Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Andrews was designated as contractor for improvements to the sewage system, in a no-bid process involving kickbacks and bribery, having made numerous false statements in the bond application package. After the contract was terminated, he submitted a claim of $748,304, based on false statements and duplicate charges. Evidence indicated that Andrews was not capable of the project work and that the entire scheme was fraudulent. He was convicted of one count of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1346, and 2, one count of program fraud, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and 2, one count of making a false claim upon the Government of the Virgin Islands, 14 V.I.C. 843(4), and one count of inducing a conflict of interest, 3 V.I.C. 1102, 1103, and 1107. The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing. Errors in the indictment and jury instructions concerning honest services fraud did not affect substantial rights. Although the 151-month term of imprisonment was within the statutory maximum for Counts Two through Five, it exceeded the statutory maximum for Counts One and Six; it was not possible to determine whether the sentence was legal as to each count View "United States v. Andrew" on Justia Law

An owner and contractor entered into an agreement for the construction of a new home. During construction, the owner refused to pay the contractor after discovering markups on the cost of materials. In response, the contractor halted construction and filed an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. The contractor subsequently filed a petition to foreclose the mechanic's lien. Although the contractor did not complete construction, the district court found the contractor rendered substantial performance under the contract and entered a judgment against the owner. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the court of appeals and reversed the district court, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the contractor had substantially completed work for the owner. Remanded. View "Flynn Builders, L.C. v. Lande" on Justia Law

Northstar Battery Company, LLC ("Northstar"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Cullman Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Northstar's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Apel Steel Corporation ("Apel") and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The case stemmed from a contract in which Apel Steel was working as a subcontractor for a battery manufacturing plant in Springfield, Missouri. Northstar Battery, owner of the plant, contracted with Walton Construction to serve as general contractor. Apel had further subcontracted a portion of its work to JS Nationwide, who erected structural steel at the plant. Sparks from welding started a fire which resulted in the destruction of property/equipment, and caused heat and smoke damage in the affected area of the plant. The contract between Apel and Walton contained a provision by which Apel allegedly waived all rights against JS Nationwide. Counts against Northstar alleged negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, misrepresentation and conspiracy. Northstar moved to dismiss citing lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding that Apel failed to carry its jurisdictional burden, the Supreme Court held that the trial court "clearly" erred in denying Northstar's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court granted Northstar's petition and issued the writ. View "Apel Steel Corporation v. JS Nationwide Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a seventy-five-day lien notice sent by Appellant, Ground Zero Construction, to Appellees, Walnut Creek, LLC and Rees Development, complied with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-115(e)(2)(C)(i), which requires that the notice contain a "general description of the labor, service, or materials furnished." The lien notice was provided in connection with sums owed and unpaid for labor and materials provided to Appellees for the construction and improvements of water and sewer for a subdivision. The circuit court concluded that the notice did not comply with the materialman's statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ground Zero's description of the labor, service, or materials furnished did not comply with the statute because Ground Zero essentially provided no description at all. View "Ground Zero Constr. v. Walnut Creek, LLC" on Justia Law

Three primary insurers and one excess carrier appealed the district court's determination on summary judgment of their duties to defend a contractor who allegedly was responsible for a fire that occurred during construction. The district court held that the three primary insurers must split the costs initially spent by one of them defending the insured, while the excess insurer could not recover any of its defense costs from the primary insurers. The court concluded that National Union could seek reimbursement for its defense costs from Continental, Columbia, and North American through contractual subrogation. The district court did not err in its allocation of Continental's defense costs among Continental, Columbia, and North American. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in part and reversed in part, and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. North American Specialty Ins., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a contractual dispute between the city and its contractor and sub-contractor concerning the design and construction of an underground parking garage. At issue was whether the city's petition for a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to decide whether that court erred when it determined the trial judge did not err when, having been presented with a motion to recuse him, he denied the motion rather than referred it to another judge. The court held that, since the affidavits at issue raised a reasonable question about the trial judge's impartiality that required the assignment of the motion to recuse to another judge, the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial judge's denial of the motion to recuse for failure to meet the requirement of USCR 23.5. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Mayor & Alderman of the City of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., et al." on Justia Law

Circle Y filed a complaint alleging, among other things, breach of contract when the school district terminated a construction management services contract with Circle Y. The trial court denied the school district's motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that, in light of the determination by the court of appeals that the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss because Circle Y's complaint alleged facts that, when taken as true, established that the contract was not void as a matter of law due to voter approval of the educational local option sales tax, it was not necessary for the court of appeals to construe OCGA 20-2-506(h) in order to resolve the appeal. Accordingly, the court remanded to the court of appeals with direction that it vacate that portion of the Division order that addressed OCGA 20-2-506. View "Greene Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Circle Y Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a subcontractor that properly performs electrical work on a jobsite, then locks up the work and transfers control to the property owner, owes a duty of care to an employee of the owner electrocuted six days later when the owner fails to deenergize the work site in contravention of various warnings and regulations. The district court granted summary judgment to the subcontractor, holding that the subcontractor owed no duty to the employee because it did not have control of the switchgear box when the employee was injured. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that, under the circumstances, the subcontractor owed no duty of care to the employee. View "McCormick v. Nikkel & Assocs." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the assault of another inmate. He retained trial counsel to pursue his appeal of right, but the attorney failed to timely file. He filed delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit. The Michigan Supreme Court denied appeal. Defendant pursued state collateral proceedings and filed a motion for relief in the trial court, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to timely pursue appeal. The trial court denied the motion, and the higher courts denied subsequent applications for leave to appeal the denial. The district court conditionally granted a habeas petition, finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely pursue appeal of right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, prejudice is presumed with no further showing. Appellate review of the denial of collateral relief is not a sufficient substitute for direct appeal; an applicant denied leave to appeal does not receive the benefit of oral argument, nor does the defendant have a right to appointed counsel on post-conviction review. View "Glover v. Birkett" on Justia Law

The suit, against law enforcement officers and the county, claimed denial of equal protection in failure to respond to complaints about gang harassment. The district court, interpreting the pro se complaint as concerning inadequate police protection, dismissed. The Seventh Circuit panel interpreted as charging defendants with arbitrarily providing less police protection to than to other residents, a "class of one" discrimination claim, but concluded that the claim failed, absent an allegation of personal animosity. On hearing case en banc, the court split three ways, affirming the dismissal by tie vote. Four judges (with a concurring opinion) stated that a "class of one" plaintiff must establish intentional discrimination by state actors who knew or should have known that they had no justification, based on their public duties, for singling him out for unfavorable treatment. The opinion stated that class-of-one suits should not be permitted against police officers or police departments. The complaint did not allege personal motives. "Rightly or wrongly they thought him a paranoid pest obsessed with motorcycle gangs." Four dissenters indicated that plaintiff should be allowed to replead and that the standard, which does not require mindreading," is the rational-basis test. View "Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp." on Justia Law