Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from an award by Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA) of two competitively bid construction contracts on its Northern Intertie Project. In November 2001 GVEA awarded Global Power & Communications, LLC (Global) a $39.4 million contract (Contract NI-8) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River flats section. Later GVEA awarded Global an approximately $5.3 million contract (Contract NI-9) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River crossing and Fairbanks sections. Subsequently, after Global had been awarded NI-9 and before it had completed work on NI-8, Global presented GVEA with requests for additional compensation (RFIs) totaling approximately $2.4 million in connection with NI-8. GVEA responded that it found "no legitimate basis" to justify Global’s RFIs and rejected Global’s request for additional payment. Global also notified GVEA that Global would submit more RFIs, arising out of both NI-8 and NI-9. In all, Global sought additional compensation totaling $5.7 million under the two contracts. GVEA responded to Global denying most of the RFIs but indicated that it would approve a few and consider partial payment for a few others. Global sued, and a trial court ultimately held in GVEA's favor, awarding it costs under both the contract and the applicable state law. Global appealed, arguing among other things, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling in favor of GVEA. Upon review of the lengthy record from the trial court, the applicable legal authority and legislative history, and the two contracts in question, the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly vacated the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for: (1) a fee determination regarding GVEA’s "UTPA" claim against Global and (2) a new trial on causation and damages relating to GVEA’s breach of NI-9. View "ASRC Energy Services Power v. Golden Valley Electric" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant David Egan, a business manager for Defendant Foxhollow Construction and Trucking, Inc. (Foxhollow), met with Wayne Johnson of Defendant L.N. Johnson Paving, LLC (Johnson) to discuss a bid for excavation and paving work for a new public high school. Foxhollow wanted to bid on the project but lacked the requisite public works license. Johnson thought its license could cover Foxhollow if the two companies submitted a bid in Johnson's name. Egan submitted a subcontract bid in Johnson’s name to Plaintiff Harris, the general contractor for the school project, and was the successful bidder. Over the course of the business relationship, a contract dispute arose. Harris brought this action, alleging that (1) Foxhollow, Johnson, and another subcontractor breached their subcontracts with Harris. Egan filed a counterclaim for indemnification from Harris. The district court dismissed Foxhollow as a party for lack of proof of notice because there was no indication that Foxhollow was ever served. After a bench trial, the court granted Harris’ motion for "directed verdict" as to Egan’s counterclaim. The court concluded however that Harris failed to prove any of its remaining claims against any of the defendants and therefore was not entitled to relief. The court also awarded fees and costs to Johnson. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Harris argued that the district court: (1) erred in concluding Harris failed to prove contract damages; (2) erred in concluding that no defendant was unjustly enriched; (3) erred in concluding that no defendant is liable for fraud; (4) erred in concluding that Harris was not entitled to indemnity; (5) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion to amend findings and conclusion; (6) abused its discretion in granting fees and costs to Johnson; and (7) abused its discretion in denying Harris’ motion for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment except for its attorney fee awards, which were vacated. View "Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Construction & Trucking, Inc. " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was the City of Lewiston's rejection of a bid for a public works project on the grounds that the lowest bidder lacked sufficient experience for the project. In 2009, the City of Lewiston (City) advertised for bids to replace the irrigation system at the City golf course. Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. (Hillside) desired to bid on the project, but prior to doing so it sent a letter to City stating that if City insisted upon having qualifications other than a current Idaho public works license to bid on the project, the City must follow the Category B procedures set forth in the Idaho Code and pre-qualify the bidders. Hillside asked that the qualification of prior experience be removed. City’s attorney denied the request, stating that City’s specifications and bidding process complied with state law. Hillside and four others submitted bids for the project. City notified the bidders that Hillside Landscape Construction submitted the lowest bid but that the company lacked the required experience specified within the bid documents. City awarded the contract to Landscapes Unlimited, the next lowest bidder. Hillside filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. The district court held that City complied with the bidding statutes, vacated a temporary restraining order, denied the motion for an injunction then dismissed Hillside’s complaint. In its review, the Supreme Court found that because the City chose to follow the "Category A" procedures set forth in the Idaho Code rather than the Category B procedures, the district court erred in holding that City could reject the bid on that ground. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hillside Landscape Construction, Inc. v. City of Lewiston " on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the grant of summary judgment against Landscapes Unlimited, LLC (LU) in which the district court: (1) applied I.C. 45-508 to postpone LU’s lien claim in golf course property to Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC’s (Hopkins) deed of trust covering the same, and (2) alternatively apportioned LU’s lien amount. Hopkins filed a complaint in district court seeking to foreclose on its deeds of trust because the borrowers were in default on both promissory notes. Hopkins alleged in the complaint that its interest in the subject properties had priority over LU’s lien claim. LU cross-claimed, alleging that its lien claim was superior to Hopkins’ deeds of trust because LU began work on the project in June 2006 and Hopkins did not record its first deed of trust until August. Accordingly, LU sought to foreclose its lien with respect to the parcels identified in its lien claim. LU filed a motion for summary judgment in December 2008 regarding the validity, superiority, and amount of its lien claim. Hopkins responded that LU’s lien, even if valid, did not have priority over Hopkins’ interest because LU failed to designate what portions of its lien amount are attributed to each parcel or improvement pursuant to I.C. 45-508. LU countered that a single lien claim could be filed, without segregating the amount, when the labor is provided pursuant to a single contract and the work provided amounts to a single improvement. The district court orally ruled that LU’s lien claim on the four parcels at issue was superior to Hopkins’ interest pursuant to I.C. 45-506. Because the Supreme Court found that I.C. 45-508 was inapplicable to LU’s lien claim and that equitable apportionment was not an appropriate alternative remedy where I.C. 45-508 does not apply, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC " on Justia Law

A construction company solicited a bid from a subcontractor to perform concrete work. The construction company provided a plan and bid schedule. The subcontractor responded with a proposal, which the construction company accepted. The subcontractor carried out the subcontract as it understood the terms. After the work was completed, the subcontractor discovered it had inadvertently underbid on the project. In the ensuing lawsuit, the superior court granted partial summary judgment to the construction company with respect to all damages claimed in relation to the bidding error. The subcontractor appealed the partial summary judgment order, claiming breach of an implied warranty that the plans and specifications would be sufficient, and arguing that the superior court erred by applying the theory of unilateral mistake to the case. Because the construction company did not breach the implied warranty and the subcontractor committed a unilateral mistake for which it bore the risk, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether property damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship is an "ocurrence" for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. The issue arose from the appeals of Plaintiffs-Appellants Greystone Construction, Inc., The Branan Company, and American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American) who all appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant National Fire & Marine Insurance Company (National). Greystone was the general contractor that employed multiple subcontractors to build a house in Colorado. As is common along Colorado’s front range, the house was built on soils containing expansive clays. Over time, soil expansion caused the foundation to shift, resulting in extensive damage to the home’s living areas. The homeowners sued Greystone for damages, alleging defective construction by the subcontractors who installed the foundation. Greystone was insured under CGL policies provided by two insurers. American provided policies for 2001 to 2003, and National provided policies for 2003 to 2006. The American and National policy periods did not overlap. Greystone tendered a claim to American and then National. National denied it owed Greystone any defense. In district court, the builders and American sought to recover a portion of their defense costs from National. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that damage arising from a poor workmanship may fall under a CGL policy’s initial grant of coverage, even though recovery may still be precluded by a business-risk exclusion or another provision of the policy. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Greystone Construction v. National Fire & Marine" on Justia Law

Employers Mutual Casualty Company (Employers Mutual) appealed a circuit court's denial of its motion to intervene in a pending case. Holman Building Company was sued by multiple homeowners who claimed their homes were poorly built from inferior building materials with poor quality workmanship. In 2010, Employers Mutual moved to intervene in the action, asserting that it had issued Holman commercial general-liability and umbrella policies that covered some if not all of the allegations made by the homeowners. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Employers Mutual's permissive intervention: "given the complexity of this case, the trial court was clearly within ints discretion to deny Employers Mutual's request to intervene for the purpose of obtaining a bifurcated trial of insurance-coverage issues or a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories ... this case provides a prime example of the need for discretion in a trial court's ruling on an insurer's motion for permissive intervention." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the insurance company's intervention. View "Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Holman Building Co., LLC et al. " on Justia Law

While making a delivery during the course of his employment, Appellant George Pool walked through a stream of running water that flowed across a parking lot. As a result, Appellant slipped and fell on black ice and suffered injuries. Appellant sued Defendants, the construction company that allegedly pumped the water into the parking lot and the owner of the parking lot, alleging negligence. Several additional defendants were subsequently added. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the original defendants and the two defendants named in Appellant's amended complaint on the ground that Appellant had assumed the risk of his injury. Appellant appealed. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the original defendants because Appellant did not assume the risk of his injury as a matter of law; (2) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of one later-named defendant and the dismissal in favor of the other later-named defendant; and (3) disavowed the reasoning related to assumption of the risk in Allen v. Marriott Worldwide Corp. View "Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

After the district court determined that the parties involved in this appeal were not in a special relationship, a jury found Appellants Eric Rolland and Rolland Building Corporation not negligent in an incident in which a skid loader attachment used to perform landscaping at Respondent Bradley Domagala's home fell on Respondent's foot, resulting in the amputation of three toes. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellants did not have a specific legal duty to warn Respondent arising in the context of a special relationship, but (2) Appellants had a general duty to warn as an exercise of the general duty of reasonable care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's special instructions to the jury that Appellants had no duty to warn and no duty to protect Respondent were misleading as to the crucial elements of duty and breach of duty, and (2) the instructions were prejudicial to Respondent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Domagala v. Rolland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of appeals in "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" (641 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2011)): "[i]s the proposed jury instruction in this case, which state[d] that '(a) Defendant may be held liable for an inadvertent trespass resulting from an intentional act,' a correct statement of Louisiana law when the trespass at issue is the severing of an underground cable located on property owned by one of the alleged trespass[e]rs, and the property is not subject to a servitude by the owners of the underground cable but only to the contractual right to keep it, as an existing cable, underneath the property?" MCI alleged that co-Defendant James Joubert negligently excavated with a backhoe in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act. MCI alleged Defendant Wayne Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. The underground cable at issue was buried under land owned by Hagan. After a trial in the federal district court, a jury found for Hagan and Joubert. MCI appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Upon review of the issue presented by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: the proposed jury instruction in this case was not a correct statement of Louisiana law. View "MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. Hagan" on Justia Law