. The property was encumbered by two easements reserved by the City of North Oaks for a future trail. The Sarpals wanted a shed on their property, and in 2006, went to the City to obtain the necessary permits. A City employee gave Dr. Sarpal an "as-built" survey in order to obtain the necessary permits, but the survey was dated to a time before the Sarpals' home was built. Dr. Sarpal, acting as his own general contractor, drew up the plans, submitted them to the requisite authorities, and built the shed on his property. He would later find out that the shed encroached on the City's two easements. Dr. Sarpal petitioned the local zoning board for a variance in order to save the shed, but was denied. The City sued to have the shed removed. The court dismissed all of the City's claims, holding that because the Sarpals relied on the survey given to them by the City, the City was equitably estopped from suing for the easements now. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that when a government entity makes a "simple mistake" when providing a document to a party upon which the party relies to obtain building permits and the government approves that permit, the mistake is not wrongful conduct sufficient to support the conclusion that the government is equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances.

The State, through its Division of Administration, Office of Facility Planning & Control, (State), issued a project manual to solicit bids for the removal and replacement of cabins at Bayou Segnette State Park. The manual included a bid form that set the procedure and conditions for submitting bids for the project. A joint venture of several companies submitted the lowest bid. Respondent Infinity Surety Agency (Infinity) wrote the bid-bond to the joint venture's winning bid. The State would later discover that Infinity was not qualified to write surety bonds on public works projects. The State notified the joint venture and Infinity that its bid was forfeited, and it rebid the entire project at a higher price. The State subsequently sued the joint venture and Infinity for the difference between its bid and the total of the rebid. The joint venture and Infinity filed peremptory exceptions of "no cause of action," alleging that the State's petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Respondents argued that the State should have rejected their bid, rather than incur damages when it found the surety bond was deficient. The trial court found that the bid was "non-responsive" and should not have been accepted by the State. The appellate court agreed, holding that the State should have been more careful when reviewing bids. The Supreme Court found that Respondents' exceptions should have been overruled. "Rather than focusing on the allegations in the petition, both courts below apparently made a factual determination that [the joint venture's] bid was non-responsive... and then based their rulings sustaining the exceptions on that determination." The Court concluded that using the exceptions to dismiss the State's claims was improper. Accordingly it reversed the holdings of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The City of New Orleans appealed a jury verdict for Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church finding that the city violated the church's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by demolishing the church building without notice. At issue was whether the suit should be dismissed because the church's procedural and substantive due process claims were unripe. The court dismissed the suit as unripe where the church did not allege a substantive due process claim that was independent of its procedural due process claim and where the court could not address the procedural due process claim without knowing the outcome of the takings claim, which was not before the court.

Petitioner requested a judgment of acquittal on the charge of felony criminal mischief where defense counsel argued that the state failed to establish a prima facie case that the damage to the doors that petitioner drove into was one thousand dollars or more, the threshold amount for the felony charge. At issue was whether the Third District Court of Appeal properly relied on a "life experience" exception to the general rule that a state must establish the amount of damage to prove felony criminal mischief. The court quashed the Third District's decision, disapproved of Jackson v. State, and other decisions in this context that applied to the "life experience" exception and held that before a defendant could be convicted of felony criminal mischief, the state must prove the amount of damage associated with the criminal conduct.

Appellant Don Phillips was the sole shareholder and officer in Crystal Lake Land Developers, Inc.(CLLD). In 1979, CLLD began developing Crystal Pines, and deeded all the roads in Crystal Pines to the Crystal Lake Road Company. In the mid 1980s, the Road Company operated as a simple homeowners association, but eventually changed its name to Crystal Pines Homeowners Association (HOA). CLLD attempted to execute a second deed to reflect the change of the Road Companyâs name to the HOA. The second deed stated that the HOA would be responsible for fixing the roads in Crystal Pines. In 1980, CLLD constructed a boat ramp that many of the homeowners used regularly. In 2004, CLLD gated and locked the boat ramp, and later conveyed title of the ramp to his son. The son then transferred title of the ramp to the Crystal Pines Yacht Club, which continued to keep the ramp locked from the residents. The HOA filed suit against Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club over who was responsible for maintaining Crystal Pinesâ roads, and for access to the boat ramp. The master-in-equity ruled in favor of the HOA, and Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club appealed. The Supreme Court found the deed in question unambiguous pertaining to who was responsible for fixing the roads. The Court found that CLLD and Phillips are not responsible for maintaining all of Crystal Pinesâ roads, only those roads they damage as a result of their development efforts. However, the Court found the mater did not err in finding that the HOA had established a prescriptive easement in its use of the boat ramp. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower courtâs decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that which it reversed.

Appellant Don Phillips was the sole shareholder and officer in Crystal Lake Land Developers, Inc.(CLLD). In 1979, CLLD began developing Crystal Pines, and deeded all the roads in Crystal Pines to the Crystal Lake Road Company. In the mid 1980s, the Road Company operated as a simple homeowners association, but eventually changed its name to Crystal Pines Homeowners Association (HOA). CLLD attempted to execute a second deed to reflect the change of the Road Companyâs name to the HOA. The second deed stated that the HOA would be responsible for fixing the roads in Crystal Pines. In 1980, CLLD constructed a boat ramp that many of the homeowners used regularly. In 2004, CLLD gated and locked the boat ramp, and later conveyed title of the ramp to his son. The son then transferred title of the ramp to the Crystal Pines Yacht Club, which continued to keep the ramp locked from the residents. The HOA filed suit against Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club over who was responsible for maintaining Crystal Pinesâ roads, and for access to the boat ramp. The master-in-equity ruled in favor of the HOA, and Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club appealed. The Supreme Court found the deed in question unambiguous pertaining to who was responsible for fixing the roads. The Court found that CLLD and Phillips are not responsible for maintaining all of Crystal Pinesâ roads, only those roads they damage as a result of their development efforts. However, the Court found the mater did not err in finding that the HOA had established a prescriptive easement in its use of the boat ramp. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower courtâs decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that which it reversed.