Justia Construction Law Opinion Summaries

A black-owned construction company was not invited to bid as general contractor on a major Boston public housing redevelopment project after participating in pre-construction work. Years earlier, the developer had called the company’s president to discuss possible involvement, but the parties disputed what promises, if any, were made during that conversation. The construction company performed pre-construction work and was later selected as general contractor for the first phase (Camden), but after performance and communication issues arose during that project, the developer chose a different, white-owned company for the second phase (Lenox). The construction company did not protest at the time but later sued, alleging breach of contract, quasi-contract, violation of Massachusetts consumer protection law, and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.The matter was first brought in Massachusetts state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on federal question jurisdiction. After discovery, the developer moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the developer, finding no enforceable contract or promise had been made regarding the Lenox phase, that the quasi-contract and Chapter 93A claims failed as derivative, and that there was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The First Circuit held that the summary judgment record did not contain evidence from which a reasonable jury could find an enforceable implied-in-fact contract or a promise sufficient for promissory estoppel. It further held that the plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding pretext or discriminatory intent under § 1981, given the legitimate business reasons cited for the company’s exclusion. Thus, summary judgment on all claims was proper. View "John B. Cruz Construction Co. v. Beacon Communities Corp." on Justia Law

In 2018, the Plaintiffs each purchased real estate in Cleveland, planning to rehabilitate and redevelop the properties. Before those purchases, Cleveland declared the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be demolished. Following the purchases, and after the Plaintiffs invested time and resources into renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them. After the demolition of the buildings, the Plaintiffs sued, arguing that the demolitions violated state laws and federal constitutional provisions. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Each Plaintiff received “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” After their purchases, Cleveland sent “new owner letters” via certified mail both to the property address and to each Plaintiff's statutory agent, including both the notice of condemnation and demolition order. Neither Plaintiff applied for required rehabilitation permits. View "First Floor Living LLC v. City of Cleveland, Ohio" on Justia Law

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the decision of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress his answers to the medical rule-out questions given subsequent to a traffic stop, holding that the ICA erred in affirming the district court's suppression of Defendant's answers to the medical rule-out questions.In granting Defendant's motion to suppress, the district court found that Defendant was subject to custodial interrogation without being given the required warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under this Court's decision in State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 511 P.3d 782 (Haw. 2022), Defendant was not in custody when he was asked the medical rule-out questions because the circumstances of the stop had not risen to those of a formal arrest. View "State v. Tronson " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court regarding several orders unfavorable to Plaintiff in this dispute over the development of a subdivision on property containing a floodplain within Lewis and Clark County, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.In its challenged orders, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims, denied Plaintiff's motion for a declaratory judgment that Mont. Code Ann. 76-5-109(4) is unconstitutional, dismissed Plaintiff's claims for inverse condemnation and nuisance, and dismissed Plaintiff's suit against the Montana Department of Transportation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim; (2) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim; (3) did not err in finding Mont. Code Ann. 76-5-109(4) was constitutional; and (4) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's remaining nuisance claims. View "Hamlin Construction & Development Co. v. Mont. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Powell, Ohio and dismissing Golf Village North LLC's claims brought under 28 U.S.C. 1983 for violating its procedural and substantive due process rights, holding that there was no error.Golf Village, a developer, sought to build a "residential hotel" on its property in Powell, Ohio but never filed the required zoning application. Instead, Golf Village requested that the City confirm the residential hotel was a permitted use of the property. The City directed Golf Village to file an appropriate application for "zoning Certificate approval" to receive an answer. Rather than reply, Golf Village sued the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Golf Village's procedural due process and substantive due process rights were not violated in this case. View "Golf Village North, LLC v. City of Powell, Ohio" on Justia Law

After Nygard removed his driveway and was about to pour a new one, an Orono inspector told Nygard that he needed a permit. The next day, Nygard finished the driveway and applied for a permit. The new driveway was narrower than the previous one. The city responded with a form, imposing several conditions. Nygard crossed out some conditions, initialed the modified form, and returned it. After several exchanges, the city notified Nygard that he must agree to the conditions or “this matter will be turned over to the prosecuting attorney.” Nygard did not acknowledge the conditions. A police officer drafted a statement of probable cause, alleging that “work had been completed without having first obtained a permit” and listing some alleged deficiencies in its construction. According to the Nygards, the police did not inspect the property and some allegations were not true.Nygard was acquitted of violating the city code. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the code was void for vagueness and alleging First Amendment retaliation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Nygard’s prosecution was not based on falsehoods. The report did not claim that the conditions were required by the code but that Nygard had not agreed to the conditions and had replaced a driveway without a permit. Any failure to investigate did not defeat probable cause; the city already knew that he installed a driveway without a permit. View "Nygard v. City of Orono" on Justia Law

In federal court, Plaintiff Timothy Martin sued the Department of Corrections (DOC) and three DOC-employed medical providers, alleging Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and medical malpractice under state law. Following the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the federal district court certified three questions of Washington state law to the Washington Supreme Court, all relating to whether RCW 7.70.150’s requirement of a certificate of merit for medical malpractice suits against state agents was constitutional. The Washington Court held that RCW 7.70.150 was invalid on its face based on Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 216 P.3d 374 (2009), and on statutory language that did not differentiate between private and public defendants. Because the Supreme Court answered certified question 1 in the affirmative, it did not reach the federal court's remaining questions. View "Martin v. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

Officers responded to a shooting in an apartment building's parking lot. Three victims were transported to the hospital. Officers observed a security camera in the window of apartment 1, pointed toward the parking lot. After interviewing two witnesses, Detective Dunn viewed video footage from a business across the street, which corroborated their account. He learned that Haney, an occupant of unit 1, was involved in a dispute with the sister of two shooting victims. Dunn obtain a warrant to search Unit 1; other officers executed the warrant. An officer moved clothes in the bedroom closet and saw a sawed-off shotgun. He also seized a baggie of white powder, a laptop, and cell phones from the bedroom. Other officers seized cameras, a computer monitor, a Kindle, shotgun shells, pieces of a scale with traces of drug residue, photographs, and documents bearing the names of Haney and Saddler.Saddler later unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence seized during the search and an incriminating statement she later made concerning the shotgun. The Eighth Circuit affirmed her subsequent conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The affidavit described facts that connected Haney to the shooting and created a fair probability that evidence that would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction would be found. Dunn’s reliance on the issuance of the warrant was objectively reasonable. In addition, the seizure of the shotgun satisfied the “plain view” exception. View "United States v. Saddler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of bail-jumping, one count for each scheduled trial he missed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in granting the State's Gillham motion to allow his former attorney to testify and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the District Court did not err by allowing Defendant's former attorney to testify as a state witness in his bail-jumping trial, and the testimony did not violate Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel; and (2) Defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims were unavailing. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law