Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner and Washington resident Delbert Williams was employed by an Idaho employment agency. The agency regularly sent him to work for Pro-Set Erectors, an Idaho construction subcontractor. In 2007, Pro-Set was hired by Respondent Leone & Keeble (L&K), a general contractor. L&K is a Washington company. Later that year, Petitioner was injured on the job. He filed a claim with the Idaho State Insurance Fund, who accepted his claim and issued workers' compensation payments. In late 2008, the payments stopped. Petitioner filed suit against L&K in Washington, but the trial court dismissed his petition citing lack of jurisdiction over Petitioner's Idaho workers' compensation claim. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over Petitioner's claim: "our courts below...seem to have given deference to opinions of the Idaho courts" instead of applying Washington law. L&K argued that because Petitioner received benefits from Idaho, he was barred from bringing the same claim in Washington. Petitioner's claim was allowed under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act, which fell under the jurisdiction of Washington courts. The Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and remanded Petitioner's case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Richard Loweke was an employee of an electrical subcontractor. Defendant Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Company was also a subcontractor. Both parties were hired for work on a construction project at the Detroit Metro Airport. Plaintiff was injured at the site when several cement boards fell on him. Defendant's employees placed the boards against the wall. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed Plaintiff no duty that was "separate and distinct" from the contractual duties it owed to the general contractor. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had a common-law duty to avoid physical harm to others from its own actions. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the trial and appeals courts misinterpreted Michigan law with respect to "duty." The Court held that the assumption of contractual obligations does not limit the common law tort duties owed to others in the performance of the contract. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff John Stuart decided to build a new house on a small farm. He contacted his insurance agent of nineteen years, Defendant Ronald Pittman for "course-of-construction" insurance to cover any problems in the course of building his house. Mr. Pittman discussed the scope of coverage that the policy would provide. Relying on Mr. Pittman's oral assurance of what the policy would cover, Plaintiff agreed to it. Construction started in 2003. Plaintiff received a premium statement, but not a written copy of the policy. An ice storm struck Plaintiff's building project. Plaintiff contacted Mr. Pittman to initiate an insurance claim. Mr. Pittman told Plaintiff that damage should be covered by the policy. In 2004, Plaintiff received a declaration page from Country Mutual Insurance Company, and found that damage to his house was not covered. Plaintiff brought an action against both Mr. Pittman and the Insurance Company alleging breach of the oral "policy" that he and Mr. Pittman agreed to at the onset of the building project. At the conclusion of the trial's evidentiary phase, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Plaintiff failed to prove that the oral insurance binder covered his project. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury would later rule in favor of Plaintiff. The verdict was overturned on appeal. The court held that there was no evidence from which a jury could have found in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the appellate court misinterpreted the Oregon law that required him to prove that the oral binder superseded the "usual exclusions" of the written policy. The Supreme Court found that the written policy was, as a matter of law, deemed to include all terms of the oral binder. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

A group of homeowners brought suit against respondent, a developer and general contractor. Respondent then filed a third-party complaint against appellant, its subcontractor, pursuant to the indemnity clause in their contract. During trial, the district court granted respondent’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury found respondent ninety-nine percent at fault, and the district court held appellant liable for the resulting judgment. Appellant appealed. At issue was whether an indemnity clause in a construction contract obligates the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for its partial negligence for constructional defects, regardless of whether the subcontractor is also negligent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the indemnification clause in the parties’ contract did not explicitly or expressly state that appellant would need to indemnify respondent for respondent’s own negligence but linked appellant’s indemnification duties to defects caused by appellant only.

Appellant brought an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The appellee argued that appellant’s appeal was untimely filed. To be timely, appellant was required to file its notice of appeal within thirty days of the order denying the motion to compel arbitration, which was entered on December 28, 2009. At issue was whether appellant’s January 4, 2010 motion to dismiss constituted a post-order motion that would have extended the time for filing the notice of the appeal under Ark. R. of App. P. Civ. 4(b). The Court concluded that because the motion substantively sought to correct procedural defects in a December 21, 2009 motion, the January 4 motion was not a new motion and was treated by the circuit court as one for reconsideration. Because it was a collateral motion, it did not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. The Court held the appellant’s notice of appeal filed on March 19, 2010 was untimely and dismissed the appeal.

After respondent was granted a permit by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (âMPUCâ) for routing and construction of a pipeline to deliver natural gas to an energy center within appellantâs city limits, appellant commenced an action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to require respondent to obtain a franchise from appellant to operate the pipeline. The district court dismissed, concluding that appellant did not have franchise authority over respondentâs pipeline, and the appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a municipality is authorized by Minn. Stat. 301B.01 to impose a franchise on a public utility that has constructed and operates a gas pipeline located on public property within the municipality, regardless of whether the pipeline itself supplies gas to the public; (2) a municipality is authorized by Minn. Stat. 216B.36 to impose a franchise on a public utility that serves customers within the municipality or that uses public property within the municipality to serve customers elsewhere; and (3) the issuance of a permit by the MPUC for the construction of a gas pipeline does not preempt pursuant to Minn. Stat. 216G.02 a municipal ordinance requiring a franchise for the operation of the pipeline after construction is complete.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, violation of G.L. c. 93A, 11, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations and defendants filed counterclaims. At issue, among others, was whether actions taken by an employer against a former employee could violate G.L. c. 151B, 4(4), and (4A), sections of the antidiscrimination law that respectively prohibited retaliation and interference with a protected right. The court held that an employer or other person could be liable to a former employee under these sections for retaliatory or interfering conduct that occurred after the employment relationship had terminated. The court also affirmed in part and reversed in part the remaining issues in case.

Appellants Bunn Builders, Inc. (Bunn) hired Appellees Richard Womack and Roy Turner (Womack & Turner) to paint the ground floor office of the Bunn Building in Arkadelphia. On August 19, 2004, a fire was reported at the building. The building sustained major structural damage as a result of the fire. Bunn insured the building through Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC). Within a few days, EMC hired investigators to find the cause and origin of the fire. The investigators asked Womack & Turner's liability insurance carrier Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Arkansas, Inc. (Farm Bureau) to preserve certain items for testing. In particular, they requested to test a halogen work lamp that the painters used on the Bunn job. EMC later sent a letter to Farm Bureau stating that EMC believed that the electrical components from the "electrical tools" used on the job were eliminated as a possible cause for igniting the fire. Testimony at trial by Womack & Turner revealed that EMC believed that the halogen lamp had been eliminated as a possible cause. However, EMC's investigators submitted reports identifying the lamp as the possible source of ignition. These reports were not sent to Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau wanted to do its own independent testing and asked EMC for the tools. EMC admitted that it had destroyed the items once its investigation was complete. Bunn and EMC sued Womack & Turner for negligence, alleging that the halogen lamp started the fire. In their response, Womack & Turner raised the issue of "spoliation," arguing that Bunn and EMC had a duty to preserve the evidence if they intended to sue for negligence. A trial was held, and the jury was given an instruction on "spoliation." The jury returned a verdict in favor of Womack & Turner. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bunn and EMC argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to instruct the jury on spoliation. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed the decision in favor of Womack & Turner.

There was a catastrophic failure at the Spokane waste water treatment plant. One man was killed, and two others were severely injured. The survivors, including Respondent Larry Michaels, successfully sued Appellant CH2M Hill, the engineering firm that worked for the city at the time of the accident. The City of Spokane, as employer of Respondents, was immune from liability under the Industrial Insurance Act. All parties agreed that the City was negligent. The issue at trial was whether CH2M Hill was also negligent. On appeal to the Supreme Court, CH2M Hill challenged the trial judge's rulings on its liability as well as twenty-six other findings of fact. Of importance here was whether the City's immunity could be imputed to CH2M Hill under the same insurance act. The Supreme Court dissected all twenty-six points in its review, and concluded that CH2M Hill was not entitled to the same immunity as the City. The Court agreed with all rulings of the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision in the case.

Petitioner appealed the district court's order denying him habeas relief where a jury convicted him of first degree murder of a police officer and the trial court imposed a death sentence. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying petitioner relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase; denied petitioner relief on his claim that counsel failed to investigate and present more detailed mitigation evidence at the penalty phase; and determined that petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel of appellate counsel for failure to challenge the trial court's impartiality was barred from federal review. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner habeas relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase where counsel did not proffer a defense counsel could not support and where, even if petitioner could show that counsel were ineffective for failing to proffer a voluntary intoxication defense, petitioner could not demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. The court also held that counsel did not fail to investigate and present more detailed mitigation evidence at the penalty phase where counsel made numerous attempts to secure a mental health expert and strategically decided not to present some of the mental health experts counsel consulted and where the penalty-phase jury was presented with identical evidence of the effects of long-term or continuous drug use that petitioner presented at the collateral hearing. The court further held that, because petitioner never raised his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the district court properly dismissed it.