Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

Winforge claimed that defendants breached a hotel development agreement between the parties, causing delay and costs that caused Winforge to default on the separate construction loan agreement between the parties. Defendants cross-claimed that Winforge breached the development agreement. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants and found that the parties had never entered into a final, enforceable contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even a signed writing is not a contract if there is no mutual assent or “distinct intention common to both;” the parties continued to exchange new drafts of the Scope of Work even after they had signed the Agreement. To the extent that defendants incurred any obligations, their failure to perform was not a breach because that failure was due to Winforge’s deficient performance of Winforge’s duties. View "Winforge, Inc. v. Coachmen Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Budrik sued Wegman for injuries sustained in an accident on a construction site managed by Wegman and was demanding almost presented a realistic possibility of a potential loss above the policy limit, $1 million), but failed to warn Wegman of this possibility. Wegman sued Admiral for failure to act in good faith, alleging that it would promptly have sought indemnity from its excess insurer, AIG (policy limit $10 million). Budrik filed suit four years before Wegman notified AIG, which denied coverage for failure to timely notify. Budrik obtained a judgment of slightly more than $2 million. The district court dismissed Wegman’s suit against Admiral, and, on remand, granted a stay, pending state court resolution of Wegman’s suit against AIG. The Seventh Circuit dismissed appeal of the stay. Although Wegman’s suit against Admiral in federal court and against AIG in state court, are related, they do not satisfy the conditions for abstention.; the district court is not finished with the case. The stay really is a stay, and not a dismissal. View "R.C. Wegman Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Mid-Continent Casualty Company ("Mid-Continent") brought a declaratory judgment action seeking determination of its coverage obligations related to construction defect litigation. Defendant-Appellee, The Village at Deer Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. (the "Association"), moved to dismiss, requesting that the district court not exercise jurisdiction over Mid-Continent's action. Weighing the five factors set forth in "State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mhoon," (31 F.3d 979, 982–83 (10th Cir. 1994)), the district court declined jurisdiction in favor of resolution in Missouri state court and dismissed the action. Mid-Continent appealed, arguing the district court's application of the "Mhoon" factors amounted to an abuse of discretion. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed its order granting the Association's motion to dismiss. View "Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Greater Midwest Builders, LTD" on Justia Law

Torrance Bunch and Fernando Sanchez-Garcia were each convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The jury also found Bunch guilty of three counts of distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, Bunch alleged that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Sanchez-Garcia contended that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and committed other trial-related errors. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by repeatedly rejecting all options except self-representation, after having been warned of the consequences, Bunch necessarily chose self-representation, and thus, the district court's ruling did not violate Bunch's rights under the Sixth Amendment; (2) the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were not improper, and thus Sanchez-Garcia was not entitled to a mistrial; (3) the district court did not commit plain error by proceeding with a joint trial; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a recording of a telephone call into evidence. View "United States v. Sanchez-Garcia" on Justia Law

After agreeing to purchase a new townhouse, the Smiths leased it back to the builder, Ryan Homes, to use for six months as a model home. Ryan Homes converted the garage into a sales office. When the Smiths took possession, they used the converted garage as additional living space. The developer sought a mandatory injunction forcing the Smiths and Ryan Homes to convert the space back to a functional garage. The chancellor ruled in favor of defendants. The recorded subdivision plan and declaration of restrictions do not prohibit conversion of a garage to living space. The partition wall of the garage conversion is not sufficiently visible to the public to trigger an architectural review requirement and fears about parking problems are overly speculative. View "Reybold Venture Grp. XI-A, LLC. v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, 40, requires a conservation commission to issue a decision on a requested order of conditions within 21 days after holding a public hearing on the applicant's notice of intent to perform work covered by the act. Following the owner’s request for an extension, a hearing on his application for construction of a pile-supported pier and floating dock was held on April 6; the commission voted to deny the application on April 27 and mailed notice on April 28, 22 days after the hearing. The department reversed, based on the commission’s failure to timely act. In the meantime, the commission issued an enforcement order, based on work being done on the applicant’s property. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an applicant may waive the statutory time restriction, but any waiver must be voluntary in fact, its duration defined and reasonable in length, and notice of the waiver's duration must be a matter of public record, available to all interested persons. In this case, the applicant is entitled to proceed under the order issued by the department. View "Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions of four counts of child enticement after the circuit court declined to suppress an incriminating statement Defendant made to police officers who were conducting a follow up investigation of incriminating admissions that Defendant made to his probation agent during a compelled polygraph examination. Defendant claimed that his admissions to the agent were subject to use and derivative use immunity, and that the derivative use immunity covered the subsequent statement he made to the police, even though this statement was preceded by a valid Miranda warning. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant's statement to officers was subject to derivative use immunity and could not be used in any subsequent criminal trial; and (2) Defendant's compelled statement to his probation agent, his subsequent statement to the police, and any evidence derived from either statement must be suppressed in any criminal trial. View "State v. Spaeth" on Justia Law

In this breach of contract case, the Supreme Court considered whether the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on several rulings by the district court that Defendant claimed materially affected his rights and denied him a fair trial. The district court refused Defendant's request to exclude exhibits disclosed by Plaintiff the day before trial in violation of the district court's pretrial scheduling order. Additionally, the district court refused the request to declare a mistrial when Plaintiff testified to certain matters in violation of the district court's stipulated ruling on a motion in limine and denied Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial because it concluded the district court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibits into evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the district court, holding that Defendant had not shown the district court committed any error in its decisions during the trial that substantially prejudiced Defendant's rights to a fair trial. Thus, Defendant was not entitled to a new trial. View "Fry v. Blauvelt " on Justia Law

Defendants were employees of subcontractor that provided concrete for Boston's Central Artery/Tunnel project, the "Big Dig." The government charged that over nine years, the company knowingly provided concrete that failed to meet project specifications and concealed that failure by creating false documentation purporting to show that the concrete provided complied with specifications. Several employees, including defendants, were convicted of mail fraud, highway project fraud, and conspiracy to defraud the government. The district court calculated the guidelines sentencing range as 87- to 108-months incarceration, then sentenced defendants to six months of home monitoring, three years of probation, and 1,000 hours of community service. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court's explanation ultimately supports the reasonableness of the sentences, based on its finding that the loss amount caused by the crimes, the most significant factor in determining the GSR, was imprecise and did not fairly reflect the defendants' culpability. The court also found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendants' conduct made the Big Dig unsafe in any way or that the defendants profited from the offenses and considered personal circumstances. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement obtained a report from German federal police indicating that the user of a particular IP address had child pornography on their computer. American officials traced the IP address, obtained the name and address of the customer whose account was associated with the address, verified the address (but not the apartment number) with post office and drivers’ records, and obtained a warrant. Neither the warrant nor any accompanying information mentioned Voustianiouk’s name. About a week later, agents arrived at the building and rang both buzzers because neither was marked. They saw a light from the second floor; a man came to the front door and confirmed that he was Voustianiouk. Officials did not explain that the warrant did not mention Voustianiouk’s name or that it clearly referred to the downstairs apartment, not the second floor. Officials discovered thousands of files containing child pornography on Voustianiouk’s computers. He admitted to viewing child pornography for more than one year. The district court imposed a five-year sentence. The Second Circuit vacated the conviction, holding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the government should have been prohibited from introducing evidence seized as a result of that search. View "United States v. Voustianiouk" on Justia Law